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The innovations of radical Islam

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Summary

Islam's leading contemporary teachers have refuted the theological principles of extremist thinking. Radicalisation experiences are increasingly heard and explored. However, a gap in countering Islamic extremism exists, which this study seeks to identify and address. Requiring authority from the texts for their actions, radical ideologues alter classical ideas to contextualise violent interpretations. This is not an organic religious evolution or adaptation of meaning to address cultural crisis, but the selective goal-based reduction and revision of God's message. This study identifies those changes in meaning, and asks whether these are changes to religious matters, or forms of social innovation unacceptable to Islam. It uses a range of methodologies to triangulate factors of innovation found in academic typologies with an assessment of innovation in changes to key concepts and an analysis of the perspectives of Muslims.

An investigation of radicalism includes an attempted chronology, and a distillation of the key concepts that are important to radical and extremist thinking. After an exploration of relevant theories of innovation and of religious innovation, consideration is given to the usage and dimensions of *bidah*. This produces a working definition by which to assess the acceptability of key concepts.

To add to these assessments, a survey of Muslim perspectives shows that respondents whose practice of Islam was more frequent preferred greater literalism, and the majority of those who preferred literalism indicated radical ideologies to be prohibited bidah. Participants' wide range of views resulted in few significant correlations: this diversity reflects the typology mapping: radical ideologies are considered both as innovations and as not innovative at all. The study also reflected a range of understanding of bidah.

In concluding, I offer suggestions for practical application. These include emphasising the Qur'an over *ahadith*, re-examining Qur'anic abrogations and interpretations, and a potential way to assess new interpretations.

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The innovations of radical Islam

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Notes

Arabic terms are provided to aid definition of the English phrases used to represent them.

On the first use of an Arabic word, I have italicised it to show its origin. However, to avoid over-emphasis, this italicisation is discontinued where these terms occur frequently throughout the text or are also commonly used in English; examples include jihad, Qur'an and Shariah.

I have retained the spelling of the Arabic used in quotes and excerpts of the texts except where this might create confusion.

1 Introduction

Extremes occur in all religions, political persuasions and lifestyles. One particular range of extremist views is used to justify terrorism against both Muslims and non-Muslims. These views take a radical and selective view of the faith from which they claim legitimacy. Their reductions of the texts admit only a part of God's revelation. Islamic radicalism is not homogenous, but such groups and ideologies share identifiable characteristics and origins. I want to understand why these views occur, their basis in the texts and traditions of Islam, and offer potential ideas to counter them.

1.1 Theme and motivation

The revelation of the Qur'an is the Straight Path to God. It has inspired some of the most extraordinary human advances. In recent years, it has also apparently inspired devastating attacks on both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. This study asks whether Islamic radicalism is legitimate, or based on forbidden innovations.

Renewal and adaptation are inbuilt and even pre-approved in the classical framework of Islam. God's revelations as recorded in Islamic scriptures, together with the consensus of the worldwide community of Muslims, the *ummah*, enable interpretations and application to every time in history through the process of juristic reasoning, *ijtihad*.

While Islam has welcomed innovation in worldly matters such as technology, its traditions have arguably survived through the preservation of ritual worship – the rejection of innovation in religious practice. Religious matters are generally understood to be the Pillars of Sunni, Shi'a and Ismaili faith, and these vary across the traditions but commonly include prayer, *salah*; fasting, *sawm*; and pilgrimage, *hajj*. This orthopraxy creates an international community, continues the ways of the first Muslims, and links each worshipper to the practice of Muhammad himself. It is for

these reasons that Islam forbids innovation in religious matters. Nonetheless, I will show how modern extremists working to re-establish the Caliphate are changing or extending some of the key concepts in Islam that give context to worship and practice. And while all religions naturally evolve over time and to adjust to circumstance, this study will show how some of these deliberate changes are actually either forbidden innovations or impact on religious matters.

1.2 Need for and significance of the study

Extremist and sectarian Islamic thought and its real-world consequences feature regularly in the news, usually owing to loss of life. Around the world, Muslims themselves are most frequently the target of terrorist attacks; on the day I am writing this paragraph, 14 people at Friday prayers in a mosque in Pakistan were killed by a suicide bomber. It is worth stating that not all the atrocities claimed by Islamists and radical groups are carried out by practising Muslims – some are criminals operating under a flag of convenience.

Since the 1800s, throughout a long period of global geopolitical change, extremist ideologues have combined various strands of Islamist ideas, explicitly reviving Islam as a call to action against perceived threats.[1] Among others, Sayyid Qutb created 'unfulfilled mission' – the notion of what Muhammad might have achieved. In this way, he appeals to the thoroughly modern and individualistic, to the latent superhero. Similarly inspired by present-day notions of identity, lay interpretation and individual deeds are increasingly emphasised in radical ideologies. Ideologues have revised traditional Islamic concepts, creating displacement and opposition, and re-casting non-Muslims and even their God-fearing co-believers as legitimate targets, while justifying the un-Islamic use of 'any means' to achieve their goals.

In exploring the scope of 'radicalism', this study will focus on Muslims who have come to hold extreme and militant views. Such views arguably gain acceptability and even

[1] Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service (P) Ltd, 2002), p19

credence through their presence online, where traditional forms of spiritual direction are often sidelined. Counter-measures may be particularly significant within these online environments.

The academic significance of this study is its potential in deriving such counter-measures: assessing new interpretations and the permissibility of their innovativeness. Equipping the layperson through educational and outreach efforts can only help reinforce and spread the authentic message of Islam.

The Islamic State (IS) group is arguably the biggest 'brand' of radical Islam at the time of writing, succeeding Al-Qaeda in the chronology of broadcast terrorist action. To date there has been one significant rebuttal of their theological arguments. However, extremist groups and individuals re-define key concepts that bolster their cause. This is potentially more corrosive as it sets the context through which individuals make interpretations and frame debates. To that end, I intend to demonstrate how radical actors are deliberately altering some the most basic ideas of Islam in ways that run counter to the faith, and explore whether these alterations change worship or are contrary to the spirit of Islam[2].

1.3 Research objectives and methodology

My overall aim is to determine whether some of the key ideas of radicalism are innovation in religious matters, or changes in social matters, that oppose the spirit and intention of Islam. If the concepts important to radical ideologies can be proved as invalid using the same precepts on which the ideologies draw, they can be countered.

To achieve this I develop and apply three different datasets, and so the overall approach is a triangulation of research methods within a progressively-developing framework. I develop a qualitative mapping of typologies from literature, an inductive analysis of radical ideologies to derive the key concepts, and assess these against data

[2] Yusuf Al Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam* (London: Dar Al Taqwa Ltd, 2011), p31

from a survey that is analysed mostly quantitatively. This combined approach is required to look not only at the origin, development and academic assessment of ideas important to radicalism, but also to relate these with the lived experience and perception of Muslims today. This triangulation, combining quantitative and qualitative data to discover aspects of innovation, aims at convergence and the complementary strengthening of the findings.[3]

To help define my understanding of the term radicalism, I firstly compile and assess existing academic typologies of Islamic ideology, considering particularly the assessment of reason and types of knowledge, to create useful definitions and themes to assist in this study. My use of typologies thematically organises the attributes discovered within the academic literature.[4] I try to ensure a balance of perspectives and reduction of preconceptions in my 'mapping' of the compiled themes. The resulting visual representation creates a powerful diagnostic tool to understand the possible types of innovation involved within each theme described.

This is followed by review and analysis of the literature on radicalism and important ideologues. Through this, I attempt to sketch the development of ideas, and through informal narrative synthesis identify common concepts most important to radicalism, or where meaning has undergone recent extension for apparently political ends. A narrative approach is employed here to enable inclusion of some very diverse sources.

I will investigate whether the key concepts and their extensions constitute either innovation in religious matters – matters traditionally preserved and privileged under divine law – or are a form of innovation in social affairs that runs counter to the spirit and intention of Islam, *haram bidah*.

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[3] Todd D Jick, 'Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action', *Administrative Science Quarterly* vol 24, no 4 (1979) p604

[4] D Harold Doty & William H Glick, 'Typologies as a Unique Form of Theory Building: Toward Improved Understanding and Modeling', in *The Academy of Management Review* vol 19 no 2 (1994), p232

To confirm or inform conclusions drawn from the mapping of typologies and the literature review, I will survey the views of practising Muslims on innovation in religious matters and bidah. In my conclusions, I offer some thoughts on the possible practical applications.

1.4 Outline of the study

Chapter 2: The religious spectrum

I will compare and contrast radicalism to wider fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is a collective response to cultural change and potentially a selective transplantation of the past into the present, described by Riesebrodt as historical innovation.[5] A principal aim of extremist ideologies is the establishment of the Islamic System, *nizam*, in part seen as a restoration of a militant 'imagined community'.[6] Disagreement about whether fundamentalism is a recurring or modern phenomenon appears to depend on the causes attributed to it. As a response to crisis, radicalism tends more to reformism than simply revivalism, and to extremism in its views and actions.[7] In comparing thematically a variety of academic categorisations, I aim to operationalise the term 'radicalism'. My definition is based on a willingness to use violence for political goals. This militancy separates radicalism from some political Salafist or fundamentalist ideologies. Radical thinking is applicable across all traditions of Islam, and I explain my reluctance to describe radicals as jihadis.

I also focus on the importance of interpretation. The most literal readings of the Qur'an – and highest levels of imitation of the Sunnah – might be thought to result in very low levels of innovation. Qualifying and 'mapping' the apparent knowledge base and interpretation of different ideologies and approaches does not directly illustrate the level of innovation, but shows the basis for it in religious knowledge. I will show

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[5] Martin Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', in *Numan* vol 47, fasc 3 (2000), p276-277

[6] Columbia University Press, review 'Interview with Olivier Roy: Author of Globalised Islam: the Search for a New Ummah'. https://cup.columbia.edu/static/Interview-roy-olivier-globalized Accessed 02 October 2014

[7] Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass (eds), *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought* (London: Fontana Books, 1977), p522

how radical positions lie outside those described as traditional, liberal and modern, and relate more to narration and explicitly-understood knowledge. This is the first element in the triangulation of views on innovation in extremist ideologies.

Radicalism's selectivity, and changes to key concepts, both potentially affect religious matters and innovation. I explore the development of these ideas in chapter 3.

Chapter 3: Radicalism within Islam

A number of thinkers and writers have contributed to the development of radical thought, such as Anwar Al Awlaki, who asserts that declining to carry out violent jihad is a sin.[8] The popular ideologues of radicalism from the last two hundred years have drawn greatly on a few influential scholars from a much earlier period, notably medieval writer Ibn Taymiyyah. Mohammed Arkoun laments the 'archaeology of meaning' missing from contemporary Islamic readings.[9] The historicity of old concepts validates modern goals, but their meaning is altered to suit contemporary contexts.

I attempt to trace the interrelationships and influence of scholars and their contributions to extremism, in many cases, revisions of existing ideas rather than original thought. I will identify specific concepts with the goal of assessing their innovativeness in chapter 4.

Chapter 4: Innovation within Islam: worldly and religious matters

To assess the radical extensions and repurposing of concepts as innovation, I will examine how they relate to wider innovation theories. I will differentiate religious innovation from innovations in religious matters. I will introduce the classifications of bidah, showing that some practices are positive developments in social affairs, improving submission to God. I examine in turn the radical concepts of hijrah, takfir, tawhid, obligation and jihad, and the use of any means. Some recent changes to these

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[8] Jack Barclay, 'Challenging the Influence of Anwar Al-Awlaki, in Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence' http://www.icsr.info Accessed 28 August 2014, p8

[9] Mohammed Arkoun, 'Deconstructing Episteme(s)', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), p44

concepts are shown to constitute either *haram* bidah or innovation in worship, however advantageous to radical causes. This analysis is the second element in triangulating views on the innovation of Islamic radicalism.

Chapter 5: Muslim views on religious innovation in Islam

Lived experience is key in understanding the appeal of radical ideologies. I survey the perspectives of Muslims on innovation in worship, bidah, and descriptions for radical ideologies. The methodologies used in the survey are fully described in this chapter. Indicators of religious observance are used to devise a 'score' of religiosity showing relative participation and observance in everyday life. I relate the findings to the mapping of typologies, completing my triangulation of the innovativeness of radical Islam with academic descriptions and my inductive assessment.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

If Muslims consider that radical approaches include innovations in religious matters, or innovations going against the spirit of Islam, this offers a potential basis for countering radical ideologies. I will draw conclusions about the innovations of radical Islam and assemble the findings from across the study that may be useful as counterpoints.

1.5 Limitations and assumptions

As Sunni Islam constitutes over 85% of all Muslims[10] and is the version of Islam promoted by the largest radical groups, it potentially offers the best return on investment for any counter-radicalisation strategy. Therefore, while I hope to maintain a non-sectarian approach, the Sunni tradition is worth prioritising.

My searches and approaches are all in English, which excludes Arabic-language sources and survey responses. However, in common with the academic community, the larger radical groups offer recruitment and marketing materials in English. Key ideologues' writing is available in translation.

[10] Tahir Abbas, *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics – The British experience* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011), p23

The survey's implementation, anonymously and online, may inadvertently give priority to a particular set of views that in reality is not widely shared. I explore the potential artefacts and limitations involved the survey in chapter 5.

2 Describing radical Islam

To help define 'radicalism', I will briefly examine descriptions of fundamentalism in general, and compile and assess classifications of Islamic ideology. I aim to differentiate fundamentalism and radicalism and relate these terms to types of knowledge and levels of interpretation. From this, I will clarify my use and understanding of the term 'radicalism'.

2.1 Across all faiths

Fundamentalism is one of four overarching movements that exist across all faiths, traditions and sects. These are: minority culturalist; syncretic; fundamentalist, in which core beliefs reform and purify faith and society; and community-oriented groups, which prioritise social welfare using forms of liberation theology.[11] Faiths, traditions and sects combine aspects of one or more of these. This definition explicitly links fundamentalism with reformism and societal change. Fundamentalism is also provoked by change, especially when identities are threatened: moral judgements are refined and strengthened.

Sociologist Max Weber created two different classifications of religious attitudes that informed his thinking on economic engagement. He suggested economic success confirmed for individuals the righteousness of their religious beliefs.[12] Conversely, he felt someone's separation from the world either physically or symbolically represented a rejection of the effort they might have contributed to the economy. On this basis, Riesebrodt noted Weber's proposition that fundamentalism incorporated a rejection

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[11] Jeff Haynes, *Religion, Fundamentalism & Ethnicity: A Global Perspective*: *UNRISD Discussion Paper 65* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995). http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=265FAA83B0EA35EB80256B67005B67F6&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/265FAA83B0EA35EB80256B67005B67F6/$file/dp65.pdf Accessed 22 August 2014, p9

[12] Pawel Zaleski, 'Ideal Types in Max Weber's Sociology of Religion: Some Theoretical Inspirations for a Study of the Religious Field', *Polish Sociological Review* vol 3, no 171 (2010), pp320-321

of the world.[13] This perspective establishes fundamentalism as an 'other', albeit through the prism of economic value.

The term 'fundamentalist' implies a 'back to basics approach' and this usage began in descriptions of American Protestantism.[14] While none of the major faiths have defined their fundamental constituent parts[15], they have in common a re-statement of founding principles, and implied literalism, morality and patriarchy.

Emerson and Hartman note the militant aspect of religious fundamentalism.[16] They define nine characteristics of fundamentalist groups, both ideological and organisational.[17] However many of these characteristics, such as duality and messianism, might be considered classical aspects of traditions. The only characteristic offered by Emerson and Hartman that appears to me to be unique to fundamentalist thinking, as opposed to traditional religiosity, is that of selectivity.

Martin Riesebrodt identifies the historical invention of selecting and extrapolating one segment of history or culture into the present, enabling a 're-imagining' of identities.[18] These identities serve to psychologically separate individuals from contemporary lifestyles and decisions perhaps perceived as morally irreconcilable. Riesebrodt views fundamentalism in general as religious revival, a back-to-basics redevelopment of ideas in ways relevant to the current era and context.[19] Examples across religious history of fundamentalism in this sense might include the Protestant Reformation, and the development of liberation theologies.

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[13] Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', pp274-275

[14] Michael O Emerson and David Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism' in *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol 32 (2006), p131

[15] Malise Ruthven, *Fundamentalism – A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p9

[16] Emerson and Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism', pp130-131

[17] Emerson and Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism', p134

[18] Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', p271-272, p276-277

[19] John O Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994 (2nd ed)), p4

In contrast, Roger Stump argues that fundamentalism is modern, its defining characteristic being selective responses to modernity. Specifically, he holds that fundamentalism is a response to the trend of secularism.[20] Hindu nationalism (also called Hindu polity or Hindutva) is a possible example. As a response to colonialism, Hindu nationalism called for the re-prioritisation of indigenous and Hindu ways of thinking, rather than the adaptation of Western thought and institutions, and in this sense it is a fundamentalist movement.

Karen Armstrong also considers fundamentalism a phenomenon with modern origins. In parallel with Stump, she locates the cause within secularism. Armstrong has theorised that the replacement of myth by rationalism in the West led to the decline of religion in Europe.[21] She implies modern disdain for myth produces reactionary fundamentalist attitudes in individuals alienated by their beliefs. This theory might be weaker when considering the US. Myths surrounding the country's founding and development have emphasised the practice of Christianity and morality, not least through tele-evangelism and the association of political leadership with demonstrable Christian belief. I would argue that the US is a strongly mythic nation, founded on religious freedom, which has given rise to various groups holding fundamentalist ideologies – groups that strongly value their nation's founding myths. These fundamentalist ideologies are a cultural response based on an apparent estrangement of values, but not apparently on a lack of myth.

Other kinds of alienation are potential factors. Economic deprivation may contribute but it does not appear to be a common characteristic: extremists frequently come from urban environments.[22] Academic Farhaan Wali suggests that identity dislocation

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[20] Roger W Stump, 'When Faiths Collide: The Case of Fundamentalism', in *Clashes of Knowledge*, P Meusberger et al, Springer Science + Business Media, 2008 http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4020-5555-3_10 Accessed 11 April 2014, p176-180

[21] Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (London: Harper Perennial, 2000), p61, p40

[22] L Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics* (Columbia University Press, 2000), p136

is key in Islamic radicalisation.[23] A middle-class upbringing and education but lack of social acceptance, owing to racial or ethnic differences, may lead to real or perceived alienation, and actively enable radicalisation.[24] Other values may also serve as a point of difference such as in the US Mennonite community, which in the past rejected modern technology and forbade marriage outside the group. Such boundaries conserve social identities and reinforce alienation.

Information is therefore necessarily a requirement for fundamentalism, in identifying sources of dissatisfaction, shaping new values, and promoting individual and group identity. Literacy and language translation are increasingly important factors across fundamentalist movements. Printing, group assemblies, radio, voice recordings and now the internet and cryptography are used to share messages and values. While this use of technology may seem at odds with an ideological emphasis on the past, or on myth and narration, religious reformers are typically early adopters of communications technology.

Having surveyed various perspectives on fundamentalism across faiths, it seems most appropriate to view it as religious revitalisation. Fundamentalism is based in action rather than just belief.[25] It recurs across history and societies. Provoked by and reacting to social change, it aims at revival of values. Aspects of fundamentalism that appear to be common around the world and across faiths are alienation, boundaries of either symbolic or physical separation, perceived differences in values, and the sharing of information.

Radicalism appears to have a similar basis to fundamentalism when viewed across all faiths. As with fundamentalism, radicalism may be a response to perceived moral

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[23] Farhaan Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, Religion and International Security Series. (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), pp38-40

[24] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p166

[25] Malise Ruthven, *Islam – A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p4

decay.[26] It involves extreme views and actions.[27] Radicalism is equally applicable to all kinds of political and religious views, and promotes reform.[28]

There is a greater extremism implied by the use of the term 'radicalism', as opposed to the term 'fundamentalism'. Radicalism tends to extremes of action, advocating far-reaching change by imposing reforms, rather than merely by offering revival. I will now examine the difference specifically with regard to Islam.

2.2 Islamic fundamentalism

The pejorative sense of the term 'fundamentalist' in the West reflects a range of positions from a conservative approach to potential fanaticism. Its usage appears firmly established within the popular media, perhaps owing to its broadness and flexibility. This usage is telling: fundamentalist groups are indeed diverse and draw on many approaches.[29] Even within movements, such as Salafism, 'different messages' result from varying interpretations.[30] Academic Anthony J Dennis supports use of the term fundamentalist, and includes within its dimensions political goals and the aspiration to return to the earliest period of Islam.[31] Olivier Roy rather dismisses the idea that fundamentalism in Islam is in any way new, but identifies very contemporary concerns as 'neo-fundamentalism'.[32] In this definition, Roy seems to combine Riesebrodt's stance, that fundamentalism has a cyclical nature, with Stump's thinking, that present-day forms of fundamentalism are concerned with specifically modern issues.

Early Islam conducted religion and state as one following the principle of *tawhid*, unity under God. Expansion across the Arab world and beyond resulted in Muslim rulers

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[26] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p20

[27] Bullock and Stallybrass, *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, p522

[28] June Elliott, Anne Knight and Chris Cowley, *The Oxford Paperback Dictionary and Thesaurus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p617

[29] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p58

[30] Morten Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda* (UK: Penguin Books, 2015), p37

[31] Anthony J Dennis, 'A New and More Dangerous Era' in *Muhammad's Monsters,* David Bukay (ed) (Arkansas: Balfour Books and Israel: ACPR Publishers, 2004). http://www.acpr.org.il/English-NATIV/02-issue/dennis-2.htm Accessed 13 December 2014

[32] Columbia University Press, Interview with Olivier Roy

having responsibility for a diverse range of peoples. Responses to this diversity tended from tolerance to exclusivism, but over time conservatism steadily increased[33], perhaps in line with the development of Muslim majorities, necessitating fewer compromises. Divinely-inspired arts and sciences were prioritised above subjects less obviously related to God's exaltation. The later colonising impacts of an increasingly industrialised Europe led to the perception of a cultural crisis: that Muslim Majority Countries were not equally participating in or benefitting from the development of technology.

Islam has had many prominent thinkers, perhaps confirming the hadith that says God will send people to renew the faith, *tajdid al-din*, every hundred years.[34] The hadith specifically includes the statement, made by Muhammad:

> *'Allah will raise for this community at the end of every hundred years the one who will renovate its religion for it'*. (Abu Dawud 38, 4278) [35]

This hadith is authenticated as sound, *sahih*, although commentators have criticised the historical oral transmission as being potentially suspect.[36] Nevertheless, its existence implies an expectation of renovation, and, further, the texts also countenance purification or reform, *islah*.[37] Thus the potential of accretion and subsequent restoration – a return to fundamentals – was foreseen and may be an intrinsic feature of this religion.

The majority of practising Muslims might be described as faithful to the fundamentals or Pillars of Islam, and as believing in scripture as divine revelation. Thus with regard

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[33] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p13

[34] Tariq Ramadan, 'Knowledge and Hermeneutics in Islam Today', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), pp24-25

[35] Sunnah.com, Sunan Abi Dawud 4291 https://sunnah.com/abudawud/39 Accessed 04 February 2017

[36] Colin Turner, 'Renewal in Islam and Bediuzzaman', *Second International Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi*, 1992, Istanbul http://www.iikv.org/academy/index.php/sympeng/article/view/868/1084 Accessed 04 January 2015, p1

[37] Ramadan, 'Knowledge and Hermeneutics in Islam Today', pp24-25

to Islam a wide spread of positions can be included within an unqualified usage of the term fundamentalism.[38]

By the second half of the nineteenth century, more than 70 per cent of the Islamic world was under European control.[39] As an indigenous faith, Islam was the authentic basis of the responses made to colonialism or to ineffective governance.[40] Such responses formed the renewal and revival efforts across the tradition to the late 1800s in three overlapping phases characterised by Youssef Choueiri among others:

- revivalism, as renewal: the creation of new nation-states in the Middle East following WWI galvanised revivalism and the status of Shariah law within national governance.[41]
- reformism, as refreshment of knowledge and consultation. Reinterpretations of the past helped introduce the idea of *Salafiyyah*.
- radicalism, starting from efforts to win independence since the 1950s, asserting divine sovereignty and the role of jihad.[42] Choueiri argued that it was changes in political authority and traditional economic relationships that resulted in militancy.[43]

Here the three phases and movements appear to be sharply defined from each other. But as I will argue later when reviewing radical thinkers and their ideas, much of radicalism aims at reform.

Many writers have attempted to define and classify Islamic ideas into types. John Voll describes four reacting and interacting styles of movement, based on the type of

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[38] Discussion with Farhaan Wali, 23 Sept 2014

[39] Ibrahim Kalin, 'Roots of Misconception: Euro-American Perceptions of Islam Before and After September 11', in Joseph E B Lumbard (ed). *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition* (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc, 2009), p183

[40] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p109 & p118

[41] Haynes, *Religion, Fundamentalism & Ethnicity: A Global Perspective: UNRISD Discussion Paper 65*, p21

[42] Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism, 3rd Edition – The Story of Islamist Movements*, p10

[43] Malik Mufti, 'Islamic Fundamentalism by Youssef M Choueiri' in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol 27, no 1 (1995), pp92-93

action involved: the syntheistic and adaptationist style of early sultans and caliphs; the succeeding conservative style that hoped to preserve the progress made; a reactive and critical fundamentalist style; and an individualist style of personal piety, including Sufism and the Imami tradition of Shi'ism.[44] He posits that the previous development of a modernising and adaptationist style across Islam has in the last fifty years given way to a reactionary fundamentalism, a trend not limited to Islam alone.[45] His perspective appears to align with Stump and Armstrong: Islamic fundamentalism as a modern response.

Selectivity of texts: the importance of interpretation and translation

Selection as a process inherently risks decontextualising parts of the whole, creating different meaning. This is particularly pertinent in Islam, based as it is on divine revelations – received by Muhammad from Gabriel, orally passed on and later recorded in the Qur'an – and on the example of Muhammad and the Companions, transmitted in narrated *ahadith* and recorded for practice as the *Sunnah*. That these two important primary sources are text-based means the context and the spelling of words are important.

Written Arabic was still under development at the time the Qur'an was recorded. It had yet to develop both the diacritical marks differentiating many consonants and the vowelling marks showing long or short vowels.[46] This rendered many words open to different interpretations depending on their context. For example, *taqwa* is used for both 'fear of God' and 'consciousness of God', not necessarily the same emotion.[47]

Translation from Arabic offers another possibility for variation, depending on the education and perspective of the individual, and the hermeneutic methodology followed. The Qur'anic verse 51:47 has been interpreted in a number of ways. Prior to

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[44] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, pp21-23
[45] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p374-377
[46] Esack, Farid, *The Qur'an: A Short Introduction*, p111
[47] Jonathan A C Brown, *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007), p22

the scientific discovery of the expansion of our universe, translations of this verse varied but followed the theme:

> *'We built the sky with Our power and made it vast.'* (M A S Abdel Haleem)[48]

Translations since the 1930s change the interpretation of the word *Musi'un* to convey a continuing expansion, thereby fitting the scientific discovery[49]:

> '*And it is We Who built the Universe with power, and certainly, it is We Who are steadily expanding it*' (Shabbir Ahmed)[50]
>
> *'And the heaven We constructed with strength, and indeed, We are [its] expander'* (Sahih International)[51]

A mis-translation might lead to a new interpretation; if that in turn altered orthopraxy, it would potentially constitute either a religious or social innovation for that tradition, depending on the practice so altered. The permissibility of that innovation might range from those encouraged by the Shariah and spirit and intentions of Islam, to those forbidden. This possibility may be why Arabic is pre-eminent in Islam and the process of *ijtihad* in deriving new meaning requires an exhaustion of one's effort.

Ranja Ebrahim suggests that Qur'anic hermeneutics now follows two opposing approaches: one considering the text as evolving, and which therefore might allow for the modern interpretation above, and one defining the text as static, limited by the historical settings of early scholars.[52] This opposition echoes early views about the

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[48] M A S Abdel Haleem (trans.) *The Qur'an* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p344
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[49] Postings to the Forum of the Council of Ex Muslims of Britain, Topic: Quran - Verse 51:47 Expanding Universe & Expanding Interpretations/Translations; posting by OM, 09 July 2011, 10:59 PM http://www.councilofexmuslims.com/index.php?topic=16572.0 Accessed 31 December 2014

[50] Shabbir Ahmed, QXPvi (The Qur'an as it Explains Itself, 6th edition) February 2015 http://drshabbir.com/library/qxp_vi_english.pdf Accessed 02 February 2017
Permission to reproduce this translation was kindly granted by Dr Shabbir Ahmed

[51] Sahih International (trans.) *The Qur'an* https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Quran%20-%20Saheeh%20International%20Translation%20.pdf, p469. Accessed 22 February 2017
Permission to reproduce allowed by Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers: http://quranproject.org/quran/files/assets/downloads/page0004.pdf

[52] Ranja Ebrahim, 'Islamic Radicalism: A result of Frozen Ideologies?' in E Aslan et al (eds), Islam, Religions and Pluralism in Europe (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2016), p59

nature of God's word. Scholars following the Hanafi legal school retained the meaning from pre-Islamic Arabic, while the Ash'arite movement determined meaning from the scriptures.[53] The Mu'tazilites (around CE820s onwards) brought a rational view to the divine word, seeing it as created by God who existed before it – of a time and therefore subject to time. The opposing conservative Hanbali view was that the divine revelation of the Qur'an was uncreated – this view meant that it was fixed, predestined, and thus to be followed literally.[54] An additional consequence of this latter opinion is the importance placed on its origination in Arabic – which reinforces Arabic cultural contexts as Islam spreads around the world.

The possibility of producing differing readings applies equally to ahadith, which vary in the soundness of their transmission, and whose meaning is sometimes uncertain.[55] While the Qur'an itself contains few historical references, the development of commentaries, *tafsir*, has aided interpretation. These include notes on the occasions and context of God's revelations, *asbāb al-nuzūl*, which limit the possibility of meaning.[56] Outwith the use of such commentaries, selected individual Qur'anic verses offer wide interpretation.

The use of the primary texts and other teachings provide one form of differentiation between fundamentalists and other more traditional and moderate movements. Islamic fundamentalism tends to reject the cumulative and aggregated intellectual and spiritual experiences of the faith.[57] Various movements have arisen that have taken the name *Ahl al-Hadith*, the People of the Hadith; based on a tradition developed in

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[53] Jonathan A C Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2014), p55
Permission to reproduce kindly granted by Oneworld Publications

[54] Nasr Abu Zayd, 'Translation of the Qur'an: An Impossible Task', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), p107

[55] Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p44

[56] David Dakake, 'The Myth of a Militant Islam', in Joseph E B Lumbard (ed). *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition* (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc, 2009), p6

[57] Fuad S Naeem, 'A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism', in Joseph E B Lumbard (ed). *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition* (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc, 2009), p80

India by reformer Shah Wali Allah in the 18th century, this style of hadith scholarship bypasses medieval teachings not directly based on the fundamentals of the Qur'an and Sunnah[58] and so undermines more mystically-inspired and interpretative approaches.

Rather than seeing Islamic fundamentalism as an organising principle in its own right, Voll describes it as a stance across different traditions.[59] This allows the possibility of a range of groups working towards potentially different goals, but having an underlying attitude in common. The focus of this attitude appears to be the elevation of the early scriptures over later forms of religious authority, aimed at preserving the 'authenticity' of primary sources used in constructing Shariah law. The later sources, developed by jurists as guidance in formulating Shariah, include the historical commentaries on the Qur'an; consensus, *ijma;* and analogies, *qiyas*, derived through a basis in mutual legal issues. Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, a medieval reformer, first proposed this division between the sources. Ibn Taymiyyah believed in removal of accretions from the texts, and fundamentalists follow his precedent to the present day.[60]

This results in a distinction between 'historic' Islam as lived experience and 'normative' Islam as solely that revealed. Voll suggests this distinction makes 'normative' Islam potentially more communicable outside its Arabian origins – by removing the cultural context used to derive consensus and analogy in 'historic' Islam.[61] While this actively rejects hindsight gained from historical events, it might also remove the acceptance of previous interpretations that are no longer appropriate anywhere in the modern world, such as slavery. In this vein, Professor of Law Ali Khan finds it 'inappropriate' that in the formulation of Shariah the revealed is combined with the unrevealed. He argues for greater recognition of a Basic Code of practice as divinely ordained in the

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[58] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p114
[59] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p277
[60] Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, pp40-41
[61] John O Voll, 'Modern Movements in Islam', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), p234

Qur'an and Sunnah, and devolved from the more adjustable fiqh.[62] This is similar to the Wahhabi view, which advocates following only the Basic Code, essentially a reduction of the overall knowledge of Islam. However some contextualisation is required: at the time of the revelations, Islam was not a mass movement requiring insight into national or international governance.

Shariah is elevated as the only guide to conduct by fundamentalist groups.[63] A principal aim is the establishment of the Islamic System, *nizam*: Shariah rule as the totality of law. However, fundamentalist groups differ over what contemporary Shariah law should look like.[64] As'ad AbuKhalil shows how contemporary Islamic fundamentalists use the Qur'an's authority, *hukm*, to establish God's lordship over all areas of life. Islamic fundamentalists use this concept to fuse religion and politics with rule. AbuKhalil however contends that the classical meaning of *hukm* was one of judgement, as opposed to political governance in the modern sense.[65] This demonstrates the importance of context and meaning: perspective determines the extent of the Qur'an's political authority – to rule or merely to offer a yardstick to judge those who rule? Nevertheless, not all Islamic groups described as fundamentalist are politically active: the re-Islamizing movement Tablighi Jama'at, which originated in India, has no overt political agenda.[66] This may help explain its internationalisation and transmission to more than ninety countries.[67]

The need to ensure Islam has contemporary relevance is evident in many fundamentalist goals, whether social, political, economic or technological. The Muslim Brotherhood was the first modern Islamic fundamentalist organisation. It built popularity and political strength through the provision of social welfare. In this way,

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[62] Ali Khan, 'The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad' in *University of St Thomas Law Journal* vol 1, no 1 (2003), p344

[63] Stump, 'When Faiths Collide: The Case of Fundamentalism', p183

[64] Ruthven, *Fundamentalism – A Very Short Introduction*, p90

[65] As'as AbuKhalil, 'The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the end of the 20th Century', in *The Middle East Journal* vol 48 no 4 (1994), p683

[66] Marius Lazar, 'Modern Indo-Pakistani Revival Between Pietism and Politics: Al-Mawdūdī and Tablighi Jama'at' in euroPOLIS vol 7, no 2 (2013), pp173-183, pp179-180

[67] Ruthven, *Islam – A Very Short Introduction*, p137

founder Hasan al-Banna shaped reformist ideas into a mass movement and emphasised Islam's role in social justice.[68] Comparable moves occurred in other Islamic traditions. In responding to early colonial rule around the world, Sufi reforms included a return to the historical use of jihad against non-Muslims, re-examination of scripture, and reorganisation of the *tariqa* system of brotherhoods through which resistance could be organised.[69] Irrespective of the tradition, scriptural authority was sought to respond to a crisis – even if the scriptures needed revision. This demonstrates the vital role of the texts in Islam.

Reaffirmation of Islam is growing within the public sphere, particularly in Muslim Majority Countries, with an increase in mosque attendance and an emphasis on Islamic dress in Muslim communities around the world.[70] Dekmejian noted in 1995 that Islamism was increasingly dominant in the Arab world, employed as an ethical standard[71] as well as a response to globalisation and pressures on national and religious identities.

This recent reassertion of Islamic values makes current fundamentalist concerns appear singularly modern. Ejaz Akram also highlights the priority that fundamentalists place on modernising Islamic society through technology.[72] Such modernity, when combined with enactments of contemporary relevance, at first appears in contrast to the proposition that fundamentalism is cyclical. However just as Shariah responds to contemporary circumstances, the interpretations of fundamentalists likewise incorporate and draw upon the contexts, technologies and methods of each time.

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[68] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p360

[69] Itzchak Weismann, 'Modernity from Within: Islamic Fundamentalism and Sufism' in *Der Islam Bd*, vol 86, S (2011), pp142-170, pp155-158

[70] Ruthven, *Islam – A Very Short Introduction*, p15

[71] R Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995, 2nd edn), pp213-216

[72] Ejaz Akram, 'The Muslim World and Globalisation: Modernity and the Roots of Conflict', in Joseph E B Lumbard (ed). *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition* (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc, 2009), p256

Martin Riesebrodt lists four basic features of fundamentalism: a radical traditionalism; a radical patriarchalism; its presence in the social life of communities; and its utilisation of lay people.[73] Fundamentalism is likely to be patriarchal owing to its basis in texts from antiquity. In its desire to establish the Islamic System, or governance under Shariah, public participation and social organisation are necessarily required. But fundamentalism differs from traditionalism by the former's selectivity and rejection of history and experience. This is this basis for my disagreement with one of Riesebrodt's conclusions; given its selectivity and rejection of lived tradition, fundamentalism surely cannot be described in terms of traditionalism. Riesebrodt may be using the term traditionalism to describe historicity.

With respect to Islam, then, fundamentalism is wide-ranging, depends on sources of authority that are revised in reaction to contemporary issues, and in spite of its opposition to cultural globalisation, it aims at technological modernisation. For those who desire far-reaching change in society, radicalism offers scope to provoke this.

2.3 Islamic radicalism

When feelings of opposition produce the intention to take actions aimed at societal change, this can lead to a radical way of thinking and acting – especially when activated with others.

Wali links the radicalisation of individuals with their politicisation[74] and the description of the 'totality of Islam' pursued by radicals conveys the combination of belief with politics.[75] This aggregation is exactly how AbuKhalil describes wider fundamentalism, which holds many of the same aspirations as radicalism, such as establishing the Islamic System under Shariah law. Distinctions between fundamentalism and radicalism may lie not only in the goals themselves, but also in the methods used to move society towards these goals.

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[73] Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', p274
[74] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p43
[75] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p20

Political versus religious standpoints

As Islam touches every part of a believer's life, it can be difficult to separate out political influences and ideologies from doctrine. Non-Muslims might regard some of the approaches included within descriptions of Islamism as political activism[76], but given its similarity to the name of the faith, this term may also be widely misinterpreted as indicating a higher level of religiosity. The terms and categories used to label movements and groups are important, as they may imply certain qualities or authority.

One of the underlying features of radical thought is the amalgamation of religion and politics. Non-Muslims living in cultures where church and state are largely separate differentiate these, while understanding them to be interrelated. Islamic radicals have updated the early Muslim view dividing the world into *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*, the world of Islam and the world of war. [A more practical modern worldview for Muslims living outside Muslim Majority Countries is *Alam al-Shahadah*, the area of testimony.] It therefore follows that for extremist Muslims employing the black-and-white nature of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, peace can only exist with other Muslims – more specifically with 'acceptable' Muslims, living under Shariah. Within a radical framework, particularly one where God's sovereignty defines all relations, peace becomes religiously-defined. Thus jihadist goals that appear to non-Muslim audiences to be politically-motivated, such as the taking of land, usurping of power, and the killing and forced conversion of civilians, are justified by radicals as religious goals – actions that are either defensive or necessary in order to create a religious peace under Dar al-Islam. Whether the adoption of this framework is religiously-motivated or convenient probably varies between individuals according to the level of their faith and their perception of crisis.

We have already discussed that where fundamentalism across all faiths tends to revival, radicalism may tend more to reform, through acts aimed at social change, and

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[76] Adnan A Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam* (Westport CT and London: Praeger, 2005), pviii

indeed Adnan Musallam equates radicalism with revolutionary tendencies.[77] Sherman Jackson states that the distinctive feature of groups including Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami is their perseverance in combining belief with political goals.[78] Radicalism's extremist approach and emphasis on reform may be the ultimate intersection of religion and politics – although seen by the extremists themselves as religiously-defined.[79] Political intent is therefore one of the aspects common to very disparate radical groups.[80]

Radicalism's militancy is analogous to the direct action, short of offensive jihad, undertaken by Muslims living on the frontiers of the early Islamic world.[81] Radical Islamists use a source from the early texts to justify the use of offensive jihad: the military biographies Sira of Muhammad, or *Sirat Rasul Allah*. These record early conquests and treaties, although the applicability of these today may be limited.[82]

Early Islam provides a potential basis for what Roy has described as a goal of radicalism: the formation of a militant 'imagined community'.[83] He refers to the selectivity of radical groups, and their retrieval of only some elements of narrated history. Shepard also flags up the selectivity that radical Islamists employ: in highlighting the 'distortions' resulting from Westernisation, and in glossing over any failures of the early Muslim communities.[84] However, selectivity is also a method used

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[77] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, pviii

[78] Sherman A Jackson, 'Liberal/Progressive, Modern and Modernised Islam', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), p169

[79] Adonis [Ali Ahmad Said Asbar], 'Toward a New Understanding of Renewal in Islam', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), p115

[80] Farhaan Wali, notes, 25/03/2017

[81] Roy Parviz Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid, 'The idea of the *jihad* in Islam before the Crusades', Reading 14 in John Wolffe, *Study Guide 1 Introducing Religious History: From the Romans to the Crusades; Religion in History – Conflict Conversion and Coexistence* (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2004), p166

[82] Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven & London: Yale University, 2006), pp137-8

[83] Columbia University Press, Interview with Olivier Roy

[84] William E Shepard, 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol 19, no 3 (1987), pp307-335, p314

by other responses to modernity including fundamentalism.[85] By itself, then, selectivity is insufficient to justify use of the term 'radicalism'. Fundamentalists and radicals desire implementation of the Islamic System, based on revised sources of authority, and some groups appear to wish this System to take what they believe was the form of the first Muslim communities. This ambition overlooks the realities of the early period of the faith, when it experienced conflict and eventually divergence.[86] Supporters of radicalism are not reinterpreting Islam to make it relevant within modernity; they aim to create a new idealised society using decontextualized ideas of the past. This is not renovation, but invention. Recalling Karen Armstrong's theory regarding the importance of myth in religiosity, one might say that radicals choose and elevate particular mythical stories and ideas. Thus the future community to which the goals of some radical groups tend are in many ways imagined constructs.

Radical collectives vary in their focus and priorities. Nationalist groups include the Indian Jama'at-i-Islami, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which aims to replace the Algerian government with Shariah rule. Some groups have national primary aims that they hope to expand internationally: Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) works toward Pakistani rule for Kashmir and advocates war against the US and India; Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) aims to establish a pan-Asian caliphate reaching from Indonesia to the Philippines. Regardless of the geographic scope of their aims, all have the goal of establishing what they see as God's sovereignty.[87]

The features of Islamic radicalism include goals that can be described as political as well as religious. These include the establishment of Shariah rule in an authentically Islamic environment. Shariah guides Muslims in many aspects of Islamic life, both in religious matters and in everyday conduct: it exists to protect five things: religion, life,

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[85] Simon A Wood, 'Rethinking Fundamentalism: Ruhollah Khomeini, Mawlana Mawdudi, and the Fundamentalist Model' in *Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory* vol 11, no 2 (2011), p178

[86] Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1991), pp18-26

[87] Public Safety Canada: Currently listed entities http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx Accessed 30 December 2014

intellect, lineage and property. Radicals prefer to use only original sources in creating law and guidance. If revisions of Shariah draw on fewer sources, but are required to oversee wide-ranging and complex contemporary issues, the potential for religious innovation exists. Extremists use militancy to pursue their goals: as I will discuss in depth later, some radical groups change traditional concepts and appear to raise offensive jihad to the same status as the five Pillars[88], as in Hizb ut-Tahrir's *System of Islam (Nidham ul Islam).* Radicals use decontextualized religious concepts to re-imagine society, but draw on institutions outside Islam to achieve them. These form the reasons that radicalism, within wider fundamentalism, is the focus of this study: its selectivity and imagined community, the adjustment of concepts to validate extreme militancy, and therefore its potential for religious innovations.

Radical thinking differs from other movements across Islam, but shares with other movements notions of reform and its basis in, or reaction to, the texts. Islamic traditionalism places importance on faith and classical concepts, and on consensus among the ummah. It does however prioritise literality above reasoning or symbolism. In contrast, liberalism uses interpretation to derive the meaning of the Qur'an and Sunnah and contextualises the ideas, resolving them with civil rights and progressive approaches. In similar way, modernism accepts 'modern' Western institutions and approaches, and specifically invites revision of classical beliefs in line with Western ideas and culture.

To further understand radicalism in relation to other movements, I will explore different classifications of religious-based movements in Islam, looking at two factors of information in each description: the types of knowledge, and the level of interpretation of that knowledge. The factors of information we are assessing are both relevant to innovation, and so potentially contribute to an understanding of whether radicalism is innovation.

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[88] Angel M Rabasa, Cheryl Bernard, Peter Chalk, C Christine Fair, Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser, David Thaler, *The Muslim World after 9/11* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2004), p21

2.4 Typologies

The broadest divisions of Islam follow differences in authority and leadership – the traditions of Sunni, Shi'a, Ismaili and so on – and then differentiate between legal schools of thought, and emphases on spirituality or rationalism.[89] The movements we are concerned with are ideological, occurring across Islam.

As we have seen with the use of the term fundamentalism, theological categories can be indeterminate and wide-ranging. The simplification and amplification of certain traits are risks inherent in the composition of categories. Omission is also possible, perhaps of outlier cases or groups. Raja M Ali Saleem makes the point that typologies are unlikely to encompass every instance of the phenomenon they try to describe, but where the majority can be classified, a typology can aid understanding.[90] Still, the classifier's perspective and purpose in compiling categories may introduce distortion.[91] The labels may reflect the concerns of the probable audience as well as those of the compiler.

The same writer can also create different classifications, based on different purposes or circumstance. R Hrair Dekmejian has twice classified contemporary Islamic movements, one highlighting methods of societal change (1977) and one emphasising the prevalence of revolutionary attitudes (1985). In basing his classifications on methods of societal change – indicating militancy – he highlights the importance of this factor in differentiating ideological approaches. Dekmejian produced these two classifications within the space of a few years and he employed different terms in each. The existence of different groups, or a change in their methods, may explain this. Or, his purpose influenced the groups examined and the categories he created.

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[89] Abdullah Saeed, 'Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification' in *Muslim World* vol 97, no 3 (2007), pp395-404, p396

[90] Raja M Ali Saleem, 'Identifying Islamist Parties Using Gunther and Diamond's Typology' in SAGE Open 2014 4 (July-September 2014), pp1–8 http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/4/3/2158244014544288 Accessed 30 September 2014, p4

[91] Thomas Hegghammer, 'Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Theology and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism', in Roel Meijer (ed) *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp244-266, p264

Academic Jasser Auda has taken issue with a RAND Corporation report, *The Muslim World after 9/11*, which includes a quasi-legal classification ultimately based on assessments of democracy and violence.[92] Auda says this determination is a judgement of Islamic groups' positions with regard to US foreign policy, and is 'not clearly related' to Islamic law, Western values or modernity.[93] The report by RAND was commissioned by the US Air Force, which has a possible vested interest in classifying threats from which it may derive both purpose and funding, and so Auda's claim may be warranted at least in part. To avoid incorporating too much bias in any one direction, I will aim for balance in authorship and perspective.

The factors most important to this study are interpretation and basis for religious knowledge. Classifications not clearly relating to these factors are not helpful to consider here. This follows Shepard, who bases his typology on ideological orientations and their doctrinal content.[94] Shepard distinguishes Radical and Moderate Secularisms, Islamic Modernism, Traditionalisms and Neo-Traditionalisms both Accommodationist and Rejectionist, and Radical Islamism. He argues that Radical Islamism, with its concern for authority, 'simplifies' and reduces Islam, and should show the least internal diversity of any of his categories.[95] In spite of the potential for greater interpretation and divergence created by a reduction in the authentic sources, Shepard judges that this is controlled among followers at least by obedience and loyalty. It may also reflect that followers are unable to create interpretations themselves.

Some writers appear to highlight the context of their typology as being either Western or Islamic. Riesebrodt agreed with Bruce Lawrence that "in order to understand the specificity of contemporary movements one has to interpret and explain them in the

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[92] Rabasa, Bernard et al, *The Muslim World after 9/11*, pp6-25

[93] Jasser Auda, 'Classification of Islamic Trends', http://www.onislam.net/english/reading-islam/research-studies/islamic-thought/416368.html Accessed 30 September 2014, pp1-4

[94] Shepard, 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', pp1-2

[95] Shepard, 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', p321

context of Western modernity".[96] This appears at first to relegate the importance of considering the Islamic context. While he holds that fundamentalism recurs through history, Riesebrodt specifically refers here to *contemporary* movements. As with fundamentalism, radicalism today may be a response at least in part to globalisation – and this seems to be Riesebrodt's motivation: Western modernity is the provocation to which Islamic radicalism is a response. Occurrences of fundamentalism in the past may have different causes. However to assess a range of classifications of Islamic ideology, the explanations and interpretations must be relevant to the constituent parts and overall purpose and content. To ignore Muslim views would potentially introduce distortion and only reinforce the very globalisation that potentially inspires radical views. Given the difference in world-view already explored, in which not to be a part of Islam is inherently to be at war with it, any counter-response must understand and integrate this if it is to be useful to all. Therefore I will give equal consideration to classifications from Muslim writers and sources as from non-Muslims.

Tariq Ramadan's typology of six 'tendencies in Islamic thought' includes a judgement of the amount of scriptural interpretation, which is particularly helpful for this study. Ramadan distinguishes: Scholastic Traditionalism, which he defines as precluding any development from the texts further than a scholarly reading; Salafi Literalism, invoking scriptural authority for all aspects of life; Salafi Reformism, interpretation based on the likely intentions of early Muslims; Political Literalist Salafism, use of the texts to oppose westernisation; Liberal or Rationalist Reformism, incorporating reason and secular understandings into the texts; and Sufism, in which the texts inspire a contemplative inner life.[97] Ramadan gives primacy to the importance and use of the texts in his groupings, across which the levels of interpretation and elaboration vary. Giving such weight to this factor makes Ramadan's classification consistent and underlines the importance he places on this factor. It is notable that of his six tendencies, 'Salafism' is a feature in three, suggesting he has identified this as a prominent theme across the faith.

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[96] Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', p275
Permission to reproduce quote kindly granted by Brill
[97] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, pp24-30

Academic Abdullah Saeed uses a greater number of factors in his classification, including law, practice, violence, modernity, ijtihad, and separation of religion and state.[98] He proposes eight categories and these groupings appear evenly split between traditional and present-day attitudes, ranging from Militant Extremists to Legalist Traditionalists and on to Progressive Ijtihads, and he pays greater attention than Ramadan to groups addressing contemporary concerns such as human rights. It might be possible to put five of Saeed's categories into the one adaptationist grouping that Ramadan offers (Liberal or Rationalist Reformism). Saeed's use of a greater number of factors means that types of political action are the apparent basis for two of his categories (Militant Extremists and Political Islamists). So even between two academics who work in 'the West', the focusing lens each has used for their classification has produced very different results.

It is worth noting that a description used by some radical actors themselves is Jihadi-Salafism (or Salafi-Jihadism), one of the terms employed by Denoeux and Hegghammer. Morten / Murad Storm, speaking of his time in radical circles and among Muslims affiliated to Al-Qaeda, described himself as a Salafi and the ideology he followed as Jihadi-Salafism.[99] The label he puts on the philosophy of such groups is 'radical'.[100] He also describes his interactions with 'radical Islamists'.[101] His uses of the term radical – which greatly outnumber his use of the term fundamentalist – may involve some consciousness of his potential readership, and reflect his subsequent distance from the ideology, but he uses it to denote an extremity of ideas and the potential for violence.

Storm most often uses the term Salafi to describe the faith of the community he adopted. There are three potential issues discussing militant ideologies using the term 'Salafi', 'Jihadi-Salafism' or variations of these. There is a broad diversity of Salafi ideas; there is the possibility of ascribing militancy to otherwise non-violent Salafis;

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[98] Saeed, 'Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification', p396
[99] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p74
[100] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p40
[101] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p51

and there is a Sunni perspective to the term that may imply the exclusion (or even denigration) of Shi'ites and other traditions. The term Jihadi-Salafism recognises that some adherents of Salafi traditions have adopted jihad as a response to rulers they see as failing to adequately incorporate divine will into their rule. However only a minority of Salafis are jihadist: traditional or literalist Salafism aspires to religious goals, and activist or *haraki* Salafism employs political methods. In many ways Salafism is a non-traditional back-to-basics approach provoked by colonialism: Choueiri sees it originating in Islamic reformism.[102] Salafis do not follow any specific legal school, using instead the example and resources available to the early generations of Muslims, the Salaf: the texts, consensus, and ijtihad. The thought of medieval thinker Ibn Taymiyyah has a large impact on this movement. Outside these sources Salafis reject all else as being innovative, without foundation in revelation. Despite these commonalities, Salafism is not a unified movement, and many trends and groups exist.

Conversely, not all 'jihadis' are Salafists, and in recent years the greater number of individuals carrying out terrorist acts in Europe and the US supposedly under the direction of extremist group IS have been shown to have had minimal involvement with Islam.[103] IS has also categorised many of its members as having only a basic knowledge of Shariah when they join the group.

Nevertheless, Salafi ideas have both influenced and been appropriated by extremist ideologues.[104] Haraki Salafism describes an activist approach to the goals of this religious perspective: the inclusion of political goals, but not militancy or violence. My use of the term 'radical' is intended to denote willingness to use violence and extremism. It is the product of the process of radicalisation, which is a process widely referred to in the media and academe. It is a term that is applicable across all traditions of Islam, has a precedent in Storm's regular use of the word, and it will

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[102] Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism, 3rd Edition – The Story of Islamist Movements*, p65

[103] Jason Burke, 'Bad' Muslim and petty criminal – killer fits the extremist profile', *The Observer* 17 July 2016

[104] Mehdi Hasan, 'How Islamic is the Islamic State? Not at all' https://newrepublic.com/article/121286/how-islamic-islamic-state Accessed 10 July 2016, p6

inevitably include some, if not all, of the 'Jihadi-Salafist' groups whose methods involve violence. In this way I am attempting to separate violence from Salafist – and even from fundamentalist – ideologies not considered extremist. To describe individuals carrying out violence as jihadis gives them a potential religiosity they do not deserve, and corrodes the principle of jihad. Use of the term radical serves to devolve extremism from its religious veneer, and recognises that violence and extremist views can occur across any culture or tradition.

2.5 Assessing the factors of interpretation and knowledge base

The use of texts and their level of interpretation are the factors at the basis of my comparison of different typologies. These are both 'measurements' that are relevant to Islamic ideologies and to innovation.

INTERPRETATION

Intention is at the base of any interpretation, and by extension, differences in practice may result. Outside the ritual acts of worship, the different schools of law, *madhihab*, govern the practice of social matters under Shariah. These four schools arose from differing interpretations, but in general use principles from the Qur'an and Sunnah, *nas*, to generate understandings of permissibility. Like the ahadith from which they may be drawn, nas are authenticated to different degrees, for example as being sound and explicit bases for ruling on permissibility. [105] Thus the interpretation of the texts may determine how various acts fall within the five general categories of behaviour:

obligatory	recommended	permitted	discouraged	prohibited
fard	*mandub*	*mubah*	*makruh*	*haram*

[In Hanafi law, *wajib* is obligatory and *fard* is the lesser state of necessary.]

One often-quoted hadith includes the following:

> *'Verily Allah ta'ala has laid down religious obligations, so do not neglect them; and He has set limits, so do not overstep them; and He has forbidden some things, so do not violate them; and He has remained silent about some things,*

[105] Al Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*, pp13-14

out of compassion for you, not forgetfulness — so do not seek after them.' (Al-Nawawi 30)[106]

Some translators, including cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, state an alternative for the last phrase:

'so do not ask questions concerning them.' [107]

The different translation of this last phrase potentially changes the meaning of the entire hadith. In the first version, God is commanding Muslims not to seek out acts about which the Qur'an makes no mention. The second version might be understood as permitting without question everything not forbidden or otherwise limited. Al-Qaradawi, founder of the Middle Way, *waasitiyya*, combined Salafi ideas with those of renewal.[108] He understood everything not specifically forbidden by the texts to be potentially permissible within Islam. Such a view would seem to rely on wide interpretation and on developing consensus, particularly in order to address the ethics of some of the new biomedical sciences. Differences in hermeneutics and understanding therefore potentially create confusion about the permissibility of inventions and new practices.

Since Muhammad received the revelations, guidance has been required for many new situations. Different interpretations may change both the sense of the text and the resolution of any contradictions within the sources. The most literal readings of the Qur'an – and highest levels of imitation of the Sunnah – may result in the very lowest levels of innovation. Conversely applying interpretation to the Qur'an and Sunnah might produce innovation. Indeed the 'flawed faculty of reason' was Ibn Hanbal's justification for a literalistic approach in his development of law.[109] However the Qur'an itself encourages the reader:

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[106] Sunnah.com, 40 Hadith Nawawi 30 https://sunnah.com/nawawi40 Accessed 04 February 2017
Reproduction permitted by Sunnah.com: https://sunnah.com/about

[107] Zafar Khan, 'Rulings regarding wearing Hijab and Niqab', *IslamAwareness* http://www.islamawareness.net/hijab/Niqab/rulings.html Accessed 17 February 2017
Permission to quote translation kindly granted by Zafar Khan of Islam Awareness

[108] Ebrahim, 'Islamic Radicalism: A result of Frozen Ideologies?', p61

[109] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p44

'Will you not use your reason?' (21:10)[110]

And so interpretation, *ijtihad*, is directly encouraged by the revelation.

The formal practice of ijtihad concerns legal or theological issues, and involves the development of new rulings where no applicable understanding already exists. The *mujtahid* carrying out this effort is to use the greatest possible level of exertion to investigate and define their thinking. This practice, a form of innovation, is especially pertinent with regard to adaptations to modernity, where social and economic circumstances are very different from the time of the revelation and example of Muhammad and the Companions. This potential for innovation led to a ban on ijtihad from the tenth to eighteenth centuries, with Muslims instructed instead to imitate, through *taqlid*, the founders of their school of law.

For the Shi'a, the main sense of taqlid is the imitation of the community's imam, who does not rely greatly on historical precedent, instead deducting and reasoning from the sources reasonably independently. The Sunnah of Ali also form an additional component of Shi'ite law.

Iranian cleric Karim Khan, who led the Shaykhi movement from the 1840s, promoted the new idea that anyone could interpret scriptures for themselves.[111] Modernising thinkers including Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh encouraged this, although they differed as to who could make interpretations.[112] Over time, its restriction to elite scholars was relaxed. Al-Afghani worked toward the strengthening of Islam within his proposed Pan-Islamic movement by promoting the existence of modern Western values, including the application of reason.[113] His student 'Abduh, in the nineteenth century, held a similar view: the use of reason was necessary to apply

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[110] Abdel Haleem (trans.) *The Qur'an*, p203
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[111] Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, p128

[112] Mehran Kamrava, 'Contextualising Innovation in Islam', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), p9

[113] Voll, 'Modern Movements in Islam', p219; Omar Imady, *The Rise & Fall of Muslim Civil Society* (Salinas, CA: MSI Press, 2005), p14

the revelations of the Qur'an and Sunnah to new situations – although he held that the practice was only for those properly qualified to undertake it. [Albert Hourani contends that 'Abduh's promotion of interpretation, intended to defend against secularism by making Islam relevant to modernity, actually enabled innovation and secular understandings.[114]] Salafi thinkers were the first to widely undertake interpretation as a personal form of ijtihad.[115] In rejecting the impact of consensus as a source of authority, they have used ijtihad instead to critique weak ahadith, and also to authenticate ahadith previously thought unreliable.[116] Iranian reformist Ali Shariati insisted in the mid-twentieth century that ijtihad was a duty for every Muslim.[117] The result is a diversity of understanding as to who may undertake interpretation and ijtihad.

The use of ijtihad – whether by scholars, reforming clerics or laypeople – represents a type of adaptation to new conditions, but its use may also be reactionary, to constrict scriptures and reduce the number of possible options, as occurs in Wahhabism. Interpretation might therefore be progressive and liberating, or regressive and limiting. In either case, innovations are possible.

I will use the level of interpretation, as apparently attributed by different writers to each of their categories, to compare the terms for those categories – and therefore as a measure of defining the potential for innovation. This forms one axis in my compilation of typologies:



Formal ijtihad has its own relation to different sources of knowledge, and the practice is described by religious reformist Hojjatoleslam Saeed 'Edalatnezhad as based on either reason, *'aql mehvar*, or on oral tradition, *naql mehvar*. He favours reason only to better understand the text, and claims the historic dominance of ijtihad based on

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[114] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, pp144-147
[115] Guilain Denoeux, 'The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam', in *Middle East Policy* vol 9, no 2 (2002), p60
[116] Brown, *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World*, pp258-259
[117] Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, p255

oral tradition has reduced the potential inventiveness of Islamic jurisprudence.[118] This link between the use of reason and a reliance on narrated text leads us to the importance of the knowledge base in defining radicalism's relationship to innovation.

KNOWLEDGE BASE

The texts provide the foundation of religious knowledge, used in creating Shariah law and determining the acceptability of different conduct or actions. Academic Yahya Fozi has defined sources of religious knowledge and used these as the basis for his typology. His overarching themes classifying Islamic ideologies are thus: narration, ration and intuition.[119] These relate well to ideas about belief. 'Narration' implies a close following of the revelation or myth as recorded. 'Ration' involves reasoning and analysis, and a logical linking of concepts. 'Intuition' tends to more instinctual understandings, symbolism, and allowing for self-evident truths. The levels of these characteristics used within movements are not fixed, and are likely to have evolved over time.

As I will re-state in chapter 4, the use of narration, ration and intuition as types of religious knowledge appears at a basic level to align with the kinds of knowledge used in formulating innovations: explicit and tacit.[120] 'Explicit knowledge' is precise, potentially in the form of instructions. This might tend towards narration. 'Tacit knowledge' is implicit, perhaps based on the result of experiences. Such self-generated understandings might tend toward intuition.

This measure does not directly illustrate the level of innovation, but shows the basis for it in knowledge. A reliance and emphasis on the text as narrated might be supposed to lead to a low level of innovation, and conversely the use of intuition might

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[118] Ramadan, 'Knowledge and Hermeneutics in Islam Today', p74

[119] Yahya Fozi, 'Typologies of Contemporary Islamic Movements' in *The Third International Conference in International Studies* (2010), Kuala Lumpur College of Law Government and International Studies Universiti Utara Malaysia, pp1-11

[120] Jon-Aril Johannessen, Bjorn Olsen, Johan Olaisen, 'Aspects of innovation theory based on knowledge management' in *International Journal of Information Management* vol 19 (1999), pp121-139

be expected to be more likely to lead to innovative responses. This epistemological approach considers the varieties of knowledge underlying the movements as described. Basis in knowledge thus forms the second axis across which typologies might be 'mapped':



Using these two factor axes together provides a potential determination of the type of knowledge and the level of interpretation writers ascribe to the movements as categorised in their typologies.

METHODOLOGY

I searched the literature for existing classifications of Islamic movements. I judged 14 as demonstrating sufficient information in both knowledge base and interpretation across the typology. Of these, seven are by Muslim writers (although many work in non–Muslim Majority Countries), one Jewish, and six 'Western' sources. [See Appendix A for a list of these classifications.] It must be noted though that the basis for publishing and peer review may presuppose 'Western' standards and acceptability, and I have only searched within English-language sources. These limitations may exclude potentially helpful contributions.

The typologies, which include those described above, were analysed for the content writers had included on interpretation and knowledge base. Based on the relative 'strength' described of ijtihad/interpretation, and the description of the knowledge base, all the terms from the 14 classifications were assigned a position on the two-dimensional axes. The terms were given their own absolute positions on each axis, ie they were not allowed to overlap – the axes were extended as required to accommodate all the categories. Thus no two terms occupied exactly the same position. One result of this is that the divergence across movements might appear potentially larger than really the case, and this in turn may exaggerate the amount of overlap between them. When I undertook the alternative to this, allowing terms to occupy the same space, the result was a field of discrete points surrounding a larger

concentration, which left little scope for understanding potential inter-relationships between themes. While my chosen method is potentially exaggerating relative positions on each axis, it creates distinct positions for each theme, enabling more effective comparison. The possible exaggeration will be borne in mind in discussing the results.

I deliberately aligned the factor-axes for knowledge base and interpretation in the reverse of possibly typical Western attitudes; thus the most conservative end of each axis was oriented to the left (axis for knowledge base) and top (axis for interpretation). I had three reasons for this. Firstly, so that my own potential bias or stereotyping might be reduced as much as possible – forcing me to assess each term independently and reducing pre-judgement. Secondly, to underline the de-prioritisation of political thought and action, the consideration of which might naturally assign conservative positions to the right of any spectrum. Thirdly, I wished to reinforce a break with 'Western classifications', in the manner of Tariq Ramadan, who places liberal reformism to the right of his spectrum.[121] I followed Ramadan's idea with respect to the vertical factor axis for ijtihad/interpretation: orienting the literal and more constrictive end at the 'top' – usually seen in the West as the most positive position – and the liberal and probably more progressive end at the bottom.

I mapped individual categories to positions on the axes depending on the apparent strength of interpretation and the type of knowledge base involved. I then grouped the terms used by the writers as far as possible into themes, based on their frequency of occurrence. This had the effect of eliminating unpopular or rare terms, and this is in keeping with my purpose, which is not to develop my own typology or ensure every element of a classification is included, but to operationalise my use of the term 'radicalism' and understand its relationship to interpretation and its basis in knowledge.

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[121] Alex Griffiths, 'Typologies of Islamic Thought', E-International Relations Publishing, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/30/typologies-of-islamic-thought Accessed 29 September 2014, p4; Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, p29

The following eight themes resulted from grouping the most popular terms: fundamentalist, radical, Salafism, traditional, Wahhab, liberal, modernism, and Sufi. These themes contain a mixture of adjectives and nouns: each resulted from the majority term used and I prefer to retain this for accuracy than revise the terms used for neatness and risk introducing my own perspective. Each theme comprises a number of definitions, points of view and purposes. Nevertheless as a grouping, each provides a guide to the relative amount of interpretation and the use of the scriptures relative to the other themes.

FINDINGS

The spectrum below shows the position of all the grouped themes on the axes:

2.5 A Mapping of all identified themes



There are a number of patterns – I will discuss those relating to innovation later. Initial findings include some configurations that might be expected:

(1) 'Sufi' occupies an opposite position on both axes to 'Wahhab'

(2) 'Liberal' groupings occupy different space to other groupings

(3) Uses of 'liberal', 'Sufi' and 'modernism' do not overlap with the use of any other term

It is apparent that uses of the term 'fundamentalist' overlap with the usage of the terms 'Wahhab', 'traditional', 'Salafism' and 'radical'. Given the preceding discussion, the alignment of 'fundamentalist' with 'Salafism' is expected. The overlap of 'fundamentalist' with 'radical' is similarly expected, and I will discuss this in detail shortly. However, based on points made above around selectivity, any alignment of 'fundamentalist' with 'traditional' was not a given. This apparent correlation may be a result of the method I have chosen, in which overlaps of theme result from the selection of absolute positions for each term. It is worth exploring the concepts and

raw data to understand whether the overlap is a data artefact I have introduced or an accurate result. Traditionalism in general conserves historical experience and sources of authority, whereas fundamentalism generally seeks to remove some of these traditional sources and is selective in its authority. However the mapping overlap is not extensive and actually results principally from one particular writer's use of 'traditional'. Saeed describes Legalist Traditionalists as implementing classical understandings of the law, together with a prominent use of taqlid and rejection of ijtihad – but his description makes no mention of selectivity. His description fits the space occupied by descriptions of fundamentalism in terms of knowledge base and interpretation, but lacks the distinguishing characteristic of selectivity, for which this model does not directly account:

2.5 B Mapping comparison: fundamentalist and traditional themes



However the reverse is also possible. One use of the term 'traditional' does not occupy fundamentalism's space in the mapping – but its qualities include the selectivity of fundamentalism. Tariq Ramadan defines his category of Scholastic Traditionalists as a restricted form of traditionalism, drawing on scholarly opinions from the 8th to the 11th centuries. His use of 'traditional' therefore approaches the selectivity of

'fundamentalist'. Selectivity is therefore not a quality exclusive to descriptions of fundamentalism.

In addition, Ramadan says that other writers confuse Salafism with traditionalism, and that his Salafi Literalist category has a 'traditionalist character'.[122] This is not greatly borne out by the mapping of the themes as plotted, but may be possible to some extent if non-unique positions had been allowed in the mapping:

2.5 C Mapping comparison: Salafism and traditional themes



Ramadan's point is significant, though, as it shows the concept of traditionalism is not uncontested.

The reasonably low overlap in the mapping between 'Salafism' and traditionalism shown here seems reasonable. Salafis sacralise particular aspects of history in service of 'purifying' the religious tradition. It attempts to elevate and differentiate Salafi practice from the merely traditional.

[122] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, pp24-25

Traditionalism probably accounts for the stance of many Muslims.[123] It is thus an important theme, and as can be seen from its position towards the imitative end of the 'interpretation axis', is generally described as making limited use of interpretation. While the implication follows that it is therefore not greatly innovative, the mapping of the traditional theme demonstrates how it encompasses all three types of knowledge base: narration, ration and intuition, with the latter's potential for symbolic meaning and so personal interpretations. This may also help explain its appeal and relevance to so many.

Comparing the usage of 'traditional' with 'radical':

2.5 D Mapping comparison: radical and traditional themes



Given the apparent lack of overlap, radicalism is not greatly associated with traditionalism, although this may be an artefact created by assigning unique points to the descriptions. Yet one might infer that descriptions of radicalism do tend to reflect non-traditional attitudes. With respect to the ways different writers use both these terms, neither 'radicalism' nor 'tradition' appears greatly associated with

[123] Rabasa, Bernard et al, *The Muslim World after 9/11*, p21

interpretation of the texts, although traditionalism can be aligned with intuitive, perhaps inherited, knowledge.

I am trying to distinguish between the terms fundamentalism and radicalism, and explain my use of radicalism in the present study. Removing the other terms, and leaving just fundamentalist and radical gives:

2.5 E Mapping comparison: fundamentalist and radical themes



The lower outlying term here of 'neo-fundamentalism/radical fundamentalism', as defined in the RAND report, appears to be at odds with other uses of the terms. As we have seen, this source has been criticised by Jasser Auda as a Western interpretation related to US foreign policy – and so potentially biased in terms of its usefulness within US politics in justifying military force. This viewpoint consolidates the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Jihad into the same category – which is inconsistent with other writers, particularly in its consideration of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the following discussion I will disregard this outlying usage of the term unless specifically relevant.

From the mapping of 'fundamentalist' and 'radical' I can conclude:

(1) Excepting the US foreign policy-oriented RAND report, most writers see radicalism as not tending to much interpretation or drawing greatly on reason. Writers tend to see radical groups as tending toward emulation and as preferring explicit and narrated forms of knowledge.

(2) With respect to the relationship of these terms and their basis in information, radicalism appears to be potentially considered a subset of a wider fundamentalism.

(3) Radicalism as described tends to more literal narratives and forms of explicit knowledge. These are emulated rather than interpreted.

I have approached an understanding of where radicalism sits in relation to fundamentalism, and where both relate to the religious knowledge base and its interpretation – an epistemological understanding.

It is useful to refer to how Muslim writers distinguish radicalism as a term within their religious descriptions. Saaed states that radicalism is often misused as a term; his classification excludes it.[124] Dekmejian equates radicalism with militancy and refers – within his grouping of 'active fundamentalists' – to radical activists as those who carry out violence.[125] Yahya Fozi includes within his 'radical narration-based movements', influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, those who condone violence.[126] Ramadan does not use the term 'radical' to name any of his categories, but refers to radical action and discourse within his category of Political Literalist Salafism – for him the relevant groups are anti-Western and condone offensive jihad.[127]

While non-Muslim writer Haroro Ingram initially divides individually non-violent radicals from terrorist militants, he later correlates the perception of crisis underlying

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[124] Saeed, 'Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification', p403
[125] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p57, p52
[126] Fozi, 'Typologies of Contemporary Islamic Movements', pp5-6
[127] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, pp27

radicalisation with 'a growing propensity toward violence'.[128] Thus radicalism possesses aspects of change, extremism and reform – all indicators of its differentiation within wider fundamentalism – but might be particularly distinguished by militancy and a willingness to engage in violence.

TESTING THE QUALITIES OF RADICALISM

One way of testing the theoretical alignment of violence with radicalism – as it is appears in the above spectrum – may be to examine the Muslim Brotherhood, said by Eric Rouleau to condemn violence.[129] This group is often labelled as fundamentalist. Dekmejian characterises the Muslim Brotherhood as radical, and while he says that radical and revolutionary groups use violence he also notes that the Brotherhood and its affiliates are the exception in not doing so.[130]

The Muslim Brotherhood gave rise to militant group Hamas, but activities carried out in the Brotherhood's name are described as being concerned with social welfare. Therefore, if other writers are generally consistent in defining radicalism as the willingness to use violent means, positions on the factor-axes where the Muslim Brotherhood appears should correlate with use of the term fundamentalist but not with uses of the term 'radical'. As expected, there is some correlation between descriptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and use of the term 'fundamentalist', although it is not extensive and potentially an artefact from the method chosen of ascribing unique points to create overlap:

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[128] Haroro J Ingram, 'Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy' in *Flinders Journal of Religion* vol 10 (2007/8), p508

[129] Rouleau, Eric 'Terrorism and Islamism' (article) *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 2001 http://mondediplo.com/2001/11/09prophet Accessed 13 November 2014, p1

[130] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p57

2.5 F Mapping comparison: fundamentalist and Muslim Brotherhood themes



The relative position of the mappings for each theme appears to indicate that writers attribute the Brotherhood with the use of more interpretation than is generally ascribed to fundamentalist groups. However only a minority of the typologies examined offer specific examples of the groups categorised within their particular terms.

With regard to descriptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and use of the term 'radical', there is a small overlap – based clearly around the use of explicit knowledge:

2.5 G Mapping comparison: radical and Muslim Brotherhood themes



The Brotherhood's activism is expressed through social justice, and this is probably the reason for the emphasis on interpretation. Comparing the correlation of the Muslim Brotherhood with descriptions of these movements, more writers associate this group with fundamentalism than with radicalism, although there are fewer occurrences of the term radicalism with which to make the possible comparison. In the mapping as displayed, radicalism appears to use the knowledge base in a different way to the Muslim Brotherhood. For the most part, excepting Dekmejian, writers appear to be consistent in linking radicalism with the willingness to use violent means.

Some writers also link the term fundamentalism with the potential for violence. The conflation of radicalism and fundamentalism in the RAND report definition makes sense: the focus of the US military is toward potentially violent actions, and it is simplest to take the broadest possible meaning of these terms, particularly when justifying the use of public funds, and in defining environments potentially hostile to servicepeople and other assets. This conflation also has academic support. Shepard cedes a rough correlation to the two terms, and places radicalism within a sub-set of

wider fundamentalist attitudes, saying: "By 'radical Islamism' I mean the orientation of many of those who are often called 'fundamentalists'. This type is especially well represented by Sayed Abul A'la Mawdudi and the later writings of Sayyid Qutb, and in only slightly lesser degree by Imam Khomeini and other current Iranian leaders".[131] Radical group Hizb ut-Tahrir states that they reserve violent action for the time when their views are accepted.[132] So willingness to use violence is a potential distinguishing factor of radical groups.

The mapping of terms suggests that radicalism is a position drawing strongly from narration-based and explicit knowledge. The writers using this term generally say that radicalism is politically-oriented in using revised versions of Shariah and selective in proposing an imagined community. This selectivity is among the reasons why I consider radicalism to be potentially innovative, as I will explore soon.

The attitude of Muslim groups towards each other is worth contemplating here. The Islamic term *takfir* is used to declare the unbelief of another Muslim. Radical or militant Islamic thought holds moderate Muslims to be unbelievers. Hizb ut-Tahrir defines Muslims outside their group boundary as sinful.[133] They do so in spite of the Sunni principle that says that those who pray towards Mecca are cannot be unbelievers unless they refute an important aspect of religious matters. [134] Hence radicalism might also be defined in opposition to the Muslim mainstream, in that radical thought is willing to reject other Muslims as followers of Muhammad. Such self-defined pre-eminence, which would probably not be recognised by the first Muslims whom radicals seek to emulate, is one reason that radicalism is worthy of study and potentially a religious innovation. Radicalism can also be defined against

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[131] William E Shepard, 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol 19, no 3 (1987), pp307-335, p314

[132] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p4, p25
[133] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p3
[134] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p66

Salafism through the pre-eminence of political or religious goals respectively. This is borne out in the mapping of these themes, where there is little apparent overlap.

2.5 H Mapping comparison: radical and Salafism themes



Thus one differentiation between radicalism and Salafism might be the incorporation of political goals into religious tradition. This is a perspective often-noted by non-radical writers and commentators and yet never stated as such in the writings of radical groups or ideologues themselves – Qutb and Mawdudi do not explicitly mention politics. Using Islam as the context for change means that radicals must promote their goals as religious ideals and God's will. It would be impossible to validate a political goal as divine, and that is why from the standpoint of Islamists, all their aims have to be solely religiously-motivated. As religion is the context in which they seek change, the innovations of radical Islam may therefore affect religious matters.

It is worth comparing once again radicalism to all the other identified themes and movements. The following shows the rough total area covered by the combined knowledge bases of all the other movements, and that of radicalism:

2.5 I Mapping comparison: radical and 'knowledge area' of all other themes combined



The knowledge base in Islam is primarily formed by the revelation and ahadith, and supplemented by interpretation, consensus, symbolism, experience, reason and context. Radicalism uses only a part of these opportunities and its selectivity is evident. Therefore the possibilities and practice open to its followers are also potentially constricted, or altered, or eliminated.[135]

I wish to understand how the themes relate to innovation, particularly for the terms radicalism and fundamentalism. I will now compare their position in relation to the axes, developed using possible parameters of religious innovation: interpretation and knowledge base.

[135] Farhaan Wali, notes, 25/03/2017

MAPPING INNOVATION

On the factor-axes developed, it should be possible to represent areas of potential innovation. Thinking about 'progressive' innovation, where interpretation takes full advantage of all information sources to develop new meanings and adaptations, it is possible to plot, relative to both axes, where this might occur. Thus the area of progressive innovation might be shown as follows:

2.5 J Mapping progressive innovation



Where the knowledge base is most fully that of narration and imitation, ie the most literal reading of scripture, progressive innovation is unlikely. Where reason is applied to interpreting the texts, progressive innovation begins to become possible. As reason and more intuitive sources of information are brought to bear, innovation becomes increasingly likely, even where imitation levels are high.

But what happens when the full range of resources are deliberately not used in innovation, such as the selectivity of extremist or radical groups? Within business theory, regressive innovation has been recognised as occurring in companies where simpler processes of production have been required, perhaps owing to high

component costs or lack of resource.[136] A 'regressive' type of innovation occurs. The need to innovate is satisfied, albeit constricted. An analogy might be a company's development of a new model of kettle or car without the budget to create new designs; parts from older versions could be used, and their colours changed; the assembly line shortened for efficiency. Different consumers may be attracted to buy the new edition owing to lower cost or the new appearance. But the functions of boiling water or driving have not been improved – indeed, if the parts used no longer have replacements or have been superseded, the lifespan of the product may be limited or performance compromised.

Regressive innovation, more reliant on selected instruction and imitation, might be represented on the factor axes:

2.5 K Mapping regressive innovation



Where selectivity is applied to the available sources of information, and only some parts of the texts, consensus, historical commentaries and analogy are used, the amount of knowledge that can be used in creating new meaning is reduced. The

[136] Konstantin Burnyshev, 'Strategy of Innovation Behaviour of Enterprises', https://web.warwick.ac.uk/russia/Kostay_eng Accessed 03 January 2015, p8

greatest extent of regressive innovation might result where explicit 'instructions' are selected and imitated prescriptively.

The potential for innovation of any kind stops beyond a certain point of imitation; actions are repetitive and unchanged, rather than new. With intuition, much greater amounts of innovation might result as lived experiences create a diversity of possible outcomes, albeit becoming more regressive with higher levels of imitation. When the mapping of radicalism is overlaid onto that of the two different types of innovation, radicalism is shown to involve some regressive innovation. While such ideologies are partly regressive innovation, they are also considered by some writers not to be innovative. This implies these writers feel extremism may have a legitimate foundation in the traditions:

2.5 L Mapping comparison: radical theme and types of innovation



My analogy here is that radicalism, where it does innovate, is using a reduced level of the information resources available to it, rejecting historical sources offering context and the ummah's collective experience. This not innovative/regressively innovative

perspective does seem borne out by some of the main qualities of radicalism: a selective and decontextualised use of the texts, a revision of Shariah law, and an imagined community based on a past golden age.

Descriptions of 'fundamentalism' also show correlation with this mapped area of regressive innovation:

2.5 M Mapping comparison: fundamentalist theme and types of innovation



Here the descriptions of fundamentalist groups appear to map roughly equally to ideas of their using progressive innovation, or regressive innovation, or not innovating at all.

There are also small areas of correlation for the use of the terms 'Salafism' and 'Wahhab', although each has an area representing a number of descriptions apparently excluding innovation:

2.5 N Mapping comparison: Salafism and Wahhab themes and types of innovation



Writers appear to be crediting some Salafist groupings with developments that are considered more progressive than regressive, and this is worth exploring further given that extremists often describe themselves as Salafi.

If the overall mapping of the theme Salafism is divided into the definitions that describe the non-jihadi Salafis (outlined in purple below), and those who advocate and carry out violent extremist action (outlined in red below), the mapping of Salafism against the factor axes becomes very interesting. It suggests that where they are innovating, the non-jihadi Salafis are described as using a progressive innovation, whereas those described as 'Jihadi-Salafists' probably employ more regressive methods of innovation if they enact ideas.

2.5 O Mapping comparison: types of Salafism and types of innovation



Usage of the term 'traditional' also shows some correlation with the area mapped by regressive innovation, although this may be the result of the contested use of the term as discussed above. A number of descriptions clearly demonstrate the progressive nature of traditionalism, and one or two that view traditionalism as not innovative at all:

2.5 P Mapping comparison: traditional theme and types of innovation



I have already acknowledged that the method chosen for this mapping, where terms were assigned unique locations, may also create artefacts, and it may be that more apparent colocations with regressive or progressive innovation have occurred than would otherwise be the case. However the relative positioning of the themes is interesting, as is the possible finding that radicalism as a theme is considered as not innovating by some writers, most of whom locate Islamic radicalism to the more conservative end of the knowledge base, where narration and explicitly-understood knowledge are important. It is worth noting that traditionalism also follows this pattern, and is described as both innovative and not innovative.

2.6 Summary

The terms and categories used to label movements and groups are important. They may be misunderstood, and they may also infer certain authority, qualities or inadequacies. The classifications highlight radicalism's social change, militancy, and the primacy of texts – although it should be noted that two Muslim writers avoided using the term radical (using instead for these groups Salafi Reformism, and Political Islamists / Militant Extremists).

I have tried to operationalise my use of the term radicalism by showing how it relates to factors of innovation: knowledge base and interpretation. The mapping showed that descriptions of radical positions lie outside those described as traditional, liberal and modern. One inference is that radicalism reflects non-traditional attitudes. Traditionalism itself is not uncontested and, in common with radicalism, is seen as both innovative and not innovative. However radicalism is seen as mostly more literal and imitative, as preferring explicit and narrated forms of knowledge. Radical ideologies appear to use only a part of the possible overall knowledge base on which Islamic traditions draw. Descriptions given to fundamentalism have a mapping parallel to that of radicalism, and descriptions of Wahhabism and Jihadi-Salafism echo this too but are not associated with progressive innovation at all. These associations may represent similarities in the derivation of the ideologies.

I will use the following chapters to explore firstly how the key ideas of radical ideologies came into being, and then identify key concepts to assess as innovations in religion.

3 The development of radical ideologies

I have developed parameters of radicalism from the literature that include militancy, selectivity, the use of an imagined past, and revision of key concepts. Alongside social change there is a willingness to use violence. A mapping of the typologies has demonstrated the potential for regressive innovation or an absence of innovation.

The circumstances and perspectives of key thinkers shape their interpretations. After reviewing some of the prominent individuals who have contributed to radicalism, I will demonstrate some exchange and absorption of ideas from theorists not normally associated with radicalism. Third, I will examine ideas considered important in radicalism to explore how these interacted and evolved. In so doing I will finally frame the particular concepts to be assessed as religious innovations in chapter 4.

3.1 Contributors to radicalism

A great number of Islamic scholars and jurists have sought to strengthen the religion. Values that give rise to such endeavours include: the importance of education and jurisprudence, the Sunni prophecy of consecutive *mujaddid* who will renew Islam, the concept of Mahdis (in Sunni Islam, the Successor; in Shi'ism, the Redeemer), and the overarching importance of the faith within the day-to-day lives of Muslims. Some of these ideas have created mass movements that between them demonstrate Islamic variants of the four overarching movements that exist across all faiths, mentioned in chapter 2: persistent minority culturalist groups (such as Muslim Kashmiris in India); accommodating syncretic groups (such as Shi'ites in Trinidad); reforming fundamentalist groups; and pragmatic community-oriented groups.

My present purpose is to investigate the development of radical thinking to better assess its innovativeness. Examination of substantial counterweights to radicalism, such as the parallel but weaker growth of Sufism over the last millennium, largely fall outwith this investigation, although Sufism's persistence has acted as a constant spur to radical thought.

KHAWARIJIYYA - KHARIJITES

The unity of Islam fractured after Muhammad's death as divisions arose over leadership and legitimacy. In attempting to influence the Muslim community, the 'neutral' Murjiya took the middle ground between the Shi'ites, who supported the legitimacy of the fourth Caliph 'Ali, and the *Khawarij*, or Kharijites, who reversed their initial acceptance of 'Ali. The Kharijite movement was puritanical and exclusivist. They imposed symbolic and physical separation by pronouncing the unbelief of opponents and outsiders. In addition, adherents made jihad a sixth Pillar.[137]

MU'TAZILYYA, ASHARIYYA, MATURIDIYYA

Differences interpreting the ahadith also created divergences. Mu'tazilites placed prime importance on tawhid and divine justice, but also drew on Greek philosophy to create and apply *kalam*, theological reasoning. For example, their interpretations of Qur'anic references to God's sight led to the idea of His watchfulness.[138] Political involvement led to an inquisition called the *Minha*.[139] In the resulting backlash against this inquisition, Sunni scholars emphasised following the Qur'an and Sunnah, as opposed to the Mu'tazilite emphasis on reason. Two similar schools of thought developed, around former Mu'tazilite Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (d936) and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d944). The *Ashariyya* used reason only to defend the truth of revelation.[140] Other groups, such as the traditionalists, *Muhaddithin*, saw the use of reason as innovation, given the lack of previous debate.

IBN HANBAL AND HANBALIYYAH

Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal (780-855) was reportedly persecuted under the Mu'tazilite Minha for his refusal to hold reason higher than revelation.[141] His approach, *athari*, promoted the uncreatedness of the Qur'an although his school of

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[137] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p37

[138] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p53

[139] New World Encyclopedia, 'Mu'tazili' http://www.newworldwncyclopedia.org/entry/Mu%27tazili Accessed 26 April 2015

[140] Lost Islamic History, 'The Rise and Fall of Mu'tazilism' http://lostislamichistory.com/mutazilism/ Accessed 26 April 2015

[141] New World Encyclopedia, 'Mu'tazili'

law adopted a Mu'tazilite idea, the centrality of tawhid. Ibn Hanbal set a precedent for literalism and constriction of the sources. Combined with the Ash'ari and Maturidi defence of revelation, the majority of Sunni Islam came to accept the pre-eminence of revelation.[142]

IBN HAZM, IBN SALAMAH

Four hundred years after Muhammad, Abu Muhammad Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Said ibn Hazm, 'al-Andalusi', (994-1064) identified a need to purify Islam.[143] Abu al-Qasim ibn Salamah (d1032) developed Hazm's ideas on militant jihad, condoning its use against unbelievers. Ibn Salamah and Imam Qadi Musa 'Iyadh (d1149) declared jihad an individual duty rather than a collective obligation.[144] All these ideas provided a foundation for later scholars.

IBN TAYMIYYAH, AL-JAWZIYYA

A professor of Hanbali law, Taqi Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) undertook the rejuvenation of conservative Islam, reformulating the ideas of Hanbaliyyah.[145] He attacked the then-prevalent norm of *taqlid*, which bound Muslims to follow unquestioningly the interpretation of another. Ibn Taymiyyah felt no human scholar or ruler could be infallible[146], and this is perhaps no surprise given the number of teachers with whom he studied[147], and the likelihood of differences in interpretation between them. Although he advocated the process of ijtihad[148], he believed the Qur'an, Sunnah and practices of the early Muslims were the only legitimate sources. This may be the

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142 Lost Islamic History, 'The Rise and Fall of Mu'tazilism'
143 Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p14
144 Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p38
145 Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, p179
146 Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, pp180-183
147 Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, 'The Impact of Ibn Taimiyya on South Asia' in Journal of Islamic Studies vol 1 (1990), p121
148 AbuKhalil, 'The incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of the 20th century', p688

foundation of the later Salafi premise that the Companions had the foremost understanding of Islam.[149]

Ibn Taymiyyah built on the restrictiveness of Ibn Hanbal, and demonstrated some militancy: his opposition to innovation and accretion was such that he is said to have advocated jihad against sects including the Druze and Ismailis.[150] This was in spite of his apparent tolerance for unbelievers[151] although that may have been a pragmatic desire to see Islam spread. He expanded the idea of jihad and declared it the best of the voluntary duties a Muslim could perform, better even than undertaking hajj.[152] In comparing jihad to the hajj, Ibn Taymiyyah comes close to raising the status of jihad to a religious matter for Sunnis. However he still explicitly listed it as a voluntary duty.

His student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350) similarly endorsed ijtihad. Their encouragement of interpretation set up the possibility of wide divergences in opinion and belief across Islam.

Sufi scholar Shah Wali Ullah (1703-1762) developed some of Ibn Taymiyyah's concepts by advocating a return to the scriptures and the removal of accretions as bidah; he advocated limiting Sufi devotional practices.[153] Others later developed this precedent regulating customary practices. However, Wali Ullah also argued that some Qur'anic commands were specific to their historical context.[154] In so doing he promoted the use of reason in developing contemporary reconsiderations.

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[149] Jonathan A C Brown, 'Is Islam Easy to Understand or Not? Salafis, the Democratisation of Interpretation and the need for the Ulema', in *Journal of Islamic Studies* (2014): etu081, pp1-28 http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/12/10/jis.etu081.short?rss=1 Accessed 19 February 2015, p17

[150] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, pp38-39

[151] AbuKhalil, 'The incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of the 20th century', p687

[152] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p21

[153] Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, pp257-258

[154] Charles Kurzman, 'Liberal Islam and its Islamic Context', in Charles Kurzman (ed). *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p16

AL-WAHHAB

The reforms of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) were based on his perception of the corruption of the ruling Ottomans. He gave religious backing to the authority of Muhammad ibn Saud and his descendants, whose territory came to encompass the holiest places in Sunni Islam.[155]

Al-Wahhab followed Ibn Taymiyyah, and his motivations were an all-encompassing *tawhid* and the idea of loyalty to God, *wala*. Al-Wahhab felt any intermediaries in an individual's personal relationship with the divine set up competitors to God. In this way, he demoted the ulama.[156] By diluting the moderating effects of imams, al-Wahhab's example is advantageous to radicalism.

Al-Wahhab's strict monotheism saw believers as only those fully implementing the Shariah. In declaring other Muslims as outside the faith, his innovation echoed the precedent of the separatist Kharijites. Hala Fattah suggests that al-Wahhab's division of and reaction against 'Muslim unbelievers' potentially legitimised the idea of using force against them.[157]

SALAFIYYAH

The eighteenth-century Salafiyyah movement aimed to produce a just society through a return to the purity of early Islam.[158] While Salafi scholars permit some ijtihad, they reject reasoning such as kalam. As Salafis generally reject the divisions between the Sunni schools of thought, some consider them a sect in their own right.

There is disagreement about the overlap between Wahhabism and Salafism but I see the difference as being political motivation. While Salafism accommodates a wide

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[155] David Herbert and John Wolffe, 'Religion and contemporary conflict in historical perspective', in John Wolffe (ed) *Religion in History: Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence* (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2004), p294

[156] Brown, 'Is Islam Easy to Understand or Not? Salafis, the Democratisation of Interpretation and the need for the Ulema', p4

[157] Hala Fattah, ''Wahhabi' Influences, Salafi Responses: Shaikh Mahmud Shukri and the Iraqi Salafi Movement, 1745-1930' in *Journal of Islamic Studies* vol 14 no 2 (2003), pp127-148, p128

[158] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p131

range of views, its overarching aims are religious: society based on divine principles. In contrast, Wahhabism explicitly associated itself with a specific emerging nation-state. It conserves a particular culture and associates it with specific religious ideas.

We might ask how Salafi Jihadism differs to Salafism. The description of Salafi Jihadism used in the typologies appears to rest upon the inclusion of political goals within religious concerns, opposition to democracy, and willingness to use violence above the limits advocated by Shariah law. Salafism's appeal as a foundation for fundamentalist and radical ideology is clear: it provides religious justification, although this has required re-purposing a number of classical concepts. Among others, Al-Afghani and 'Abduh are credited with the mining of jihad to mobilise political change.

AL-AFGHANI

Reformist Sayyid Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897) issued an 'appeal for unity' across Islam that would lead to jihad against the West.[159] Al-Afghani advocated Islam as a total way of life, and its implementation as the responsibility of every Muslim.[160] He believed in the primacy of the Qur'an, and supported the proper use of reason, ijtihad and symbolic interpretation to understand it.[161] Based on al-Afghani's rejection of taqlid and promotion of reason, Charles Kurzman considers him significant to liberalism.[162] In contrast to Kurzman, I feel al-Afghani's enthusiasm for jihad demonstrates a radical edge. Ingram describes al-Afghani as the acknowledged founder of modern Islamism.[163] While that credit potentially also belongs to al-Wahhab, al-Afghani's ideas enable both a globalised vision of Islam and individualistic participation that fit modern identities. In his acceptance and use of Western institutions and approaches in creating his response, Al-Afghani demonstrates a modernist attitude.

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[159] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, p116
[160] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p6
[161] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, pp125-127
[162] Kurzman, 'Liberal Islam and its Islamic Context', p8
[163] Ingram, 'Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy', p511

'Abduh

Kurzman also describes Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) as a liberal thinker, based on 'Abduh's initial support for ijtihad. 'Abduh rejected taqlid, and felt applying reason to the principles of the early times would create a morality relevant to the present.[164] His early rationality later became more conservative: he felt Islam must be the clear basis for any progress in society.[165]

'Abduh's work extended a number of concepts: he expanded the definition of public interest, *maslaha*, to promote social welfare, and widened the scope of legal interpretations.[166] A co-founder of Islamic modernism, it is specifically his extraction of an imagined past, and possibly his emphasis on only Islamically-driven progress, that are relevant to radicalism.

Rida

Rashid Rida (1865-1935) revived Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas and utilised primarily the Qur'an and Sunnah, rejecting later developments.[167] He approved of ijtihad for the ulama, but reason only to resolve contradiction between the sources.[168] Kamrava feels Rida inhibited Salafism by restricting the use of reason in ijtihad.[169] Although these stances are ostensibly revivalist in nature, Rida is included among modernising thinkers given his acceptance of Western-inspired responses. Following the example of Ibn Taymiyyah, Rida was in favour of a pan-Islamic caliphate.[170]

Rida argued that religious matters, as divinely-commanded, were absolute and not open to change, although he defined religious matters as incorporating the five Pillars and jihad.[171]

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[164] Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, p347
[165] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, p139; Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p17
[166] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, p151-152
[167] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p162
[168] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, pp230-234
[169] Kamrava, 'Contextualising Innovation in Islam', p9
[170] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p163
[171] Herbert and Wolffe, 'Religion and contemporary conflict in historical perspective', p296

AL-BANNA

Fundamentalist activist Hasan Al-Banna (1906-1949) drew on Salafist ideas and those of Al-Ghazali to respond to colonialism.[172] He established a new type of association: the *Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, or Muslim Brotherhood.[173] This exemplified Al-Banna's view of jihad, which included social reform.[174] His community-oriented movement was one ultimately willing to consider violence to achieve its goals though. The Brotherhood's slogan set out its priorities: 'Allah is our objective; the Qur'an is the constitution; the Prophet is our leader; jihad is our way; death for the sake of Allah is our wish.' The Brotherhood gained legitimacy by framing its authority through Shariah.[175] It also demonstrated the potential success and real-world appeal of Islamic governance in a modern context.

Voll notes the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology.[176] Al-Banna's concept of jihad became increasingly militant; he set up the *al-Jihaz al-Khass*, whose members received military training and later superseded his purpose by conducting terrorist acts.[177] Al-Banna also modified Al-Wahhab's call to fight Muslim unbelievers into a charge against all unbelievers.[178] In this way, he began reintroducing the medieval concept of a *jahiliyyah* society, setting ignorance as the opposition to life governed by Shariah.[179] All those whose actions were ungoverned by Shariah were effectively outside Islam.

MAWDUDI

Abu al-A'la 'Mawlana' Mawdudi (1903-1979), the founder of the *Jamaat-i-Islami* movement, tried to update Islam, his reforms including the idea of laypeople being

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[172] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p14
[173] Wood, 'Rethinking Fundamentalism: Ruhollad Khomeini, Mawlana Mawdudi, and the Fundamentalist Model', p174
[174] Imady, *The Rise & Fall of Muslim Civil Society*, p73
[175] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p180
[176] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p210
[177] Imady, *The Rise & Fall of Muslim Civil Society*, pp74-77
[178] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p31
[179] AbuKhalil, 'The incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of the 20th century', p680

proactive in their own religious education and interpretation.[180] He interpreted the Qur'an freely, rejecting taqlid and reliance on the ulama.[181] Mawdudi classified nine aspects of renewal that a mujaddid might work towards, including intellectual revolution, defence of Islam, revival of the Islamic system. He justified a call for universal jihad by citing western cultural aggression, a defence Karen Armstrong describes as innovation.[182] Anti-colonial responses had already existed for a century prior: it is the stress laid on a specifically cultural aggression – globalisation – which was new. Mawdudi also modernised the concept of a coming mahdi, revising this as revolutionary leadership[183], perhaps to inspire others or intended as his own legacy. In contrast to state-sponsoring Wahhabism, Mawdudi rejected nationalism.[184] He saw human power as a source of conflict, and stretched the idea of tawhid into the exclusive right of God to rule, *hakimiyyah*, under which human rulers were restricted to carrying out divine will. [185] Mawdudi further updated the idea of jahiliyyah from historical ignorance of Islam to modern decline in belief.[186]

QUTB

A journalist and literary critic, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) developed anti-Western feelings and began analysing the Qur'an. His built on Mawdudi's legacy and the work of Indian academic Abu al-Hasan 'Ali al-Nadawi to develop jahiliyyah.[187] Qutb defined the modern age of Jahiliyyah as determined rejection of revelation, worse than the pre-modern simple ignorance.[188] He was criticised by Mawdudi's supporters for this

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[180] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p60
[181] Wood, 'Rethinking Fundamentalism: Ruhollad Khomeini, Mawlana Mawdudi, and the Fundamentalist Model', p184
[182] Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, pp237-239
[183] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, pp60-62
[184] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p236
[185] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, pp60-61
[186] Wood, 'Rethinking Fundamentalism: Ruhollad Khomeini, Mawlana Mawdudi, and the Fundamentalist Model', p174
[187] Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism, 3rd Edition – The Story of Islamist Movements*, pp121-122
[188] Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, p241

change.[189] Qutb's Jahiliyyah, a wilful opposition to Islam, exacerbates the divisiveness of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Qutb also followed al-Wahhab's innovation in differentiating between Muslims.

Following precedents set by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi, Qutb re-conceived individual duty as including the transformation of *jahili* society through outreach or preaching, *dawah*, and militant jihad. [190] He built on the idea of an imagined past, advocating the action of the early Muslims[191] as opposed to later passivity[192]. He disapproved of consensus as being an elevation of reason.[193]

Qutb also updated the meaning of the term *hijrah*. The term had described pre-Islamic pagan pilgrimage to Mecca.[194] Within Islam, the first use of hijrah described Muhammad's flight from Mecca to Medinah, and for a while relocation to Medina was compulsory until Mecca was secured as Muslim territory.[195] The term has also represented the renunciation of – or flight from – practices hateful to God.[196] Qutb re-defined hijrah as separation from unbelievers and as a stage through which Muslim societies developed. This view reinforces another idea of his: that following hijrah, Muslim society would enter the stage of jihad – echoing again the historical events of the seventh century CE. Qutb's retrieval of old concepts appears at first revivalist in nature; his re-framing of them might even be considered progressive, depending on

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[189] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, p151

[190] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p85

[191] Qutb, *Milestones*, p9

[192] Qutb, *Milestones*, p19

[193] Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism, 3rd Edition – The Story of Islamist Movements*, p140

[194] AbuKhalil, 'The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the end of the 20th Century', p681

[195] F K Khan Durrani, *Mishkat-ul-Masabeeh*, trans. Capt A N Matthews (Lahore: Tabligh Literature Company [undated]) http://aaiil.org/text/books/others/durrani/mishkatulmasabeehmasabih/mishkatulmasabeehmasabih.pdf Accessed 07 June 2015, p3

[196] Israr Ahmad, 'The Basis for Organisation of a Revivalist Party in Islam', http://archive.org/stream/BooksofDrisrarAhmad/BaiyahTheBasisofOrganizationenglish-drisrarAhmad-www.islamchest.org_djvu.txt Accessed 15 March 2015

your view of the need for, and cultural subjugation of, Islam. However his selectivity and militancy place him firmly among radical thought.

Qutb drew on Muhammad's life to provide examples of separation from ignorance, proactive jihad against non-Muslims, and the establishment of an Islamic State.[197] Jihad is a prominent and recurring theme in Qutb's writing.[198] He quoted extensively from the Qur'an to validate his ideology.[199] He acknowledges that his readers may be unused to Qur'anic quotations employed in these ways – but contrarily justifies their use as providing 'greater accessibility' to the layperson. Their inclusion is intended to give his ideas authority, and Al Qaradawi is among the scholars who reject Qutb's selective use of the Qur'an in this way.[200]

Qutb's most famous work, *Milestones*, has the style of a manifesto. He sets up 'mission': re-creating the stages through which Islam passed in its growth, and extending this recreation to include advances Muhammad might have undertaken. These include freeing Arab lands from imperialism, starting a re-distributive social movement, and imposing tawhid.[201] In so doing, Muhammad's authority is invoked in support of Qutb's creation of 'unfinished business' that other Muslims might carry out, primarily aimed at modern political goals. He establishes the potential for moral superheroes, which speaks to modern individualism and culture.

Among the ideas of other writers appropriated by Qutb, or his brother Mohammed Qutb[202], was Mawdudi's concept of *al-hakimiyyah*, God's exclusive rulership. The Qutbian expansion of hakimiyyah defined God as the only possible ruler: any Muslim

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[197] Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, p242
[198] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p35
[199] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, p98
[200] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, pp177-178
[201] Qutb, *Milestones*, pp25-27
[202] Hassan Hassan, *The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context* (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016) http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context-pub-63746 Accessed 08 July 2016, p8

obeying human laws was therefore raising humans to the level of the divine.[203] From this perspective, any submission to man-made law consequently qualified that society as jahili, deliberately rejecting God's absolute authority in all spheres.[204] Qutb's writing provides radical groups such as al-Takfir and al-Jihad with a basis to declare Muslims who follow any human law as legitimate targets for retribution.[205]
Hrair Dekmejian states that Qutb derived hakimiyyah from the concepts of sovereignty, divinity and Lordship, described together by *al-uluhiyyah*, *al-rububiyyah* and *al-rabbaniyyah*. Dekmejian notes the lack of Qur'anic foundation in hakimiyyah, and while noting the roles of Mawdudi and al-Banna in establishing the idea, gives earlier theorists Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Jawziyyah the greater credit for inspiring Qutb.[206]

Qutb in turn inspires the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other groups. Former Islamist Ed Husain notes how Qutb was himself influenced by Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideas while he was in prison, and Husain casts *Milestones* as a version of the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).[207] However, there are differences, among them the concept of hijrah. HT emphasises Muhammad's military ambitions rather than the physical separation Qutb discusses.[208] Qutb and HT founder An-Nabahani's views are reciprocal: Qutb's opinion that an idea is only operationalised within a system of belief, *'aqidah*, appears to validate An-Nabahani's *System of Islam*.

While key themes are revised to suit different contexts, radical thought can be critical of its antecedents, and contest key points. The author(s) of *The Management of Savagery* baldly reject the 'distorted' proofs used by the Brotherhood.[209] Qutb saw the

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[203] Qutb, *Milestones*, p36
[204] Qutb, *Milestones*, p82
[205] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p64
[206] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, pp85-86
[207] Ed Husain, *The Islamist* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2007), p89
[208] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p146
[209] Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, trans. William McCants, funded by the John M Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, 23 May 2006 https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-

decline of Islam at the time of the Umayyads as not just the result of tribalism but also a consequence of the use of ends to justify means.[210] In this Qutb follows traditional understandings: contributory actions that are *haram* cannot result in anything but an outcome that is also haram. In spite of this, HT states any means are permissible to achieve their goals. [211] I will return to this key concept of means later, but it is worth noting that Qutb was critical of the premise.

KHOMEINI

The texts provided a basis for other quite different innovations. In developing fiqh, Shi'ite *usulis* achieved capability over the sources that created a religious hierarchy.[212] Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902-1989) transformed Shi'ism in Iran; his revolutionary ideas changed the tradition of vigilance for the hidden Imam. Khomeini invented 'the guardianship of the jurist', whereby religious leaders could also rule populations. He later elaborated this into another new idea, 'the absolute government of the jurist', in which religious leaders governed and held pre-eminence over the Shariah thanks to their ability to uncover hidden truths. Khomeini is often included among those individuals who inspired radicalism owing to his influence in the Iranian Revolution. In addition to his militancy, I include him here among radical ideologues because of his innovations, and as his reformist concepts were deliberate departures from traditionalism.[213]

AL AWLAKI, AZZAM

Anwar Al Awlaki (1971-2011) followed Qutbian example in refashioning ideas: he stated that it is obligatory for Muslims to reinstate Shariah and an Islamic caliphate. Yet his writing was not aimed at spiritual revival, but worldly goals. He based his opinion that 'physical jihad' is obligatory and continual on its appearance in hundreds

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most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf Accessed 19 February 2015, pp98-99

[210] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, p72

[211] Taqiuddin An-Nabahani, *The System of Islam (Nidham ul Islam)* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2002), p76

[212] Adam J Silverstein, *Islamic History – A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p114

[213] Wood, 'Rethinking Fundamentalism: Ruhollah Khomeini, Mawlana Mawdudi, and the Fundamentalist Model', pp181-182

of Qur'anic verses and ahadith.[214] Al Awlaki states that jihad is the pinnacle of Islam – a description usually reserved for *salah* – implying this is the best of the practices for approaching God. While encouraging martyrdom and allegedly directing militant operations, Al Awlaki appears to have avoided fighting 'physical jihad' himself. Jay Winter has described martyrdom as integral to Islamic radicalism.[215] In encouraging martyrdom, Al Awlaki circumvents the collective obligation required for jihad, and allocates responsibility to individual martyrs instead. Al Awlaki also countermanded Muhammad's injunction to obey one's parents (al-Bukhari 4:52, 248), stating that disobedience to parents becomes a virtue in order to fight jihad.[216] This follows a fatwa of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941-1989), a co-founder of Al-Qaeda. In his writings, Azzam quotes Ibn Taymiyyah a great deal. Probably influenced by Qutb, Azzam composed a fatwa changing the obligation to fight jihad – in this case, in Afghanistan. In making jihad an obligation of every individual, rather than of the community, Azzam states that obtaining permission to undertake it, such as from one's family, is not required. While Azzam concedes that jihad and parental obedience are both individual duties, *fard ayn*, he says protection of the religion through jihad takes priority over individual safety and the distress of one's parents.[217]

To emphasise the level of obligation at which Al Awlaki locates jihad, he stated in his lectures that jihad, salah and sawm are all equal forms of worship.[218] Here again he compares jihad to salah, and plainly defines religious matters as including jihad. Azzam goes further, saying that an individual's jihad is more important than prayer and

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[214] Anwar Al Awlaki, *The State of the Ummah*, http://www.authentictauheed.com/2009/12/state-of-ummah-imam-anwar-al-awlaki.html Accessed 19/02/2015

[215] Jay Winter, 'War and Martyrdom in the Twentieth Century and After', in Martyrdom and Memory in Eastern Europe, *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society*, vol 1, no 2 (2015), p221

[216] Anwar Al Awlaki, *Constants on the Path of Jihad by Shaykh Yusuf al 'Uyayree* (Lecture Series) trans. 'Mujahid Fe Sabeelillah' http://www.islamicline.com/islamicbooks/new/current/Constants_on_The_Path_of_Jihad_(www.islamicline.com).pdf Accessed 19 February 2015, p41

[217] Abdullah Azzam, 'Defense of the Muslim Lands – The First Obligation After Iman', trans. Brothers in Ribatt, http://www.kalamullah.com Accessed 02 April 2015, p29

[218] Al Awlaki, *Constants on the Path of Jihad by Shaykh Yusuf al 'Uyayree*, p43

fasting. He bases this on a quote from Ibn Taymiyyah, which declares jihad to be Muslims' first obligation after faith.[219] Even while Islamist Yusuf al Qaradawi states that only God may determine matters of worship[220], other extremist scholars create new practice and requirement, even in religious matters. These revisions invite reforms that specifically serve a radical agenda: fighting a geopolitical jihad.

AL-MAQDISI, AL-ZAWAHIRI, AL-ZARQAWI

Jordanian-Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi revised the concept of wala, loyalty to God, applying this to human laws – echoing the Qutbian revision of hakimiyyah. For al-Maqdisi, everything outside God's laws must be rejected: *al-wala wal-bara*, loyalty to God and denial of all else. While this approach might appear revivalist, the application to human laws gives it a reforming agenda. However its oppositionist nature and emphasis on an exclusivist jihadism makes clear its radical stance.

One hadith speaks of Islam's 73 sects (Abu Dawud 41, 4579), noting that only one is on the correct path. Jihadis and radicals see themselves as this chosen sect, and all other Muslims as outside this – such a view helps justify their violence against fellow believers.

Another proponent of global jihad, the Egyptian Al-Qaeda strategist and successor to Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, supported creating a caliphate, but he was to see the Islamic State group ultimately turn against Al-Qaeda.[221]

Maqdisi taught Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006), the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq and a leading ideologue of Islamic State, when they were in prison together in the

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[219] Azzam, 'Defense of the Muslim Lands – The First Obligation After Iman' (trans. Brothers in Ribatt), p34

[220] Al Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*, pp16-18

[221] Cole Bunzel, 'From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State', *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World*, Centre for Middle East Policy at Brookings, No. 19, March 2015, p30

1990s, and Maqdisi also taught other theorists of Islamic State.[222] Al-Zarqawi's sectarian anti-Shi'ism led him to leave Al-Qaeda, where the motivation was opposing Western culture. The Jihadi Salafist movement divided: Al-Qaeda prioritising anti-Western jihad, and Islamic State prioritising anti-Shi'ite jihad.[223]

The brand of Jihadi Salafism would appear stretched to breaking point by modern extremists. Theology appears less important than political goals. Whereas many of the responses to cultural and economic crises before the 1960s (with the exception of Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism) aimed at increasing the strength and authenticity of Islam, the more recent responses aim to differentiate within Islam and between Muslims. This is where modern radicalism is easy to spot: rather than spiritual evolutions that strengthen the ummah, radical ideologies are specific revisions of classical Islam necessary to support the militant pursuit of particular geopolitical gains.

In the absence of scholarly training and qualifications, extremist policies are opportunistic alloys. Sutton and Vertigans credit a range of people and groups as being influential in al-Qaeda's ideology, including Ibn Taymiyyah, Wahhabism, the Deobandis, Jamaat-i-Islami, and the Muslim Brotherhood.[224] Interactions are wide-ranging, and as we will now see, have both influenced and drawn upon liberal and modernist approaches as well.

3.2 Wider impacts and interactions

Aspects of radicalism have influenced other movements. After China's Ma Mingxin (d1781) absorbed such teachings, he transformed the usually silent Sufi practice of *tariqa* into the vocal recitation of his militant *Jahriyya* 'New Teaching'. Haji Shariaht

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[222] Bunzel, 'From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State', pp10-13

[223] Mohammad Abu Rumman, *I Am A Salafi: A Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis* (Amman, Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014), pp127-128, p154

[224] Philip W Sutton and Stephen Vertigans, 'Islamic "New Social Movements"? Radical Islam, Al-Qa'ida and Social Movement Theory' in *Mobilisation: An International Journal* vol 11, no 1 (2006), p105

Ullah (1781-1840), influenced by Wahhabism, founded the *Faraizi* movement to remove syncretic Hindu practices from Indian Islam.

Tunisian teacher Rashid Al Ghannouchi (b1941), described as a liberal, was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood to co-found *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah* – he led this and other groups, including the *Hizb al-Nahdah* and *Harakat al Ittijah al-Islami*. He saw jihad as socio-political[225], favouring non-violent social change and democratic consultation, *shura*[226]. Al Ghannouchi condemned the use of takfir.[227]

Conversely, Urdu poet Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) inspired radical theorists by promoting reason and freedom of interpretation. Described as the most influential liberal Muslim of the twentieth century, he advocated innovation and creativity, seeing the Qur'an as encouraging reason.[228] While liberalism uses interpretative freedom to produce syncretic readings accommodating human rights and democracy, radicalism revises meaning and removes adaptations. Counter-intuitively, some of their aims are similar, although their methods are very different. Liberal concerns have included social justice, and a number of radical actors have worked to oppose unjust rule; one of Qutb's main themes was opposition to tyranny.

The following flowchart of the key contributions to radical thought attempts to show the interrelationship of some of the ideas, individuals and movements. The interactions confirm many of the main premises of Sunni radical thinking and jihadism today depend on the reformulation of existing concepts from earlier times.

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[225] Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism, 3rd Edition – The Story of Islamist Movements*, p203

[226] DinwaDawla 'Rashid Al Ghannoushi 1941: Islamic Reformer, Thinker and Party Leader', https://dinwdawla.wordpress.com/2012/07/08/7-rashid-al-ghannoushi-1941-islamic-reformer-thinker-and-party-leader/ Accessed 14 March 2015

[227] AbuKhalil, 'The incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of the 20th century', p679

[228] Kurzman, 'Liberal Islam and its Islamic Context', p25

3.2 Influences on radicalism – a concept-based analysis



In the flowchart (Fig 3.2) the key paths in the development of extremist concepts are shown in gold. The connectivity is not exhaustive, but reflects the ancestry of concepts.

Although dialogue and common goals exist among modern-day extremists, there are disagreements about scope and methodology. Not all of the theorists featuring in the flowchart are militant – but their ideas have proved useful in constructing radical ideologies. I will identify the main concepts shortly.

I have tried to assign the ideas as closely as possible to the correct chronological period (while allowing depiction of the interconnectedness). The obvious pattern resulting from this is that many of the concepts influential today developed within the last 200 years. This seems to confirm the theories proposed by Armstrong and Stump and discussed in chapter 2, that fundamentalism (and so radicalism) is a modern phenomenon, driven by colonialism. However what is also clear is that many of the ideas in the period 1800-2000 seem to have their roots in the period 1200-1400, and Ibn Taymiyyah's contributions. That there appear to be relatively few direct originators seems analogous to radicalism's selectivity and regressive innovation.

Collectives dominate early development; later thought is characterised by individual activists. This is potentially attributable to the relative lack of written records from early Islamic history, and may also demonstrate greater contemporary acceptability for the opinions of individual strategists.

Radical thought is not just a response to forces outside Islam; it has also responded to authentically Islamic movements and events. Ideas about rule may have inspired Abu Nasr Al-Farabi (870-950) and Ibn Sina, called Avicenna (980-1037), who wrote about the use of reason as well as imagination. Ibn Sina empowered professor and theologian Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) to apply scientific methods to his study

of Sufism; he created greater understanding between orthodoxy and mysticism.[229] He popularised Ashari doctrines – the importance of revelation – and explored obligation. Tunisian writer Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) followed Al-Ghazali in his use of mysticism.[230] In contrast, reacting against Al-Ghazali, the Andalusian scholar Ibn Rushd, called Averroes (1126-1198), defended the use of reason, but preserved philosophy for the elite. This was evidently a period of great debate about the strength and purpose of reason and intuition in Islam.

The development of modernising ideas occurred alongside the explosion of fundamentalist perspectives. Al-Afghani developed concepts used by both radicals and modernists. He embraced the religious egalitarianism of his time and extrapolated minority culturalist ideas into concepts of pan-Islamism and statehood, influencing Egyptian scholar 'Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888-1986), who contested the religious authority of caliphs, arguing for division between religion and state politics. [231]

Reaction to change and crisis in Islam has the potential to be both modernising or radical, depending on the intention and interpretation applied to the sources.

3.3 Concepts in radicalism

The concepts charted above all resulted from new interpretations and extensions of Islam. The contributions to radical thought or jihadism often seem intended to validate implementation of Shariah through physical jihad. Oppression seems to be the motivation for many of the responses and interpretations aimed at establishing a caliphate. Equally, these concepts have arguably also prompted ijtihad among non-radicals aimed at pursuing essentially the opposite: integration and modernism.

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[229] W Montgomery Watt (trans.), *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1994), pp9-13

[230] Charles Issawi and Oliver Leaman, 'Ibn Khaldun, 'Abd al-Rahman (1332-1406)' (Routledge, 1998), http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H024.htm Accessed 28 March 2015

[231] Ibrahim Kalin, 'Sayyid Jamal al-Din Muhammad b. Safdar al-Afghani (1838-1897)' http://www.cis-ca.org/voices/a/afghni.htm Accessed 28 March 2015

All Islamic scholars, including those with militant intentions, seek to demonstrate authenticity and show the validity of the faith in the modern world.[232] By drawing on a restricted knowledge base, radical thinkers have often introduced reformed practice and obligations for Muslims.[233] In general, radical theorists have revised existing ideas. The succeeding 'elaborations' of some of the concepts do echo the elaboration of some of the concepts in the Qur'an in the successive revelations received by Muhammad. The process of refinement and reworking is therefore not without precedent and such evolutions can contribute to the relevance of faith. I would argue however that the revision of some concepts, particularly by the under-qualified, offer 'false context' supporting specific ends as opposed to an evolution that meets the needs of the majority of the ummah.

As Islam developed, ulama undertook strenuous training to make considered assessments of the available sources. With increasing reformism, many have argued within the Sunni and Shi'a traditions against intellectual elitism and for the right of all Muslims to offer interpretation.[234] A lack of qualifications and training is advantageous to radicals, who in Sunnism have tended to be 'laymen'[235], as ideological freedom is obtained without the cost of coherence or permissibility.

The false context potentially introduced by such lay interpretations is worth exploring briefly before reviewing some of the main concepts affected. There is a Qur'anic ayah often quoted in respect of determining *kufr:*

> *'And whoever does not rule by what God has revealed, truly they are the unbelievers'* (5:44)[236]

Supporters of the need for Shariah law have used this verse to justify their position. While also useful to those proscribing an unjust ruler, this verse might have been

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[232] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p362
[233] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p118
[234] Kamrava, 'Contextualising Innovation in Islam', p76
[235] Shepard, 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', p316
[236] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p82

among those Qutb built upon in his thinking that any subscription to human-made law defied the rule of God and rendered a society jahili. The verse originally had a different interpretation, made by the Companion Ibn Abbas, who ruled that the unbelief discussed did not place the subject 'outside the Muslim community'.[237] This early interpretation is thus in harmony with the classic Sunni principle that holds that those who pray towards Mecca cannot be unbelievers, unless they deny religious matters. A literal use of this verse may be advantageous for jihadis in enabling the differentiation of less strict Muslims as unbelievers, but it is not necessarily an authentic understanding. As we will see, different readings have suited the context of particular times and particular writers, such as Ibn Taymiyyah's differentiation between good and sinful Muslims, which provided his justification for revolt against unjust rulers.[238]

TAKFIR

For any individual's actions to be considered unbelief, they must also demonstrate this as an intention.[239] Takfir is the act of deeming an individual to be outside the faith – no longer a Muslim. Salafis hold that making this judgement is a serious matter, requiring sufficient religious authority.[240] Sects differ as to its meaning and the authority required. This variance has proved useful to radicals and fundamentalists, allowing them to declare the unbelief of those not subscribing to their particular ideologies. The concept of *al-takfir wa al-istihlal* is used to justify killing believers not members of their group.[241] Al-istihlal means to make something permitted that is otherwise forbidden; it is effectively a human intervention in divine law. This is useful to extremists in justifying their views, but inconsistent with their professed idea that God's sovereignty should be foremost. For example, Mawdudi states in *Let Us Be*

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[237] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p82

[238] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p22

[239] Salafi Publications.com, 'Nine Rules Concerning Kufr and Takfir', 25 July 2002, http://www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=MNJ09&articleID=MNJ090006&articlePages=1 Accessed 25 July 2015, p6

[240] Salafi Publications.com, 'Nine Rules Concerning Kufr and Takfir', p6

[241] Tawfik Hamid, *Inside Jihad – How Radical Islam Works, Why it Should Terrify Us, How to Defeat It* (Mountain Lake Park, Maryland, Mountain Lake Press: 2015), p83

Muslims that obeying man-made laws – in his view, setting up humans with the same level of respect accorded to God – renders the individual as kuffar, an unbeliever. He validates this with the ayah (5:44) discussed above, but translates it differently, using 'judge' instead of 'rule', and creating a potential change in sense and the possibility of individual responsibility: whoever fails to judge by revelation is equivalent to an unbeliever. In this way, he equates the act of sin with unbelief. This suits his purpose in admonishing believers for their personal transgressions, and creates reprisal by separating them from Islam. And yet the wider context surrounding this verse in the Qur'an is God's recommendation of forgiveness and the forgoing of harsh punishment. Another translation of the same ayah speaks of rejection (and later of grave wrong) but not of exclusion from the faith:

> *'…those who do not judge according to what God has sent down are rejecting [God's teachings].'* (5:44)[242]

This demonstrates the possibilities of interpretation created using extracts out of their wider context. I will now discuss a different example involving a hadith in which a portion is decontextualised for the purposes of jihadism in a way that denies its true meaning.

CHANGES IN EMPHASIS

The terrorist group Islamic State (IS) employs a sound hadith that seems otherwise little-used. The group has used a portion of it in editions of its former magazine, *Dabiq*.[243]

The portion is one in which Muhammad states:

> *'And I command you with five [things] that Allah commanded me: Listening and Obeying, Jihad, Hijrah, and the Jama'ah.'* (Al-Tirmidhi 5:42, 2863)[244]

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[242] Abdel Haleem (trans.) *The Qur'an*, p72

[243] Islamic State, *Dabiq* Issue 1 (July 2014), Al-Hayat Media Center, via http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq Accessed 28 March 2015, p13; Islamic State, *Dabiq* Issue 4 (September 2014), Al-Hayat Media Center, via http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq Accessed 28 March 2015, p3

[244] Sunnah.com, Al-Tirmidhi 5:42, 2863 https://sunnah.com/urn/630960 Accessed 04 February 2017

Reproduction permitted by Sunnah.com: https://sunnah.com/about

The group's use of this extract appears to validate the formation of an organisation, and of an obligation to undertake hijrah and jihad. Choueiri cites both these latter activities as sequential phases within Islamic revivalism[245], and so the existence of this hadith is valuable to radical groups.

This usage, of just this part of the hadith, gives an authority to ideas that are useful to the group, and appear to bolster their cause. The entire hadith actually begins with and devotes more time to a parable, which it attributes to Yahya bin Zakariyya, John the Baptist. The narrative appears partly related to the Parable of the Unjust Steward, of which early Muslims may have been aware. The portion above makes sense within the story, which outlines the Pillars of Islam before stating the above five activities which correlate with and illustrate each of the Pillars, the point of the hadith. The Pillars are the Shahadah (obeying through testimony), Salah (listening through prayer), Sawm (the jihad of conquering one's desires), Zakah (benefitting the community, then the Jama'ah), and Hajj (the physical enactment of the original hijrah). Correlating both sets of five things gives Muslims the reasons why they should carry out the Pillars, and examples as to how – and it also potentially helps explain Islam to new Muslims who were familiar with Christian stories and parables.

The overall hadith reminds Muslims that God's message has been sent before; that devotions and responsibilities should be carried out as if in God's presence, and that the benefits and blessings from practice and effort carried out in God's name are due to Him. The hadith continues:

> *'For indeed whoever parts from the Jama'ah the measure of a hand-span, then he has cast off the yoke of Islam from his neck, unless he returns. …'*

This sentence seems to urge cohesion, and so the continuation of the ummah. But the use and context of this sentence by the Islamic State group seems to create an emphasis on joining the group through hijrah to carry out the jihad of physical fighting. This change in emphasis, and denial of its original context, denies Muslims the truth. Selectivity in choosing just these small portions of the narrative to use in isolated

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[245] Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism, 3rd Edition – The Story of Islamist Movements*, p24

quotes gives a completely different context to Muhammad's words – one to their advantage as a group trying to recruit new members.

New ideas also result from changes in perspectives and the meaning of concepts. In chapter 2, I outlined how radicals updated the concept of Dar al-Harb to ascribe antagonism to everything outside Dar al-Islam. The idea of jahiliyyah was similarly lifted out of its original context by Qutb, who revised its meaning to that of a deliberate rejection of God's will. Mawdudi's resurrection of hakimiyyah was also altered by Qutb, although some sources credit this instead to Qutb's brother, Muhammad.

There are three possible main motives at work behind these revisions. Firstly, the new meanings reinforce the need to live by Shariah. Secondly, they support the idea of wilful ignorance or non-compliance posed by non-Muslims and Muslims outside radical boundaries. Lastly, the updated concepts set a challenge, and delegate responsibility to individuals to answer that challenge.

MEANS

Long-held values are also the subject of revisions. Traditional principles as well as contemporary writers show how 'Islam is not a religion in which the ends justify the means'.[246] Islamist Yusuf al-Qaradawi, writing at the same time as Qutb, shows how an action contributing to a goal defined as haram renders that action haram as well. He emphasises that God is the only arbiter of permissibility, and that good intentions cannot make haram actions acceptable.[247] Therefore, in pursuit of any objective it is vital to understand the means and their permissibility. Hizb ut-Tahrir's *System of Islam* states that in respect of delivering dawah, no harm results from using any means. Their goal in this is to avoid compromise in thought or method, and to establish an Islamic state. An-Nabahani attempts to validate his statement with a story of Muhammad sanctioning the destruction of idols, as that particular act did not

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[246] Waleed El-Ansary, 'The Economics of Terrorism: How Bin Laden has Changed the Rules of the Game' in Joseph E B Lumbard (ed). *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition* (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc, 2009), p205

[247] Al Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*, pp28-31

contravene the aqidah.[248] However, it does not follow that any means are permissible in the delivery of dawah today.

JIHAD

In the context of jihad, Anwar Al Awlaki also held that the end justified the means.[249] In this he sacrifices religious principle for military goals, although Islamism expert Tawfik Hamid states that scholars agree violent interpretations are valid.[250] Irrespective of this, jihad is governed by collective obligation – in carrying out fighting (the 'lesser jihad'), as well as the repudiation of evil (the 'greater jihad').

Traditionally, once fighting jihad is formally authorised, its obligations apply only to providing a defensive force.[251] To exploit this, Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the co-founder of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, extended the traditional idea of defensive jihad to encompass even risks of indignity[252] and made it obligatory for all Muslims [Articles 12 and 15][253]. Jihad did not always mean aggression: in the eighth century CE, Ibn Ishaq stated that Muhammad received permission to fight as part of his jihad, whereas previously jihad had emphasised fortitude.[254]

EXPANSION OF TAWHID

Al-Wahhab conceived three types of *tawhid*, comprising: affirmation of God's creation, sovereignty, and control of affairs; God's right as the sole recipient of worship; and conviction in God's names and attributes.[255] Al-Wahhab's conception of tawhid also

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[248] An-Nabahani, *System of Islam*, pp73-76
[249] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p10
[250] Hamid, *Inside Jihad – How Radical Islam Works, Why it Should Terrify Us, How to Defeat It*, p36
[251] Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, p151; Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid, 'The idea of the jihad in Islam before the Crusades', pp169-170
[252] Herbert and Wolffe, 'Religion and contemporary conflict in historical perspective', p293
[253] Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, 'The Charter of Hamas', Reading 12 in John Wolffe, *Study Guide 5 Religion, Conflict and Coexistence since the Holocaust; Religion in History – Conflict Conversion and Coexistence* (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2005), p120
[254] Sadakat Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law* (London: Vintage Books, 2012), p8
[255] Muhammad bin Saalih Al-'Uthaimeen, *The Creed*, trans. Saleh As-Saleh, http://abdurrahman.org/salah/FiqhulIbaadat.pdf Accessed 15 March 2015, pp26-33

involved his view that individuals were required to demonstrate all three aspects to remain Muslims.[256] Tawhid is the theological keystone for jihadism and radical thought: following God alone. Mawdudi used this re-definition of tawhid to revive the notion of hakimiyyah, God's exclusive rulership. This idea would have helped bind together the early Muslims, and perhaps was useful to Muhammad to convince converts that he did not seek their allegiance in his own name. It conveys the faith as beyond any human dynasty or frailty.

While tawhid helps justify the role of Shariah and freedom from tyranny, Mawdudi and the Qutb brothers extended its scope to encompass obeying any man-made law, which action they decreed set humans up as equal to God. Yet, Jackson notes that Ibn Taymiyyah himself had previously tried to ensure the state had the scope to enact laws for the betterment of practice.[257] To restrict the application of law potentially created a narrowing of the ways in which worshipping God might be possible.

The concept of tawhid is sufficiently wide that it has also found expression in other ways. Sociologist Ali Shariati (1939-1977) developed the idea of tawhid differently, expanding it to encompass God's creation of the universe and all levels of human society. This cross-society unity was applied as a revolutionary response opposing the Iranian authorities: an Islamic liberation theology.[258] Thus the original concept, expanded by Al-Wahhab, ultimately led to variants creating both fewer and greater freedoms.

Shariati's expansion of tawhid into universalism may have facilitated the thinking of his Iranian contemporary, Khomeini. Shariati 'equalised' all levels of society as God's creation. Khomeini may have also understood a concept of tawhid as ensuring the inviolability of the religious – even to the extent where spiritual rule, and rulers, must

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[256] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p23
[257] Jackson, 'Liberal/Progressive, Modern and Modernised Islam', p176
[258] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p306; Mohamed Tahar Bensaada, *The Islamic Liberation Theology of Ali Shariati*, trans. Karen Wirsig, http://www.decolonialtranslation.com/english/the-islamic-liberation-theology-of-ali-shariatiEng.html Accessed 14 March 2015

lead society. In Islam, rulers theoretically implement divine legislation, rather than creating legislation themselves. Qutb had explicitly rejected the possibility of the 'spokesmen of God' becoming rulers.[259] Khomeini's invention of the Guardianship of the Jurist effectively challenges this, putting theologians above any of the other sources of law.

CHANGES IN OBLIGATION

Scholars have long argued changes to revealed obligations, attempting to recruit Muslims to their worldly causes. Ibn Salamah and 'Iyadh had proposed jihad as an individual duty for Sunnis in the eleventh and twelfth centuries AD. Qutb reasserted this individual obligation, which – like al-Wahhab's demonstration of three aspects of tawhid – raises the requirements for being a Sunni Muslim higher than those specified by God. Al-Qaeda co-founder Abdullah Azzam codified Qutb's intention into a fatwa, imposing the obligation to fight jihad individually on each Muslim, citing it as an act of worship.[260]

Obligation is also vital to Al Awlaki's conception of jihad. Al Awlaki emphasised the level of duty at which he located jihad, equating it with salah and sawm.[261] Similarly, the Egyptian Al-Jihad group hold that jihad is 'the forgotten pillar'.[262] One popular website states that all properly-motivated actions in pursuit of submission are acts of worship.[263] Rida had earlier located jihad as a religious matter with the five Pillars, and as having a similarly 'unchanging nature', in contrast to social matters. The distinction between religious and social matters, the classification of actions as mandatory, voluntary or permissible, and the status of fatwa are at the heart of an understanding of innovations in Islam. I will explore these topics, and their intersection with religious innovation, in chapter 4.

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[259] Qutb, *Milestones*, p58

[260] Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism, 3rd Edition – The Story of Islamist Movements*, p226

[261] Al Awlaki, *Constants on the Path of Jihad by Shaykh Yusuf al 'Uyayree*, p43

[262] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, p180

[263] IslamiCity in Cyberspace, 'Basics of Becoming a Muslim'; edited from Abul A'la Mawdudi, "Towards Understanding Islam" trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Markfield: The Islamic Foundation 1982) www.islamicity.com/mosque/muslim.htm Accessed 27 February 2015

Rida's separation of religious and social matters was in line with Islamic jurisprudence. Although caliphs were ruling on God's behalf, it was necessary to ensure they could not alter the basic rituals and practices required of Muslims, and that their decrees were not seen as revelation.[264] Egyptian scholar 'Ali 'Ab al-Raziq's separation of the religious from the political also seems to emulate this principle. These distinctions appear to lay the foundation for liberal readings that consider Shariah and secular law separately within a democratic society.

Mary Habeck notes the assumptions within ahadith and the schools of fiqh that military successes will ensure Shariah's eventual supremacy.[265] But this assumes formation of a force across the population through a collective obligation and relies on an antiquated view of international relations: a militant community experienced by the early Muslims and thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyyah. Al-Raziq provides an alternative by showing that the first Medinan community need not be imitated as the only framework for organisation of the ummah.[266] Further justification for militancy comes from the idea of an 'imagined past', evoking the period of jihad-based Muslim expansion as the faith established itself.[267] Community-based obligations to fight would have been expedient then, but given modern professionalised forces, extremist groups need to re-frame the obligation to fight as an individual duty to obtain new recruits.

ORGANISATION AND TECHNOLOGY

Modern methods of organisation and media have come to dominate radical action, sometimes altering classical doctrine. [268] The mass distribution of printed communications helped spread reformist ideas: Rida's journal *al-Manar* was read

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[264] The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 'Muhammad Rashid Rida', http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1979 Accessed 28 March 2015

[265] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p116

[266] Ebrahim Moosa, 'The Debts and Burdens of Critical Islam' in Omid Safi (ed.) *Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender and Pluralism* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), pp111-127 http://studyofislam.org/pdf/EbrahimMoosa_DebtsBurdens_PM.pdf Accessed 15 March 2015, p120

[267] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p124

[268] Voll, 'Modern Movements in Islam', p232

across Africa and Asia, and 'Abduh disseminated *fatawa* through the *Waqa'i'* newspaper.[269] Al Awlaki was behind the creation of *Inspire* magazine.[270] These methods have evolved into the generation of influence and interaction online. Adam Silverstein shows how communications technologies have enabled anyone with access to them to disseminate unmoderated ideas.[271] New technology symbiotically enables both freedom of interpretation and its dissemination.

Modern ways of organising, and globalising forces, are both present across Islam. Groups such as Ahl al-Hadith, al-Harakah al-Islamiyyah, and al-Ittihad al-Islami have become transnational.[272] Their global outreach necessarily involves modern networks and forms of interaction.

What appear to be modern strategies may also be updated versions of historical methods of organisation. HT's ideologue An-Nabahani used an ideology based on Mawdudi's writings to create the Hizb – a political party that could respond to Nasserism in 1950s Egypt.[273] Hizb ut-Tahrir's main aim is the foundation of an Islamic caliphate, *Dawlah Islamiyyah*.[274] An-Nabahani's *System of Islam* is ostensibly a reworking of the 'aqidah. Yet this intended constitution for the caliphate is another example of the recycling of old concepts: it originates in thirteenth-century histories of government and rule.[275] Additionally, the group's goals are set out as religious duties for its members.[276] This again highlights changes to the nature of religious obligations, authority and means.

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[269] Kurzman, 'Liberal Islam and its Islamic Context', p9; Imady, *The Rise & Fall of Muslim Civil Society*, p35
[270] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p238
[271] Silverstein, *Islamic History – A Very Short Introduction*, p46
[272] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p67
[273] Husain, *The Islamist*, pp83-88
[274] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p24
[275] Husain, *The Islamist*, p133
[276] Husain, *The Islamist*, p92

The majority of the radical concepts I have discussed were derived from old ideas to respond to perceived crisis or meet the needs of extremist groups; an ancestry aimed at establishing legitimacy.[277] This linkage with the past is not a natural evolution of religious thinking though. Herbert and Wolffe suggest that – in parallel to the identity dislocation of individual Muslims who are radicalised – radical Islam is itself a cultural dislocation: while it claims a basis in tradition, it is in fact 'de-traditionalised'.[278] This separation from tradition enables divergence between groups, and a lack of consensus is potentially a hallmark of the movement. Wali noted that groups can employ radical ideologies very differently.[279] Selectivity and differences in application have created inconsistency in both doctrine and action.

Given the use of new communications technologies, it is now possible to add to the features of radicalism the input of laymen, and a divergence or lack of consensus. Radical groups invoke divine authority and may advocate 'any means' in pursuit of their goals. They have subtly increased the requirements of being Muslim, expanded the idea of worship, and developed an individual obligation of fighting jihad.

3.4 Revivalism, reformism, radicalism

As discussed in chapter 2, changes in political and economic authority over the last two hundred years have arguably led to three overlapping phases of rejuvenation and adaptation in Islamic culture: revivalism to the late 1800s, reformism to the 1950s, and radicalism to date. All three are responses to perceived crises resulting from individual rulers or in reaction to cultural threats.[280] Different interpretations of narrated knowledge result in competition for legitimacy.

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[277] Discussion with Farhaan Wali, 25 February 2015

[278] Herbert and Wolffe, 'Religion and contemporary conflict in historical perspective', p304

[279] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p176

[280] Derek Hopwood, 'A Pattern of Revival Movements in Islam?', pp149-158 http://www.salaam.co.uk/knowledge/pattern-of-revival-movements-in-islam.pdf Accessed 24 May 2015, p150

Dekmejian characterises revivalism as persistent religious responses to cultural challenges, often translating and associating across national borders.[281] He appears to include reform movements within the reassertion of values and goals of revivalism.[282] Choueiri differentiates between revivalism as a response to colonialism, and reformism at the appearance of Salafiyyah and evocation of the past. His division between reformism and radicalism comes after the Western-led geopolitical changes following WWII, and the absence of a caliphate. This is another of the defining characteristics of radical thinking: the re-establishment of a caliphate as a priority. [283] This goal has geopolitical, social and military ramifications, and has its roots in the history of Islam as much as religious dimensions. While not specifically mentioned in the Qur'an, the establishment of a caliphate – agreed and understood to exist by consensus among scholars – is considered a communal obligation on the ummah, and, critically, as requiring the consensus of all Muslims.[284]

I argued in chapter 2 that the other characteristics of radical thought include: rule by a revised Shariah; selectivity, decontextualisation and regressive innovation; an imagined community; militancy and a willingness to use violence; and the elevation of laypeople. The changed concepts used in working towards radical goals include hijrah and tawhid; the use of any means and inclusion of jihad as a religious duty for Sunnis; declarations of takfir; and changes in obligation, elevating the importance of individual deeds rather than the collective effort of the ummah.

The presence and basis for innovations might also form a key part of determining whether a movement is a revival or a reformation. A retrieval of past practices transposed to the present, however strict, might be considered more revivalist, but it should be noted that this inevitably involves some kind of innovation: in assessing the need for a response, and adapting or integrating the practice into modernity. In

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[281] R Hrair Dekmejian, 'The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives' in *Middle East Journal* vol 34 no 1 (1980), p1

[282] Bullock and Stallybrass, *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, p532

[283] Email from Farhaan Wali, 20 April 2015

[284] HE the Sultan Muhammad Sa'ad Ababakar, and 125 others, *Open Letter*, 19 September 2014. http://www.lettertoBaghdadi.com Accessed 21 October 2015, p15

addition existing practice and culture is altered, perhaps such as Al-Ghannouchi's inclusion of shura-based consultation, or by salvational or mystical components. However conservatively viewed, a change to practice or meaning is a change. If innovation is defined as an adaptation or change to the existing ways of doing something, even revivalism might be considered (regressively) innovative.

In the next chapter, I will explore innovation and bidah, and assess whether the key concepts of radical Islam are innovations in religious matters.

4 Types of innovation

Radical actors have drawn on the ijtihad and interpretation of individuals, within and outside radical ideologies, to change long-held principles in Islam. One example is the interpretation attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah, who permitted the killing of Muslims; this standpoint has been used to legitimise many acts and attitudes within radicalism.[285]

To assess whether radical interpretations are innovation, I will examine how key radical ideas and their development relates to wider innovation theory. Many of these ideas are developments of existing concepts, so I must also answer whether the extension or adaptation of a concept can be considered as an innovation.

In Islam, religious innovation is not necessarily the same as innovations made to specific revealed religious matters. I will investigate the scope of religious matters and look at whether ideas important to radicalism could be considered religious innovation, or innovation in worship. I will also examine the idea of innovation in social matters, which is categorised into degrees of permissibility ranging from obligatory to forbidden.

The categorisation of bidah, which I will outline, shows Islam is not anti-innovation. Throughout history, Muslim scientists and thinkers have added to our understanding of the physical universe and human affairs through their inventiveness. Karen Armstrong has said – in support of her contention regarding the modernity of fundamentalism – that innovations depend on investment, and the levels of capital required to innovate widely have only been available in the modern era.[286] I would take issue with this in regard to the sciences such as astronomy and mathematics, the results of which have been incorporated into Islamic exploration and architecture for centuries. I would also note that while her statement appears to refer to worldly innovations, religious innovations do not necessarily require financial investment; capital investment may help propagate religious innovations, but authority or

[285] Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law*, p129
[286] Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, p33

legitimacy are also key. Armstrong may be using the term 'innovation' to mean modern technological inventions. To accurately discuss innovations and their permissibility in Islam, the difference between social and religious matters is also crucial to understand.

Religious matters were revealed and recorded throughout the Qur'an, and brought together in the hadith of Gabriel, in which Muhammad responds to questions about faith and Islam; these questions were posed by a man later identified by Muhammad as being the angel Gabriel. Being revealed requirements, they are not open to reason or debate. Carrying out these ritual practices gives the ummah cohesiveness and helps preserve the faith's most important principle: submission to God.

I will look at types of innovation, and then at perspectives on bidah across Islam in order to judge whether radicalism's main ideas and characteristics, as outlined in chapter 3, might constitute bidah or innovations in religious matters.

4.1 Radicalism as a type of innovation

The pragmatic nature of innovation is echoed in the Islamic principle that thinking should lead to action. I will discuss religious innovation in Islam in particular shortly, but before that, it is worthwhile considering the nature of innovation.

Innovation in business has been defined as the addition of something new to something established, which has value to customers, and adds to the organisation's knowledge.[287] The parallel I intend to show with regard to Islam and radicalism is clearer if we consider Muslims as analogous to the 'customers' or adherents described above, and Islam as the 'organisation'. Two principles arise from this definition: something established is altered; and that the change has value for those adopting it. In order to be accepted, interpretations of the texts and guidance necessarily need to add something of significance to Muslims, for example advice on conducting their

[287] David O'Sullivan and Lawrence Dooley, *Applying Innovation* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), p5

affairs in accordance with God's will. New paradigms determine the range of possible interpretations developed and their acceptance as applicable. These add to the overall knowledge base of Islam. If the results constitute changes to practice, some might consider these accretions.

I wish to clarify whether the extended ideas used within radical ideologies can really count as innovation. After reviewing classical theory, I will review types of innovation.

Economist Joseph Schumpeter developed his 'five dimensions' of innovation in the 1930s. Still quoted today, they comprise: the introduction of a new product or improved version of an existing product; improved methods of production; creation of new markets; development of a new source or supply chain; and greater effectiveness in organisation.[288] These parameters are primarily economic, but have relevance to religion. Their equivalents might respectively include: new ideologies or doctrine; the creation of schools and colleges teaching religion; dissemination and media encouraging mission and dawah; increasing sacralisation such as expansion of pilgrimage and fatawa; and institutional rejuvenation, networking and work in the community.

One related aspect of Schumpeter's economic model bears particular comparison to religious revivals. His theory of 'plausible capitalism' involves successive cycles of growth, in which innovators are the source of change, and so of profit.[289] This appears echoed by Riesebrodt's contention that fundamentalism – as revivalism – reoccurs over time. More specifically with respect to Islam, Schumpeter's model of 'plausible capitalism' and dimensions of innovation seem analogous to the sound hadith predicting renewal of the faith, *tajdid al-din*, by a thinker sent by God every hundred

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[288] Nicola Cavalli, 'The Symbolic Dimension of Innovation Processes', *American Behavioral Scientist* vol 50 no 7 (2007), p959

[289] Robert Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2000), pp293-304

years.[290] Progress involves cycles of renewal, and renewal is dependent on innovation. Successful innovations have appeal, effectiveness, and include new components.

On what basis might Schumpeter's new or improved products be understood as innovations? O'Sullivan and Dooley distinguish between invention and innovation in that the latter adds value *through its exploitation*. Even if that which is applied is an existing technique or technology, it is a legitimate innovation if *novel to the organisation applying it*. Two points arise from this with respect to Islam. Firstly, that the 'existing techniques' of ijtihad and interpretation are therefore valid ways of creating changes that count as innovation. Secondly, that hypothesising alone is not enough for a change to count as innovation – it is only through enactment that an idea becomes an innovation.[291] Hizb ut-Tahrir's published *modus operandi* of using any means, potentially including prohibited methods, to achieve its goals, is new to previous understandings of Islam. Ideas become innovations once individuals begin working towards their implementation.

Many of the ideas I have identified as key to extremist or radical thinking are extensions or repurposing of old concepts. Is a change in meaning or emphasis sufficiently different to count as an innovation? Dictionaries reiterate the definition of innovation offered by O'Sullivan and Dooley: the introduction of something new that makes changes to something established.[292] A good example of this is in radical ideology is Jahiliyyah: a concept as old as Islam, originally used to represent pagan ignorance of God's revelation. Qutb's re-definition of Jahiliyyah as wilful refusal and its extension to include Muslims and Peoples of the Book is not an innovation whilst it remains only an idea. It becomes an innovation when this re-purposed idea finds expression perhaps in condemnation of 'Jahili' lifestyles, or lived out through symbolic and physical separation. Once put into practice, the change of meaning becomes an innovation.

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[290] Ramadan, 'Knowledge and Hermeneutics in Islam Today', pp24-25
[291] O'Sullivan and Dooley, *Applying Innovation*, pp6-7
[292] Judy Pearsall, *New Oxford Dictionary of English* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p942

The knowledge base of an organisation or movement sets its scope for new ideas.[293] If Islam is again analogous to the 'organisation', we can say that the Islamic scriptures, texts, teaching, histories and the consensus of Muslims form its knowledge base. As shown in the typologies, these are followed or understood in different ways. Added to this, the threats as perceived by radical Muslims to Islam and Islamic culture alter the overall knowledge base; the perception itself acts as a lens, focusing on parts of the information base as relevant and leaving other parts as 'out of focus'. Addressing new realities requires new ideas, but a tension arises between the need for change and a restricted knowledge base. As discussed in chapter 2, the available information sources determine whether innovations developed have the potential to be progressive or, in the case of reduced or selected resources and inputs, of a regressive type.[294]

Different types of knowledge are involved in innovation: explicit knowledge, hidden knowledge, and, the main source of information used in innovation, tacit knowledge – that which results from experience, practice or insight.[295] This tacit experiential knowledge is that gained by practising believers, and so possibly very relevant to innovations in religion. Insights about needs and opportunities, based on motivations and circumstance, serve as drivers and shapers of innovation.[296] It is therefore reasonable that the changing circumstances of Muslims and their homelands, particularly over the last one hundred years, might result in successively different insights, and therefore responses will use differently-selected parts of the knowledge base. Such selections consequently produce varying innovations in thought and action: liberal, adaptive, separatist or militant.

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[293] O'Sullivan and Dooley, *Applying Innovation*, p11

[294] Burnyshev, 'Strategy of Innovation Behaviour of Enterprises', p8

[295] Johannessen, Olsen and Olaisen, 'Aspects of innovation theory based on knowledge management', p127

[296] James M Utterback and William J Abernathy, 'A Dynamic Model of Prcess and Product Innovation' in *OMEGA, the International Journal of Management Science* vol 3, no 6 (1975), pp640-3

The types of change resulting from innovations vary, affecting the level of practice or even eventually completely reorienting organisations.[297] Even where religious revitalisation efforts 'fail' to strengthen a tradition, and result instead in new divergent sects and denominations, it is clear that the process of revivalism creates significant change not easily dismissed.[298] But change in religious organisations is vital to ensure the ongoing relevance of revelation to society. Radicalism may therefore be a by-product of Islam's adaptation to modernity.

One study has examined innovation specifically in religious organisations. Academic Kent Miller draws on a definition (by sociologists Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge) of religious organisations as social enterprises that enable religious experience through participation. Miller applies strategic management theory to understand the competition between religious organisations. He argues that viewing religious organisations as competitors for scarce resources may provide insights into their organisation and strategy. These resources might potentially include believers, money/tithes, or influence over policy and law-making. Miller's apparent context is Christian religious movements, but there is similarity with Islam that I shall discuss shortly. I would contend that this idea of competition probably applies to traditions as a whole, ie 'Islam' or 'Christianity', as well as to sects or denominations within traditions, although some of these have ethnic bases, and a sectarian divide within a tradition may be harder to cross than the division between traditions. With regard to Islam, Miller's concept of competition seems less apt when considering sectarian divisions between Sunni, Shi'a, Ismailis and others, but it may be applicable particularly to the themes or movements already discussed such as fundamentalism, modernism, liberalism, and traditionalism. Epstein and Gang modelled fundamentalist observance, finding that rivalry between groups may increase members' level of observance, or

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[297] George W Downs Jr & Lawrence B Mohr, 'Conceptual Issues in the Study of Innovation', in *Administrative Science Quarterly* vol 21, no 4 (1976), p704

[298] Anthony F C Wallace, 'Revitalisation Movements' in *American Anthropologist* vol 58, no 2 (1956), p267

tendency to extremism and potential deviation from orthodoxy.[299] Assertions of legitimacy may also form a basis for competition.

Miller highlights how Christianity has struggled to balance traditional and innovating forces[300], a tension that I feel again might equally apply to Islam. He suggests forms of revival that invoke a faith's unique history may offer a competitive advantage – to the extent that sects emphasising their historical roots and so 'legitimacy' may become more successful than the original tradition.[301] This point is comparable to the success of the Salafist trends in Islam: differentiation is achieved by recalling an imagined past, ostensibly authentic and yet an innovation in worldview.

Before I move on to discuss radicalism as specifically religious innovation, I want to compare the similarity of religious innovation with other types of innovation. Academics Timo Hamalainen and Risto Heiskala define five types of innovation [technological, economic, regulative, normative and cultural]. They define cultural innovations as challenging established interpretations of reality.[302] This appears eminently suitable as a way of describing the processes used in developing radical thinking: ijtihad, often used by laypeople, motivated by their need to address new circumstances – and resulting in new practices and approaches to life. Therefore radicalism might be seen also as a form of cultural innovation.

In Sudan, Mahdiyya activism, inspired by Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, was a response to the oppressive Turko-Egyptian regime. It ostensibly united previously disparate Muslim Sufi brotherhoods and recently-imported Egyptian perspectives. The movement's militancy resulted in territorial gains, cementing an ideology based

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[299] Gil S Epstein and Ira N Gang, 'Understanding the development of fundamentalism' in *Public Choice* vol 132 (2007), pp269-270

[300] Kent D Miller, 'Competitive Strategies of Religious Organisations' in *Strategic Management Journal* vol 23 (2002), pp435-456, pp440-6

[301] Miller, 'Competitive Strategies of Religious Organisations', p443

[302] Julie Caulier-Grice, Anna Davies, Robert Patrick & Will Norman, 'Defining Social Innovation'. A deliverable of the project *The theoretical, empirical and policy foundations for building social innovation in Europe (TEPSIE), Euroepan Commission – 7th Framework Programme* (Brussels: European Commission & DG Research, 2012), p8

heavily on jihad.[303] While the Mahdi called for religious revival, the historic form of Islam in the country had been a personalised piety; his reform of society established a new kind of Sudan-specific and centrally-administered Islam. His revivalism therefore resulted in reform and innovation. Aggressive jihad is also at the heart of Wahhabism's support of a geopolitical state.[304]

At first glance, the ideas important to radical Islam also appear to satisfy many of the features of social innovation, especially when considered from the extremist point of view. The EU-funded TEPSIE project, run by the Danish Technological Institute, assessed social innovation and drew up five core elements they considered defined a practice as socially innovative. These comprise: being new or applied in a new way; implementation; effectiveness in adjusting social values; meeting specific social needs; and creating new roles or relationships that enhance society's capacity to act.[305]

Creating a capacity for action is surely the leading reason for much militant and radical ideology. One good example here might be the removal of need for parental consent to fight jihad by militant radicals, who otherwise might have difficulty attracting fighters in sufficient numbers. In changing the dynamic of family relationships, radical ideologies are innovating socially as well as culturally. Similarly, the Taliban's imposition of social and cultural regulations, such as the banning of the creative arts, are an innovation in great contrast to classical Islam.

The many categorisations of innovation are based on different aspects such as the sources of change or their impact. One common framework identifies types of innovation according to whether it involves new products, processes, marketing or organisation methods. This model, defined by the OECD in its 2005 Oslo Manual, has among its criteria the scope to which an idea is novel, ie new to the company, market

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[303] Hopwood, 'A Pattern of Revival Movements in Islam?', p156; Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Washington DC, 'The Turco-Egyptian', 'The Mahdiyya', http://www.sudanembassy.org/index.php/the-turco-egyptian, http://www.sudanembassy.org/index.php/the-mahdiyya Accessed 01/04/2017

[304] Hopwood, 'A Pattern of Revival Movements in Islam?', p155

[305] Caulier-Grice, Davies, Patrick & Norman, 'Defining Social Innovation', pp18-21

or world. The highest level of novelty is disruptive innovation, where new markets are created and incumbent offerings are made obsolete. Academic Clayton Christensen first framed the idea of disruptive innovation, and he included among its qualities both simplicity and the use of a different set of values. While the idea appears at first glance to be potentially appropriate to radical ideologies, it requires a figurative leap to meet the assumption of eventual displacement. The theory of disruptive innovation depends on an inability of the 'customers' – in our case, Muslims – to absorb all the offerings of traditional Islam. The development of the new 'product', ie radical ideologies, competes for a while in the same ideological market before disrupting it to such an extent that a completely new market forms around the product.[306] This is not the present situation, where mainstream Islamic traditions remain strong. Yet, if we suggest that radical narratives appeal to some Muslims owing to their selectivity and literal interpretation – equivalent in the analogy to a low cost – and that radicalisation enables adoption of a new religious identity, seen as separate to the traditional ummah, then the potential for this theory to apply becomes clearer. It is worth noting that the Oslo Manual is quoted as also describing such processes as 'radical innovation', and that radical innovation often relates to the degree of new technology involved.

Riesebrodt noted the group formation process integral to fundamentalism makes use of modern technologies, networks and responses.[307] But radicalism is more greatly innovative than just adopting new technologies to react to perceived crisis. It seeks not only to assert religious values, but to adjust and reform them.

Finke and Iannaccone suggest that religious innovation in general may be prompted by the availability of new ideas, and enabled by increased travel and new media.[308] This

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[306] Hannes Selhofer, René Arnold, Markus Lassnig, Pietro Evangelista, *Disruptive Innovation: Implications for Competitiveness and Innovation Policy*, Version 2.1 April 2012, INNO-Grips – Global Review of Innovation Policy Studies, European Commission http://www.proinno-europe.eu/innogrips2 Accessed 06 December 2016, p18

[307] Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', p277

[308] Roger Finke and Laurence R Iannaccone, 'Supply-side Explanations for Religious Change' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* vol 527 (1993), p39

aligns with the idea of exposure, and raises the idea of competition between groups with divergent ideas, prompting increasingly radical thinking. Radicalism thus equals or is analogous to innovation in the aspects of competition, enactment, changed ideas, self-renewing cycles and the use of knowledge. It is described by definitions of cultural and social innovation. As a possible disruptive innovation if taken up by a critical mass of believers, it may have the potential to re-cast traditional understandings of Islam.

Radicalism, as a part of fundamentalism, may also – and perhaps inadvertently – act as a process of religious rejuvenation, even if only through the ways it highlights important, albeit contested, elements of orthodoxy and opinion relevant to the present.

4.2 Radicalism as religious innovation

In Islam, religious innovation is not necessarily the same as innovation in religious matters, which are considered particular aspects or parts of the faith. I will outline these religious matters shortly, after considering the nature of religious innovation.

Religious changes need not challenge creed or doctrine; examples include televised preaching or prayers offered online. Such evolutions can enhance practice, or enable access for the ill or disabled. Within Islam, using technology to find the direction of prayer is one example. New technologies were used in early Islam, to write down the recited revelations. The investigation, authentication and compilation of ahadith required a new field of scholarship. It is arguable that the intentional attempts by fundamentalists and extremists to promote selectivity are similar innovations.

As discussed above, radicalism seems analogous to other types of innovation. When enacted, the extension of concepts discussed in chapter 3 such as the use of any means or rejection of parental authority are clearly a type of innovation – but are they religious innovation? They appear to meet the conditions required for religious innovations to spread. The uptake of innovation was defined by Roger Wuthnow (in regard to religion in the US in the 1970s) as requiring four conditions: exposure,

legitimacy, opportunities, motivation.[309] Despite the US context, this seems a reasonable basis to describe the enactment of religious innovation and radicalism in Islam. Innovations in religion need exposure to an audience in order to be reproduced; examples might include the use of online media, networking and outreach within extensive dawah. Wuthnow also holds that religious innovations need a legitimate origin, such as a basis in the text. The opportunity to try them out for oneself makes them acts rather than just theoretical – which might be brought about be physical separation – and to motivate departure from tradition the innovation must have relevance to individuals, by addressing crises such as cultural dissonance or identity dislocation.

Religious innovations may result from change in either religious practice or in a tradition's organisation.[310] It is worth noting that the act of writing and recording the Shariah, which only took place from the fifteenth century CE, was an innovation that has become successful[311], although Ibn Hanbal opposed the development.[312] Social changes brought about by innovation in one period may be pragmatically accepted later.

Islam prioritises education to support access to revelation, particularly for religious teachers and law-makers. Clerics influence believers through their interpretations, for example in obliging them to follow (or at least not oppose) the government of the day.[313] Humans do not make law: jurists divine God's will through the process of developing opinions, and rulers then enact God's law as so elaborated.[314]

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[309] Joseph B Tamney, Shawn Powell and Stephen Johnson, 'Innovation Theory and Religious Nones' in *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* vol 28, no 2 (1989), p216

[310] Gordon Marshall 'Religious innovation' *A Dictionary of Sociology* (1988), Encyclopedia.com http://www.encyclopedia.com Accessed 06 June 2015

[311] Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law*, p119

[312] Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law*, p64 & p71

[313] AbuKhalil, 'The incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of the 20th century', p683

[314] Bernard Weiss, 'Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad' in *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, vol 26, no 2 (1977), pp199-200

Where existing jurisprudence is unclear, an expert in religious law, *mufti,* may pronounce on specific issues. These pronouncements are *fatawa* (singular: *fatwa*), explanations of Shariah developed through ijtihad. They may include issues of obligation and permissibility. Ijtihad depends on the probability, *zann*, of the soundness of the scholar's inference, *istinbat*, made from the text.[315] Should a cleric not exhaust himself intellectually in developing a ruling, it is considered void. Fatawa may not enable things that are forbidden, or change worship; they typically explain practice or permit excusal, such as deferrals from pilgrimage when ill. As clerics encounter varying contexts and infuse their own opinions, differences result; proper jurisprudential training allows for this.[316] Consequently, a fatwa is only binding upon the person who issues it [this is not the case in Shariah legal disputes, where judicial rulings apply to the recipient]. Sunni and Shi'a permit different sources; Sunnis allow consensus, Shi'a recognise human intuition, imams and the Hidden Imam.[317]

This skilled religious innovation, provided for by the framework of the faith, ensures Islam's relevance. Jurists traditionally balance the Qur'an's lack of historical context by using commentaries to locate it in time. Radical Islamists prefer not to use these, 'liberating' revelation from context but in reality constricting possible interpretations. Stephen Schwarz notes the limited scope used by radical clerics in deriving rulings and suggests this as a way to identify radicalism.[318] Many recent radical ideologues lacked juridical training or qualifications. Al-Banna was a schoolteacher, Mawdudi and Qutb worked as journalists, and Al Awlaki trained as an engineer, taking up preaching after informal study. Their development and publishing of religious interpretation without the requisite training or qualifications is itself an innovation.

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[315] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, p43

[316] Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, 'What is a Fatwa?', Understanding Islam http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/44-what-is-a-fatwa.html Accessed 26 February 2015

[317] Weiss, 'Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad', pp210-211

[318] Irfan Al-Alawi, Stephen S Schwartz, Kamal Hasani, Veli Sirin, Daut Dauti, Qanta Ahmed, *A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009* (London: Centre for Islamic Pluralism, 2009), pp13-14 http://www.islamicpluralism.org Accessed 30 December 2014

Disagreements abound over the inconsistencies between interpretations and also within and between the texts. The legal process of abrogation, *naskh*, resolves contradictions between Qur'anic verses by prioritising later verses over those revealed earlier – however these later verses are often more militant, reflecting the circumstances of the early Muslims.[319]

Fiqh books comprise guidance and prescriptions for religious matters (ibadah, concerning one's relationship with God: worship) and social duties (*mu'amalat*, involving one's relationships with others, such as punishment, inheritance, marriage and jihad). The fiqh also differentiates between two sorts of obligation. Individual duty, *fard al-'ayn*, governs the religious duties Muslims are each required to perform, such as salah or hajj; these were set by divine revelation. Sufficiency duty, *fard al-kifāya*, are those duties imposed on all Muslims collectively; they are produced and regulated by jurisprudence. I will discuss later how these obligations, and the distinction between religious and social matters, offer another way of defining radicalism as innovation.

While I have shown how radicalism is religious innovation and analogous to other types of innovation, this study's focus is whether the changes in meaning and extensions of concepts central to radical Islam touch on religious matters. To that end it is necessary to understand what constitutes religious matters, to which I now turn.

4.3 Religious matters

As Islam is a source of legislation in around a dozen countries, the distinction between religious matters and social matters is important.[320] The Qur'an sets out certain acts God requires. Basic ibadah comprises the rituals and faith. There are six Pillars of faith: belief in God, belief in angels, belief in God's books, belief in the Prophets, belief in the Day of Judgement, and belief in destiny. None of these Pillars of faith are apparently directly affected by the concepts extended by radical ideologues.

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[319] Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law*, pp131-2
[320] Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law*, pxii

The Qur'an includes many mentions of the scope of belief and of worship, such as 2:177, which explicitly links goodness to the Pillars of both faith and practice. The rituals of worship – basic and mandatory religious duties – are the declaration of faith, *Shahadah*; daily prayer, *salah*; tithing of income for community benefit, *zakah*; fasting during the month of Ramadan, *sawm*; and for those able to undertake it, pilgrimage to Mecca, *hajj*, at least once. In the Qur'an as arranged by human hands, these mentions are spread through the text [verses 3:18, 20:14, 7:156, 2:185, and 22:27-28 respectively]. Perhaps because they are disparate, they are also collected within the hadith of Gabriel, the title emphasising its provenance.

The Shi'a expand on these Pillars, Twelver Shi'ites holding five beliefs and conducting ten practices, and the Ismailis seven practices. Both these main Shi'ite traditions include tawhid and jihad among their Pillars of the faith. And therefore in the following, when discussing tawhid and jihad as innovations in religious matters, I am referring to Sunni Islam.

Innovation in these Pillars of faith and ritual is forbidden in Islam as, being ordained by God, they are not subject to reason – and therefore also not proper topics of ijtihad or analogical reasoning, *qiyas*.[321] It is an innovation in religious matters to alter these practices of worship or to add to their number: an example might include contesting the need for prayer. The Pillars' conservation enables cohesion of the ummah across many cultures and languages. The scope of action within religious matters is defined by the concept of *tawqif*, which I will explore soon. The Qur'an outlines other practices prescribed for and forbidden to Muslims. Verses 6:150 to 6:153 reveal the Straight Path, and while they also encourage the hearer to use their reason, are instructions to be followed. Tariq Ramadan notes that the advantage presented by a

[321] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence* http://202.74.245.22:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/409/Principles%20of%20Islamic%20Jurisprudence%20by%20M.%20H.%20Kamali,%201991,%20December%2021,%202014.pdf?sequence=1 Accessed 07 June 2015

literal reading of the texts is its apparent authority.[322] The authority present in the specific instructions for worship lends weight to other literal readings.

As previously noted, religious matters are governed by obligation. Individuals undertake ritual worship under the obligation of *fard al-'ayn*, one's personal relationship with God.
Not subject to any human ruling, worship may be clarified by fatawa, but not altered.

Revelation therefore distinguishes between the religious and the social, but humans have further differentiated these. Albert Hourani implies that Ibn Taymiyyah, among others, identified that there should be a difference in the interpretation between worship, ibadah, and social matters, *mu'amalat*.[323] At a time when imitation, taqlid, was prioritised, Ibn Taymiyyah may have accentuated the division between these two spheres to advance the possibility of some interpretation.

Many of the verses in the Qur'an and statements in the ahadith govern human relationships and affairs. These are open to interpretation or conjecture, *zanni*, as to their meaning, *dalala*.[324] It is from these *zanni* texts that opinions diverge between ulama. Although jurists base their opinions on scriptural evidence, their ijtihad and judgements will be influenced by their environment and context, *dalil*. Former radical Salafi Morten Storm reported that in a Yemeni mosque worshippers were enjoined to keep their shoes on while praying, a change to the usual form of this kind of worship, as the Sheikh there held as authentic a particular hadith stating this to be Muhammad's practice.[325]

The 140 verses in the Qur'an relating to religious matters, ibadah, are not though ordinarily open to interpretation. Mawdudi felt that ibadah was the purpose of human

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[322] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, p43
[323] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, p148
[324] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, p205
[325] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p39

lives.[326] Defined by the Qur'an, ibadah has been further categorised into different types, such as the ritual and the transactional. Academic Ilhaamie Abdul Ghani Azmi outlines three types: (1) basic ibadah: the Pillars of Islam and faith, (2) main ibadah: optional rituals, and (3) general ibadah: worship carried out in the course of daily life.[327] The latter category obviously includes worldly matters, but illustrates the intention it is possible for a Muslim to bring to their entire life.

Practice of the rituals of worship may be improved. Al-Ghazali, writing about the common good, defined three *maslaha* categories, including the combined category of 'anything that may bring about an improvement in religious practice' – this is *al-tahsiniyyat* and *al-kamaliyyat*, the enhancing and the perfecting.[328] Examples include greater cleanliness before prayer and making extra gifts to charity.[329] These improvements increase the performer's strength of intention and so their devotion. Al-Ghazali uses the context of the common good, but he seeks to indirectly affect worship (for the better).

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) appears to add to the list of religious matters for Sunnis. Islam recognises the right of a ruler to run a state within the bounds of Shariah, either making rulings himself or referring cases to judges. In spite of the lack of historical precedent, *System of Islam* contains a Shariah-only draft constitution. It asserts the ruler may adopt rules relating to worship, within which it lists both zakah and jihad.[330] This statement suggests HT consider both zakah and jihad to be religious matters. Former HT member Ed Husain noted that while drawing on eleventh-century precedent, the group varies from classical understandings over the permissibility and practice of certain acts and on some matters of belief. [331]

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[326] Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, pp135-136

[327] Ilhaamie Abdul Ghani Azmi, 'Human Capital Development and Organizational Performance: A Focus on Islamic Perspective', *Shariah Journal* vol 17 no 2 (2009), p360

[328] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, p39

[329] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Maqasid al Shariah: The Objectives of Islamic Law* http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?6176-Maqasid-al-Shariah-The-Objectives-of-Islamic-Law Accessed 14 June 2015

[330] An-Nabahani, *System of Islam*, p116

[331] Husain, *The Islamist*, pp91-92 & p99

When discussing changes to religious matters, it is worth considering a point made by John Voll, that Muhammad incorporated existing customs into Islam where these were appropriate in the context of revelation. [332] These customs include hajj and the re-purposing of the Ka'ba. [333] Thus pagan activity was re-sacralised under Islam and one might say this is analogous to the changes made to religious matters by extremists, however there is a key difference. Muhammad changed the purpose of an existing activity or entity where this served the revelation, whereas radicals arguably seek to change the meaning of revelation to serve geopolitical goals. The intention is paramount. Farhaan Wali shows how young radicals seek to resolve their cultural dislocation: authenticity of custom, but not necessarily of meaning.[334] This apparent revivalism of practice is actually revelation turned on its head: rather than God's overall message setting the values and practices of Islam, Islamists select and promote just the parts of the texts that support their goals.

Radical ideologies conserve the form of the message through orthopraxy, but may change its sense. Former HT member Maajid Nawaz states that within the group religious matters were secondary to political goals.[335] HT's demotion of ritual practice desacralizes Islam, increasing the pool of potential members upon which it might draw.

I will now examine a topic discussed greatly in connection with innovation in Islam, and particularly in relation to changes in religious matters: bidah.

4.4 Bidah

I will show here and in the next chapter that the innovations of radical Islam include bidah, although the meaning and usage of the term are contested and misunderstood.

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[332] Voll, *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, p8
[333] Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, p156
[334] Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled*, p38
[335] Maajid Nawaz, *Radical* (London: WH Allen [PenguinRandomHouse UK], 2012), p288

Like some of Islam's rituals and terms, the Arabic word bidah predated the faith, and described departures from pagan custom.[336] Islam itself created profound social change. One of the ninety-nine Attributes of God is His role as The Originator, *Badi*, a name that uses the linguistic root *bd'*, which also gave rise to the word bidah.[337] With an understanding of God as the Creator, the word bidah began to describe new developments or novelties.

The term has evolved and its use has varied through Islamic history. In spite of the positive nature of many innovations since the time of Muhammad, such as scholarship to investigate the authenticity of ahadith, the term bidah appears increasingly pejorative. Some groups now use the term bidah to condemn practices outwith conservative Sunnism. The negative connotations given to the term may also result from a context in the Qur'an, when God commands Muhammad to establish continuity in his mission by denying his own novelty:

> *'Say: I am nothing new among God's messengers'* (46:9)[338]

Muhammad defends his legitimacy by building on that of his predecessors. The idea of following established tradition is similarly vital for the continuing importance of the Sunnah.[339] It is the usage of the word bidah for newness and novelty in this context that gives the term what is described online as its 'linguistic usage' or meaning. Online sources also describe a 'Shariah usage' or meaning of the term, referring to its use for innovations that contravene the Shariah. A sound and often-quoted hadith includes:

> *'Verily he among you who lives long will see great controversy, so you must keep to my Sunnah and to the Sunnah of the Khulafa ar-Radshideen (the rightly-guided caliphs), those who guide to the right way. Cling to it stubbornly. Beware*

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[336] Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, *Innovation and Creativity in Islam* (Illinois: The Nawawi Foundation, 2006), p2

[337] Patrick Laude, 'Creation, Originality and Innovation in Sufi Poetry', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011), p129

[338] Abdel Haleem (trans.) *The Qur'an*, p327

[339] Abd-Allah, *Innovation and Creativity in Islam*, p3

of newly-invented matters, for verily every bidah (innovation) is misguidance'.

(40 Hadith Nawawi 28)[340]

One phrase from this hadith,

'every innovation is misguidance'

has been used to criticise many social and cultural innovations. But context of the hadith is that of relating matters to guidance. The translation and interpretation of 'newly-invented' is also important – it may imply only those as yet unapproved or debated. The selection of just part of the hadith surely denies the divinity and intention of the whole.

Tariq Ramadan argues that radicals fail to allow for differences between the immutable, *thabit*, such as the aqidah, ibadah and morals, which are derived solely from the texts, and the adaptable practices, *mutaghayyir*, which are located in time.[341] Muhammad's own statement,

'You have better knowledge in the affairs of the world' (Sahih Muslim, 2363)[342]

humbly illustrated his own potential fallibility in worldly matters, as opposed to those he received by revelation. Muhammad here emphasises the difference between religious matters, on which he received guidance, and social affairs.

One hadith appears to show innovation in religious matters as received positively, and it unfortunately serves to confuse the meaning and application of the term bidah. Companion 'Umar bin Al-Khattab is walking with the hadith's narrator on two occasions during Ramadan; the first time, they see individuals praying by themselves. On the next evening, the worshippers are instead congregated together. 'Umar remarks:

'What an excellent bidah this is.' (al-Bukhari 3:32, 227)[343]

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[340] Sunnah.com, 40 Hadith Nawawi 28 https://sunnah.com/nawawi40/28 Accessed 04 February 2017
Reproduction permitted by Sunnah.com: https://sunnah.com/about

[341] Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, p9

[342] Sunnah.com, Sahih Muslim 2363 https://sunnah.com/muslim/43/186 Accessed 04 February 2017
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Here the usage of the word bidah refers to the newness of the act of group prayer in Ramadan. But it applies to a matter of worship. Consequently, the Imami School sees the group prayer referred to as an unlawful innovation. However it might also be viewed as an improvement of religious matters in a similar way to Al-Ghazali's perfections of prayer. Muhammad had in fact tried the practice for a short time, but did not continue it. On that basis, Sunni jurist Abu Bakr bin Al-Arabi ruled that it was a legal Sunnah as well as a bidah.[344] Sources online say this example demonstrates a 'linguistic usage' by 'Umar: a way of merely describing novelty, so reconciling his apparent approval of a change to worship.[345]

The *mujaddid* who is to renew Islam does so by defending the Sunnah against bidah.[346] In this sense bidah means those things that have no precedent among the practice or sayings of Muhammad and the early Muslims. The term bidah took on this meaning in the ninth century CE, when customs across the geographically-expanding tradition began to diverge. Ahadith were collected as a way of authenticating practice.[347] This process preserved the original sources, providing a way of judging the permissibility of social actions. Some actions, having right intention, are good or beneficial; some are forbidden owing to their harmful result or method. The concept of permissibility helps enable innovations in worldly matters, such as technology and healthcare.

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[343] Sunnah.com, Sahih al-Bukhari 2010 https://sunnah.com/bukhari/31 Accessed 04 February 2017
Reproduction permitted by Sunnah.com: https://sunnah.com/about

[344] Abd-Allah, *Innovation and Creativity in Islam*, pp4-6

[345] See for example '230276: Why did 'Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) call uniting the people in praying Taraweeh behind one imam an innovation (bid'ah)?' Islam Question and Answer https://islamqa.info/en/230276 and 'Why Umar (r.a) said praying taraweeh in jamaah was "good bidah"?' Islam Stack Exchange http://islam.stackexchange.com/questions/1488/why-umar-r-a-said-praying-taraweeh-in-jamaah-was-good-bidah both accessed 18 February 2017

[346] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, p60

[347] Malik Muhammad Tariq, 'The Ideological Background of Rationality in Islam' in *Al-Hikmat* vol 28 (2008), pp31-32

Mehran Kamrava notes that jurists avoided the charge of bidah in their ijtihad by ensuring they contextualised them in accepted practice.[348] Zarif *et al* describe this concept as helping provide 'a standard of excellence' in law-making.[349]

Despite the Shariah accepting beneficial innovation, Ibn Taymiyyah rejected even worldly innovations.[350] As a jurist, he may have been trying to eradicate distracting local customs in order to more accurately follow the jurisprudential idea of 'seeking the best', *istihsan*, in rulings. This approach may be influential in Wahhabist thinking, however it also risks redacting past consensus and pragmatic adaptations. Wahhabism is noted for its opposition to bidah.[351] Academic TJ Winter criticises Wahhabism for contributing to the widespread understanding that Islam rejects all innovation.[352] In denying the general premise that in social affairs, mu'amalat, what is not explicitly forbidden in the texts is allowed, the early historical and 'imagined past' is given an exalted status.[353]

Al-Shafi'i classified bidah into two: the innovations of misguidance, *bid'ah dalāla*, and the non-reprehensible innovations, *bid'ah ghayr madhmūma*.[354] This categorisation indirectly enables innovations outside religious matters, by designating them non-reprehensible. The acceptability of innovations in social matters is affirmed by a categorisation, also attributed to Al-Shafi'i, of social innovations that have developed since the earliest days of Islam, and that are accepted by the four schools of fiqh. It follows the classification of *nas* and all actions, and as well as providing a basis for

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[348] Kamrava, 'Contextualising Innovation in Islam', p6

[349] Muhammad Mustaqium Mohd Zarif, Mohd Azmir Mohd Nizah, Anita Ismail and Adibah Mohamad, Adibah, 'Creating Creative and Innovative Muslim Society: Bidah as an Approach' in *Asia Social Science* vol 9, no 11 (2013), pp126

[350] Imady, *The Rise & Fall of Muslim Civil Society*, p33; Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p88; TJ Winter, 'The Poverty of Fanaticism', in Joseph E B Lumbard (ed). *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition* (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc, 2009), p307

[351] Khan, 'The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad', p369

[352] Winter, 'The Poverty of Fanaticism', p307

[353] Ramadan, 'Knowledge and Hermeneutics in Islam Today', pp29-30

[354] Winter, 'The Poverty of Fanaticism', p306

jurists' analogies, aims to enable individuals to judge their own conduct appropriately:[355]

Category	Obligatory (community)	recommended	permitted	discouraged	prohibited
Arabic	*fard kifāya*	*mandub*	*mubah*	*makruh*	*haram*
Example	Study of grammar and the Qur'an	School-building	Flour sifting	Extravagant mosque decoration	Unlawful taxation

When bidah exists, owing to a lack of precedent, meaning and intention are important.[356] The purpose or outcomes of an action are critical to understanding permissibility. Innovations that are 'good', halal, or commended, *bidah hasanah*, accord with the divine: fresh and valid interpretation.[357] Where intention cannot be related to the texts or spirit of Islam, innovations in social matters are considered haram or misguided, *bidah dalalah*.

Morten Storm notes the Taliban's encouragement of more than the five daily prayers.[358] Whether this is bidah depends on the intention behind it. This offers a critical test for the concepts used in radical ideologies: are the extensions and changes of meaning intended in the right way and designed to enable the spirit of Islam? Al-Ghazali's improvements to prayer – social changes to religious practice – could be viewed as misguided bidah if the intention behind them is in error, such as ostentatiously seeking to increase the appearance of piety among one's peers without inward submission.

Ninth-century Imam Abu Ishaq Al-Shatibi is often quoted on bidah owing to his extensive exploration of the subject, as a result of which he rejected the classification of bidah. He felt acts characterised as being obligatory or neutral (on the basis of nas,

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[355] Kamrava, 'Contextualising Innovation in Islam', pp2-3; Winter, 'The Poverty of Fanaticism', p307

[356] Durrani, *Mishkat-ul-Masabeeh* (trans. Capt A N Matthews), p63

[357] John Kelsay, 'Islamist Movements and Shari'a Reasoning' in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Regimes* vol 10, no 2 (2009), pp130-131

[358] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p45

by Al-Shafi'i and others) should fall instead into the category of being beneficial to the community, *masalih mursalah*. His definition of bidah comprised acts not possible to qualify as masalih mursalah, such as haram innovations or inventions in ritual worship. However Al-Shatibi went on to divide bidah in worship into two categories: the forbidden *haqiqiyyah* and the perspective-dependent (ie perhaps morally ambiguous) *idafiyyah*.[359] These categories depend on comparative levels of agreement with the law. He thus perceives some acts or innovations as being in opposition to the Shariah in every way, *bidah haqiqiyyah*, and some acts as being relative or *bidah idaifiyyah:* more equivocal cases, when Shariah sources both censure some aspects and validate other aspects of an innovation.[360] This way of viewing innovation may not be helpful as it might be used to support the radical idea that the use of any means is acceptable, ie a 'good' outcome can validate the use of prohibited or discouraged means in achieving it. Its net effect is to ultimately accept some bidah, at the cost of clear judgement.

In many sources online, various actions are simply called bidah, without a qualifying adjective – greatly contributing to the perception that all innovations are negative. Online sources also describe innovations in religious matters as 'bidah' in the sense the so-called 'Shariah usage' of this term, but this usage reinforces a one-sidedly negative view of bidah. To add to the potential for confusion, thirteenth-century scholar Al-Qarafi divided bidah into the five types discussed above, but addressed these to innovations in worship.[361]

The word bidah means innovation or invention. By itself, it will be assumed to be forbidden innovation in religious matters. But when used to describe innovation in social affairs, usage of a qualifying adjective indicating relative permissibility is

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[359] Syed Mohd Jeffri bin Syed Jaafar & Saadan Bin Man*, Bid`ah vs. Ijtihad In `Ibadah: A Preliminary Study on al-Shatibi's Thought*, http://ukmsyariah.org/terbitan/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/28-Syed-Mohd-Jeffri-bin-Syed-Jaafar.pdf Accessed 03 July 2016, pp6-7

[360] Abu.Iyaad, 'Refuting the Notion of Bidah Hasanah (Good Innovation) in Worship: Parts 1 to 8' http://www.bidah.com/articles/ p8 Accessed 26 August 2014

[361] Zarif, Nizah, Ismail and Mohamad, 'Creating Creative and Innovative Muslim Society: Bidah as an Approach', p124

advantageous for understanding. Once an analogy to the law can be established an innovation can be classified as being for the public good, or described as a recommended or permitted innovation. If it is not possible to make a proof or analogy to the sources, it would be beneficial to use the relevant qualifying adjective, ie makruh or haram. As we have seen above, enabling the idea of 'relatively-lawful' innovations may be dangerous: for lay use, permissibility is a more useful qualifier than that of proportionality in the law.

No innovations are permitted that negate or add to the Pillars of worship as these are specified in the Qur'an. But the forms of worship may be improved. The Sunnah of each tradition include those that describe forms of the Pillars of practice. These are hugely important examples, but they are secondary to the need for the Pillars as revealed.

The idea of tawqif – which is translated variously as limitation or instruction – governs the need for the ritual Pillars of practice. It was reportedly used in lawmaking by Ibn Hanbal among others, and restricts worship to only those practices requested by God.[362] To knowingly change or add to the types of worship therefore potentially violates tawqif. To knowingly change the form of practice may oppose the Sunnah for that tradition. The laws surrounding worship (fiqh al ibadah) appear to draw upon the Qur'an, Sunnah, sira, consensus and analogy.[363] Consequently, they vary according to each tradition. Transgressing these may result in innovation in religious matters.

Sufism has been described as bidah, as it draws on mystical practice and prayers, the concept of brotherhoods, and cosmology; these ideas are neither mentioned in the texts nor were practised at the time of Islam's formation.[364] It does not contradict the

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[362] SunnahOnline.com, 'The Principle of Limitation (Tawqif)' http://sunnahonline.com/library/beliefs-and-methodology/79-principle-of-limitation-tawqif-the Accessed 12 February 2017

[363] Tauheed Institute, 'Fiqh al-Ibadah (Jurisprudence of Worship)' course description https://tauheedinstitute.wordpress.com/fiqh-al-ibadah-jurisprudence-of-worship/ Accessed 18 February 2017

[364] Brown, *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World*, p187

Shariah and its intention is just, so consensus has legitimised Sufi practice, although not in the eyes of all, particularly Salafis.[365]

Perhaps owing to Wahhabism's allegiance to the idea of tawhid and God's ultimate sovereignty, it has an emphasis on avoidance of bidah. Hassan Hassan says that Wahhabi clerics devote much attention to bidah, which they use primarily to denigrate other Islamic traditions. However in trying to make his point about Wahhabi condemnation of Sufi and Shia practices[366], his statement fails to recognise the often good social innovations that might initially be classified as bidah.

The preceding discussion results in the following dimensions of *haram* bidah, constituting a working hypothesis or definition for the purpose of this study. Haram bidah are new or altered social developments that:

- *Either* have no basis in or go against Shariah: prohibited permissibility
- *Or* oppose the spirit and intention of Islam as understood by a majority of Muslims within a tradition (Sunni, Shi'a etc)

Together with the always-forbidden prohibited innovations in religious matters – also haram bidah – this offers ways to assess whether the important concepts used in radical thinking are permissible in Islamic traditions. To that end I will now assess the concepts previously identified as the most important in radical thinking, namely tawhid, takfir, hijrah, jihad, obligation and means.

4.5 Assessing radical innovations

It is possible to see how social matters may affect worship: Al-Ghazali showed that the piety of worship might be improved by social practices connected with the common good, *al-maslaha*, such as wearing perfume for communal prayers. And it is also possible to offer optional prayers, or undertake voluntary acts of charity, that increase devotion. If social affairs can have a positive effect on worship, then logically they may also negatively impact worship. But the altered performance or absence of worship

[365] Brown, *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World*, p258
[366] Hassan, *The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context*, p4

might still remain within the boundaries of Shariah: concessions, *rukhas*, may be made to obligatory religious duties, such as an ill person not needing to fast. In the absence of these dispensations, changes to practice are forbidden in religious matters. And I have established that some social matters may be haram bidah if they oppose Shariah. I will now assess the literature on key concepts of radical Islam in this light.

HIJRAH

I have previously discussed the changes in meaning to the concept of hijrah. Chronologically, the concept has represented: the flight from Mecca to Medinah (defining the start of the Islamic calendar, AH); a rejection of practices hateful to God; the Qutbian separation from unbelievers and antecedent of societal jihad; and the contemporary encouragement of individuals to leave their families in order to fight. In many ways, hijrah epitomises the act of radicalisation: an individual's forbearance is replaced with an attitude of symbolic and/or physical separation and of jihad, mirroring Muhammad's own reported exchange of fortitude for jihad. However, hijrah is not a religious matter. In spite of the use by IS of the hadith in which Muhammad states it to be among the five things with which God has commanded him, it is not among the Pillars of any of the traditions. Hijrah is associated with jihad, both as the historical pivot through which jihad was approved, and conceptually as a developmental stage in Qutb's idea of a Muslim society. Radical ideology associates it with the physical separation of individuals. Given the pervasiveness of advertising, it is easier nowadays to separate ourselves physically than symbolically, and so this change to the meaning of hijrah is likely to persist and develop.

Changes to the concept of hijrah therefore enable the fighting of jihad, primarily through the way it might be used to disregard or negate the need to obtain parental or family permission to do so. The need for such permission is clear from a sound hadith narrated by 'Abdullah bin 'Amr:

> *'A man came to the Prophet asking his permission to take part in Jihad. The Prophet asked him 'Are your parents alive?' He replied in the affirmative. The*

Prophet said to him, 'Then exert yourself in their service.' (al-Bukhari 4:52, 248)[367]

Radical groups encourage young people to join their cause by changing the idea of hijrah, the new sense of which appears plausible owing to the concept's resonances throughout the history of Islam. This change aims to overcome the need for parental permission to fight jihad, in clear contravention of Muhammad's advice. Obeying one's parents is not a matter of worship, it is a social matter. However, in encouraging uptake of jihad, it does contradict the Sunnah, and goes against the spirit of Islam. It does not benefit the public good, instead detracting from it by weakening the community. Therefore this changed usage is potentially a haram bidah.

TAKFIR

Hijrah may be used to describe the separation of believers from others. Another concept used in radical ideology is that of takfir, similar to the idea of Christian excommunication, although in Islam there is no such formal process. As previously discussed, the concept of takfir enables the separation or exclusion, both physically and symbolically, of one or many individuals, from other Muslims. First used by extremist Kharijites, it is the pronouncement of the unbelief of others. The texts warn against such accusations, particularly when a Muslim is outwardly adherent, as God alone is the arbiter of belief. Many Sunnah speak of such pronouncements of unbelief as being equivalent to the killing of a Muslim (al-Bukhari 8:73, 73), and the killing of Muslims is equally described as equal to unbelief (al-Bukhari 9:88, 197). Qutb uses the idea of takfir to reject lawmakers' authority, and to define them as outside Islam. However in this he goes against Ibn Taymiyyah and Mawdudi. Mawdudi stated that offering the condemnation of takfir is an innovation, an individual's wrong understanding not being a basis for expulsion from Islam.[368] In this Mawdudi emulated Ibn Taymiyyah, who wrote that takfir was bidah.[369] He seems to recognise

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[367] Sunnah.com, Sahih al-Bukhari 3004 https://sunnah.com/bukhari/56 Accessed 04 February 2017
Reproduction permitted by Sunnah.com: https://sunnah.com/about

[368] Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, pp131-132

[369] AbuKhalil, 'The incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of the 20th century', p679

that takfir runs counter to the spirit of Islam: it enables Muslims to refuse assistance, denying access to communal prayer or pilgrimage.

In spite of the general sense that declarations of takfir are taboo, its use has persisted in radical ideology. This usage of takfir makes three different things possible: firstly, it attempts to describe other Muslims as 'not Muslim enough'. This is undoubtedly helpful to extremists in overcoming classical injunctions to obey unjust rulers, but also to defy parents in obtaining permission to fight, to undertake the re-conceived separatist 'hijrah', or to shun anyone deemed unacceptable. Secondly, as takfir is often packaged up with the concepts of tawhid and sovereignty it offers extremists the illusion of moral superiority. These ideas lead to the third opportunity, creation of a caliphate without the traditional consensus of all Muslims. But the Qur'an itself defines 'true Muslims' as those following the articles of faith and those:

> *'…who give away some of their wealth, however much they cherish it, to their relatives, to orphans, to the needy, travellers and beggars, and to liberate those in bondage; those who keep up prayer and pay the prescribed alms; who keep pledges wherever they make them; who are steadfast in misfortune, adversity and times of danger. These are the ones who are true, and it is they who are aware of God.'* (2:177)[370]

Therefore if one's practice is correct the Qur'an itself can offer reassurance about being 'Muslim enough'. Declarations of takfir in spite of correct practice thus contravene the Qur'an and go against the spirit of the faith: potentially a haram bidah. Hassan shows how extremist groups such as IS have further turned the idea upon itself, to the extent that the failure of an individual to identify others as infidels and apostates 'can lead one to become an infidel or apostate himself'.[371] It is this idea of takfir that distinguishes astute Salafis from extremists.[372] True Salafis would not use the concept to aggressively divide Muslim from Muslim. Takfir is thus an innovation directly challenging worship: blocking the validity of Shahadah and negating practice of

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[370] Abdel Haleem (trans.) *The Qur'an*, p19
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[371] Hassan, *The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context*, p11

[372] Hassan, *The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context*, p6

a Pillar of Islam, as well as awarding oneself the divine power to assess the strength of another individual's belief. It is therefore an innovation in religious matters as well as contrary to the spirit and intention of Islam.

TAWHID

The unity of tawhid has similarly been used to invalidate other forms of belief. Sayyid Qutb wrote in *Milestones* that the idea of the Trinity was a distortion of the original idea of God and therefore made Christian societies jahili.[373] This statement denies the status that revelation, as well as Muhammad's own example, accorded to the Peoples of the Book.[374]

Mawdudi says that complying with the 'orders or suggestions' of parents or religious scholars invalidates God's sovereignty[375] and he later equates this to 'true Islam' as opposed to being a 'partial Muslim'[376]. Here he deliberately appears to create an idea of 'degrees' of Muslim-ness, but even viewing this error charitably it is clear that he opposes injunctions Muhammad made on obeying one's parents.

Al-Wahhab's conception of tawhid involved his view that individuals were required to demonstrate compliance with three different aspects of God's sovereignty in order to remain Muslims.[377] Al-Wahhab's view increases both the demonstration and obligation asked of Muslims in the Sunnah, and more than the articles of faith or practice require. While this seems similar to Al-Ghazali's optional 'perfecting' maslahah in charity and prayer, it is the requirement to demonstrate the three aspects to 'remain Muslims' that is the issue. The three aspects outlined by Al-Wahhab are affirmation of God's sovereignty; His right as the sole recipient of worship; and conviction in the qualities of God's names and attributes. The Shahadah covers the first two aspects and the third is an element of belief, the assessment of which is God's alone. Al-Wahhab's requirement thus appears redundant. Many Muslims would in any

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373 Qutb, *Milestones*, p81
374 Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, pp66-67
375 Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, p95
376 Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, pp112-115
377 Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p23

case read these aspects as being broadly integral to Islam and of correct intention. However, as noted in the discussion of takfir, Al-Wahhab cannot determine the parameters of remaining Muslim: correct practice legitimises one's status within the ummah. Al-Wahhab's required tri-partite tawhid cannot invalidate a belief demonstrated by correct practice and performance of the Shahadah.

OBLIGATION AND JIHAD

In Shi'ism, the concept of jihad is one of the Pillars on which the tradition rests – an individual obligation, with the priority on the 'greater jihad'. In Sunni Islam, there are differences in understanding of the obligation surrounding defensive and offensive jihad. Traditionally, fighting jihad is a collective obligation, undertaken by the community[378], and enforcing it as an individual duty in Sunnism effectively elevates the idea of jihad to a religious matter. Al-Banna was the first to cite jihad as an individual obligation; this was his response to colonial rule in Egypt.[379] Azzam and Al-Zawahiri have issued fatwas that try to impose on each individual Muslim the obligation to fight jihad.[380] These fatawa, and Al-Banna's view, seem to reflect their understanding that without such verdicts, jihad is indeed a collective duty – the clerics are finding it necessary to create individual duty. Azzam's view was that exceptional threats to the faith justified forbidden acts.[381] But as the sphere of individual obligation governs religious practices, these fatawa do promote jihad to the level of a religious matter for Sunnis. [It is worth re-stating that fatawa are only binding upon the issuer.]

The obligations surrounding jihad have been categorized by jurists in four ways: by heart, the greater internal jihad of which Muhammad spoke; by tongue and by hand, respectively encouraging or inhibiting actions; and by sword, fighting in defence of the

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[378] Ruthven, *Islam – A Very Short Introduction*, p113; Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, p151

[379] Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law*, p140

[380] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, pp193

[381] Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law*, p154

faith.[382] It might be argued that all acts under this characterisation, properly conducted, are acts of worship before God; however, I would contend that in Sunni Islam, fighting jihad is not properly conducted if it is regarded as an individual duty rather than a collective responsibility and is not authorised by recognised rulers. In this situation, fighting jihad is both a change to one's relationship with God and to the requirements of practice defined by Him. The change to the nature of obligation is a direct innovation in the divine realm governing Sunni worship, and therefore is an innovation in religious matters.

Mawdudi compounds this by saying that ritual worship becomes 'empty of meaning' if jihad is not the worshipper's intention.[383] [He does not clarify whether he is referring to the greater or lesser jihad, although his context in discussing jihad immediately prior to this statement was one of fighting for the sake of territory and worldly riches.[384]] These are changes to both the nature of obligation as well as the demarcation of Sunni religious matters. To assert jihad to be a religious matter but also one for individuals to decide is therefore unlawful in Sunni Islam. In elevating jihad to the status of one of the Sunni Pillars, Sunnism approaches Shi'ism, which recognises jihad as necessary orthopraxy and as part of worship.

David Dakake contends that a sense of jihad – as right intention in service of God – should pervade the five Pillars, and that in this way that it can be regarded as the 'sixth pillar' of [Sunni] practice. However the context for his statement are the aspects of jihad outside the martial, and he notes the lack of balance between the greater and lesser jihad practiced by militant groups.[385] Ruthven notes that the lesser and greater jihad could now be regarded as interchangeable.[386] Changes in the concept of 'defence' are used to justify calls to join defensive jihad, with acts to be defended

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[382] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, pp179-80
[383] Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, p293
[384] Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, p292
[385] Dakake, 'The Myth of a Militant Islam', p3
[386] Ruthven, *Islam – A Very Short Introduction*, p119

against now including a wounding of pride, or any restrictions on freedom.[387] Mary Habeck alleges that abrogations of the sources have served to reduce the number of tolerant revelations, increasing the apparent militancy of the texts.[388] It now appears as though offensive and defensive jihads are indistinguishable. This appears confirmed by the writings of extremist clerics Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir and Abu Bakr Naji, who justify violence against 'infidels', an apparently limitless category.[389]

It is however worth noting that recent radical ideologues have not agreed as to against whom jihad may be waged. Azzam held that only non-Muslims be subject to jihad, whereas Osama bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri held Muslim countries (and so presumably Muslims living there) to be legitimate targets.[390] Following the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, Omar Bakri Mohammed, then leader of the UK al-Muhajiroun group, declared the permissibility of jihad in the UK.[391] His opinion was apparently opportunistic, following the bombings, rather than resulting from theological reasoning. It is worth noting that the 1988 Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders had already designated civilians as legitimate targets.[392] All these denunciations are contrary to Islam's rules defining just war, which excludes the murder of civilians and innocents, and against the guidelines of jihad that spare women and children, the elderly and infirm. If radical groups classify the violence they perpetrate as being other than war, then action against non-military targets should fall under the tradition that prohibits the ends justifying the means.[393] As we will see, extremist ideologies extinguish this long-held Islamic ideal to achieve their militant goals.

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[387] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p110
[388] Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, p34
[389] Hassan, *The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context*, p17
[390] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islam*, p191
[391] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p86
[392] Kelsay, 'Islamist Movements and Shari'a Reasoning', p121
[393] El-Ansary, 'The Economics of Terrorism: How Bin Laden has Changed the Rules of the Game', p205

MEANS

Scholar Malik bin Anas developed the legal method of 'blocking the means', *sadd al-dhara'i*. Through this, anything contributing to a result that would be haram was also to be considered haram, even if permissible in other circumstances.[394] Both the outcome and the intention are potentially relevant – when the intention is unjust, then to prevent harm, the means enabling the otherwise legal act should be blocked. In this way, this concept of blocking the means contributes to the public good, *masalih mursalah*. The schools of law differ in the ways they judge *sadd al-dhara'i*; the Shafi'i school only considers it valid where there is an expression of harmful intention, but the Maliki and Hanbali schools additionally take into account the outcomes produced of actions.

Anwar Al Awlaki held that, in jihad, the end could justify the means used.[395] Similarly, Hizb ut-Tahrir states that its goals, including the foundation of an Islamic caliphate, may be achieved by 'any means'.[396] These theoretical statements make no allowance for particular circumstance, casualty level, or outcome: they sanction any eventuality. In this they fail to follow the greater accountability demonstrated by the schools of law, and it is hard to see how these expansive statements can be considered as possessing right intention. They are therefore potentially haram bidah.

In contradicting the law, these statements overturn the emphasis that Islam places on the authenticity of example and transmission. Hizb ut-Tahrir has also set its goals as a religious duty for its members[397], changing an individual's obligations to God. The concept of *bidah idafiyyah*, innovations whose acceptability depend on perspective, was discussed earlier. It is perhaps arguable that Hizb ut-Tahrir's guidance here does not necessarily create harm of itself. But it does rather set up the group's goals as equal to those duties owed to God, effectively rejecting divine sovereignty.

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[394] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, p31
[395] Storm, *Agent Storm: A Spy Inside Al Qaeda*, p10
[396] An-Nabahani, *System of Islam*, p76
[397] Husain, *The Islamist*, p92

Where the 'ends being used to justify the means' impacts any of the Pillars, this is an innovation that goes against the spirit of the faith. Therefore even where the change is enhancing piety, such as stealing money in order to give superogatory donations to charity, the haram methods might contravene the worship of zakah. Encouragement to wage jihad or establish a Caliphate using any means and without limitation of outcome is ultimately self-defeating for the ummah. Similarly, if fighting jihad is deliberately carried out to pursue specifically sectarian violence and results in Muslim deaths, it cannot be legitimate within the spirit of Islam. Therefore extremist fighting with sectarian purpose is haram bidah.

4.1 Summary of concepts as bidah or as innovation in religious matters

	Haram bidah	Innovation in religious matters
Hijrah: to overcome the need for permission to fight jihad	✓	
Takfir: pronouncements of, equation with sin, division	✓	✓
Tawhid: requirement to demonstrate three aspects		
Obligation and jihad: sixth pillar for Sunnis, individual obligation of jihad for Sunnis, for sectarian ends		✓
Means: desired ends justifying haram actions	✓	

Shown above in Figure 4.1 are the results from comparing the concepts or their extensions to the hypothesis or working definition of haram bidah, and to the proposition of specifically labelling innovations in religious matters.

Three of the concept extensions found in radical ideologies might be regarded as haram bidah: hijrah, takfir and the use of any means. These appear to be in conflict with the spirit of Islam as understood by the majority of Muslims. I have identified two areas in which radical thinking appears to have created innovation in religious matters: declarations of takfir and fighting jihad for sectarian reasons. In Sunni Islam, extremist ideologies also seek to change the obligation individuals owe to God in terms of jihad.

5 Muslim views on religious innovation in Islam

I wish to understand whether Muslims consider radical ideas to be innovations or part of the traditions. These views, anonymously surveyed, will inform my own conclusions about innovation in religious matters and bidah, and potentially contribute to counter-arguments to combat radical ideologies. They will also complete the triangulation with typologies gathered from the literature.

After stating the survey's aims, I will introduce and examine the methodology and results, analyse key associations, and then discuss some of the main trends.

5.1 Aims

The aims of the survey comprised: assessing whether different levels of observance are associated with views on innovation in religion and bidah, gaining perspectives on radical ideologies, and drawing out views on the key concepts discussed above identified as playing a role in Islamic radical narratives.

5.2 Methodology

After gaining ethical approval[398], I created a survey for adult Muslims, to compare their practice and environment with their perspectives on religious innovation. Using the Bristol Online Surveys platform, I presented a short series of 12 questions in a format equally accessible via desktop pcs and smartphones, using every-day language, with short explanations of any new or possibly unfamiliar term. The survey was promoted

[398] Ethical approval was granted by the University's College of Arts & Humanities Research Ethicals Committee prior to the release of the survey. Consideration was given to the aims, means of recruitment, questions, the storage and confidentiality of data, preservation of participants' anonymity and their ability to withdraw at any point. As part of the conditions for ethical approval, all participants had to confirm before accessing the survey their age as being over 18 years, their understanding of the participant information provided, and consent to the recording of their answers. All responses were made anonymously, and the data appears in the Appendix. Further information on the methodology appears in the text.

and conducted in English: the language I would use to follow-up concerns or for interviews by phone or email.

The online nature of the survey ensured:

- a wide range of individuals could participate from anywhere around the world
- the virtual process enabled complete anonymity for respondents if they wished
- format and questions were consistent for all participants

I advertised the survey as being open only to Muslims. Given the anonymity I wished to offer participants – to encourage honesty of opinion – I was aware that this request was open to potential abuse, and therefore I decided to exclude any responses indicating no knowledge of Islam or Muslim practice.

The questions are entered in Appendix B. Of the 12 questions, four firstly tried to establish basic parameters as to the respondent's religious engagement, based on observance and environment: their home life, national legislation, and the frequency and extent of practice of Islam. The answers to these questions were 'scored' using a simple range against the options provided as answers, and then totalled to derive a relative score of 'religiosity'. The intention of this basic device was to accommodate the potentially very different environments from which respondents were answering, without asking them for detailed descriptions probably hard to compare. However this score can show only relative contrasts between respondents and is not intended to be a complete description of any individual's spirituality or intention. Five questions asked about views on innovation, and three asked about bidah.

The survey's design followed quality criteria set out by Andrews, Nonnecke, Preece in 2003.[399] The questions were mostly in the format of multiple-choice answers,

[399] Dorine Andrews, Blair Nonnecke, Jennifer Preece, 'Electronic Survey Methodology: A Case Study in Reaching Hard-to-Involve Internet Users', *International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction* vol 16 no 2 (2003), pp187-188

although open text fields were provided for some questions, to enable clarifying information to be given, and open text fields were provided at the end of the survey enabling those who wished to make further comment to do so. The only incentive offered to participants was receipt of summarised responses, and across the duration of the survey, three such updates were sent. Data was encrypted and protected. The only responses collected were the finished surveys as submitted by the respondents. Respondents did not need to provide a name or any identifying information to participate. Answers from those who withdrew part-way were not collected, to preserve the privacy of those who changed their mind after consenting. My contact details were given before and after the survey for use by anyone who had concerns. Telephone interviews or email discussions were also offered. This additional feature gave respondents the opportunity to discuss their answers or related concepts. After these exchanges finished and updates sent to those who wished to receive them, contact data was deleted.

Distribution of the survey comprised promotion across the social media platforms of LinkedIn and Facebook. Facebook was the platform that produced the greatest number of responses; I created a short advert including a link to the survey and this was promoted to Facebook members whose interests included selected terms or phrases. The terms and details of the promotion are entered in Appendix C.

5.3 Results

The total number of people accessing the survey was 1,938. Of these, 1,769 did not proceed further than the introduction and consent page. 87 people withdrew from the survey prior to completing it; their answers were not seen or recorded. 79 people submitted the survey completed with valid responses. Three other responses were received and subsequently excluded, as based on their answers, comments and/or email address the participants did not appear to be Muslim or have knowledge of Islam. This potentially removed valid responses but seemed preferable to eliminate any doubt over the validity of the whole.

Completion point	Participants
Completed to page 1, then withdrew without submitting	1,769
Completed to page 2, then withdrew without submitting	40
Completed to page 3, then withdrew without submitting	21
Completed to page 4, then withdrew without submitting	7
Completed to page 5, then withdrew without submitting	19
Submitted and manually excluded	3
Submitted valid responses	79
Total accessing the survey	**1,938**
Completion rate for valid responses	**4.0%**

The anonymised responses appear in Appendix D [responses to questions on innovation and bidah in D1, and the individual elements contributing to religiosity score in D2].

Half of the respondents live in a country with legislation they described as a combination of secular and religious. One third lived under legislation they described as mostly religious. These answers (and those of the question that followed) used my wide-ranging terms such as secular and religious that are open to some interpretation but indicated the individual's perception of the legislation under which they live.

There was a mix of descriptions of home life; the most popular answer (34%) described these respondents' home lives as 'mostly religious with some secular activities or attitudes'.

A total of three quarters of the 79 respondents practise Islam once a day or more, with 44% practising at least five times a day. 10% of the respondents practised Islam less than once a year, and I considered disregarding answers from this cohort. Nevertheless, I wished to gain input from as wide a range of range of views as possible, and these respondents otherwise had experience of Islam. Most of the answers from this cohort were as wide-ranging as the answers given by Muslims practising five times a day, with the exception of the level of authority needed to interpret revelation, which those not practising mostly attributed to any Muslim.

The religiosity scores for each respondent, and the component individual measures of observance, are provided in Appendix D2.

Based on the simple numerical range assigned to the possible answers for each question, the theoretical range of 'religiosity' had a minimum possible score of 2 and a maximum possible score of 18. The results ranged from 3 to 17. Developing this score – while retaining the individual responses to home life, legislation, and frequency and extent of practice – made possible an 'overview' of religious engagement.

The average or mean religiosity score was 10.3. The median was 11 and the mode (of 18 respondents) was also 11. Therefore, I have regarded scores of 12 and above as being more religious than the average level of engagement, and scores of 9 or below as being less religious than average:

5.3 Distribution of religiosity scores



The religiosity scores followed a normal distribution as shown above and confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test, producing a significance value of .087 and a Q-Q plot that resulted in a straight-line trend. This normal distribution shows there are no outliers to skew interpretations.

Descriptive statistics were performed in Excel and confirmed in SPSS:

Religiosity score	
Mean	10.25316
Standard Error	0.315389
Median	11
Mode	11
Standard Deviation	2.803242
Sample Variance	7.858163
Kurtosis	-0.0149
Skewness	-0.32412
Range	14
Minimum	3
Maximum	17
Sum	810
Count	79

I will use the religiosity scores in my analysis of the following responses.

5.4 Responses

The majority of respondents agreed to some extent that revelation could be interpreted, and disagreed to some extent that literal readings were preferable. The survey questions and the numbers responding are shown below:

Select the answer below that indicates the extent to which you agree with this statement: Revelation is an eternal message that can be interpreted for any situation.



Select the answer below that indicates the extent to which you agree with this statement: A literal reading of revelation from God is preferable to interpretation.



Clerics and imams were acknowledged as having the authority to make interpretations, but one fifth of the total responses attributed this right to any Muslim:



This may indicate that a proportion of respondents feel able to think through interpretations of revelation for themselves. However while nine respondents selected 'any Muslim' alongside other answer options, 15 respondents selected only 'any Muslim' as their answer to this question, implying belief alone – and not any particular religious education or training – qualifies one to interpret the texts. At 19%, or one-fifth, of all respondents, this understanding that any Muslim has the authority to interpret the texts is an interesting result, suggesting a diversity of opinion in the meaning of scripture may exist.

One half of respondents agreed that innovation in worship was forbidden, but a fifth strongly disagreed. This disagreement does not necessarily imply this group therefore feels innovation in worship is acceptable, only that it is not forbidden.

There is similarity in size of the proportion who feel innovation in worship is not forbidden and the proportion indicating any Muslim has the authority to interpret the texts, but there was not found to be a statistically significant correlation when testing between the two groups: the same individuals did not necessarily give both answers. Based on the data in the survey, it is therefore only possible to note this as another point of interest, rather than to say that any relationship exists between the ideas. However, the similarity of the proportions potentially establishes a possible premise

for future study. For the present it is only possible to say that one-fifth of respondents strongly disagree that innovation in worship is forbidden in Islam, and when those slightly disagreeing are included, overall, one quarter of respondents disagree to some extent that innovation in worship is forbidden:

Select the answer below that indicates the extent to which you agree with this statement: Innovation in worship is forbidden in Islam.



Of the 23 respondents disagreeing either strongly or slightly that innovation in worship is forbidden, the majority practise Islam at least once a day or more (seven practised at least daily, seven practised at least five times a day, three at least weekly, three at least yearly and three less than once a year). So it cannot be said that those disagreeing that innovation in worship is forbidden are those lacking knowledge of Islam – over half answering in this way practise Islam every day.

Nearly 90% of respondents (71) knew the concept of bidah but it was characterised very differently. Half of all respondents saw it as innovation in worship, and a further quarter as bad or forbidden innovation:

If you have seen or heard this term before, please select the answer that most closely fits your understanding. Bid'ah is ... [select one]



Some participants who saw bidah as bad or forbidden innovation still selected the possible characterisations of bidah as including fard kifāya, mandub or mubah. These characteristics accounted for over one third (34.7%) of all the descriptions of bidah selected.

Do you recognise any of these as possible categories or characterisations of bid'ah? [select all that apply]



Awareness of the complexities of bidah were demonstrated by those with religiosity scores both below and above average:

- Two respondents [13143636, 13022519] strongly agreed that innovation in worship is forbidden, selected the response option that bidah is any kind of innovation, and that bidah can be characterised as fard kifāya, obligatory on the community. These answer selections make sense if the idea of innovation in worship, classically understood to be forbidden, is felt to be different to the concept of bidah, some classifications of which may be positive social innovations for the community. The religiosity scores of these respondents were 6 and 13, one well below average but one above average. These respondents demonstrate that a nuanced understanding of the difference between innovation in worship and bidah is possible irrespective of the level of an individual's religious engagement.
- Two respondents [13821363, 12737752] both strongly agreed that innovation in worship is forbidden, that bidah is innovation in worship or religious matters, and that bidah can be characterised as fard kifāya, obligatory on the community; mandub, recommended; and mubah, permitted. They also both indicated bidah was makruh, discouraged and the latter also said that bidah could also be haram, prohibited. The religiosity scores of these respondents

were 9 and 14, the former just below average and the latter well above average. These respondents appear to understand the possible permissibility of bidah, but perhaps less so my description of religious matters.

- One respondent [13486990] slightly agreed that innovation in worship is forbidden, specifically qualified that bidah was "adding anything to religious practice by own self" and characterised bidah as fard kifāya, mandub, and mubah. This respondent's religiosity score was 11, about average and equal to the modal or most frequent value. This participant's understanding of bidah is unclear from these answers.

The answers appear to show a lack of consensus as to the qualities of bidah, and that this occurs irrespective of religious observance.

One respondent [13249843] noted that "it is impossible for a bidah for example to be Fard or Mandub because for something to be Fard or Mandub then this requires a proof, which in turn does not make it a Bidah!" This respondent noted that Imam Al-Shatibi had refuted the concept that bidah can be split into five levels of permissibility. As we have seen in the investigation of bidah in the previous chapter, Al-Shatibi only recognised bidah as innovations in worship, seeing new things in social affairs as not part of the concept of bidah.[400] Furthermore, he appears to condone innovations in worship through his definition of the equivocal classification of *idafiyyah*.

As previously described, one way often used by a range of commentators to explain bidah, through a 'linguistic meaning' and a 'Shariah meaning', can be confusing. These 'meanings' appear respectively to map to innovations in social matters or a sense of novelty, and to innovations in worship, but it seems to be the case across the information available online that this is rarely spelled out, and the two spheres are entangled in discussion, perpetuating the lack of clarity. As the above survey respondent demonstrates, denunciations of innovation in worship often mask the ethical acceptability of innovations in social matters, some of which may be for the

[400] Jaafar & Bin Man, *Bid`ah vs. Ijtihad In `Ibadah: A Preliminary Study on al-Shatibi's Thought*, pp6-7

greater good of the ummah. Social innovations or bidah such as the study of grammar may be ruled as obligatory and in the spread of the then-new idea, those who encounter it for the first time will be aware of its permissibility. As Nawawi Foundation scholar Umar Faruq Abd-Allah notes, the concept of bidah enables individuals to navigate new developments safely.[401]

The wide range of responses in relation to bidah, apparently irrespective of 'religiosity', emphasises the possible varieties of understanding, and might indicate that even where practice appears similar, the rationales for it may be different. The variations among survey answers may be due to participants selecting familiar terms, irrespective of their appropriateness to bidah or understanding as to why such terms were relevant. *The Young Fundamentalists' Survey* of 2005 similarly proposed participants' familiarity with terms as a cause in order to account for some of the responses made within its broad online survey of young Christians in the US.[402]

One of the aims of the survey was to gain perspectives on whether Muslims consider radical ideologies as innovation in worship or bidah. The broad answer is that 66% of respondents, a clear majority, described radical ideologies as one of these types of innovation. But the possible lack of understanding about bidah casts doubt on the answers that include this term. Just over one quarter of respondents, 27%, saw radical ideologies as prohibited bidah, and 5% saw such ideologies as permitted bidah. What is striking about the answers to this question is that a total of one third of respondents felt radical ideologies are either not innovation, or are not described by any answer featuring innovation. If radicalism is neither new nor described by newness, this implies a substantial proportion of Muslims feel radical ideologies to be an existing or integral part of Islam:

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401 Abd-Allah, *Innovation and Creativity in Islam*, p7

402 Mark L Ward Jr, *The Young Fundamentalists' Survey* (A Fundamentalism File Research Report, 06/06/2005), p3

Do you think radical Islamic ideologies can best be described as ... [select one]



This result tallies to some extent with the mapping of the descriptions of radicalism in chapter 2 (see Fig 2.5 K). I found that these descriptions mapped to positions on the factor-axes of interpretation and knowledge base that corresponded to no innovation, and to regressive and progressive innovation. This consensus between the writers descriptions' and the answers given in the survey by practising Muslims is potentially a key finding and may also explain the endurance and popularity of radical ideologies. They appear to be perceived as not innovation, ie integral to Islam, by a substantial minority.

The aims of the survey also included assessing whether religiosity is associated with views on innovation in religion and bidah. I will now turn to analysis of the key trends and associations.

5.5 Key trends and associations

There are a few statistically significant associations at the confidence level of 95%, ie having high likelihood of applying to wider Muslim populations as opposed to just survey participants. However only two things appear correlated specifically to the religiosity score: respondents' awareness of bidah, and a preference for a literal reading of revelation.

Data was analysed and is presented variously in Excel, SPSS and Datacracker software.

RELIGIOSITY SCORE

Awareness of bidah is weakly correlated with religiosity score. This was a statistically significant result with confidence of 95%, and appears to be a logical association: a less religious lifestyle or environment would probably be less likely to have included discussion or teaching of bidah. Those unaware of bidah had an average religiosity score of 8.3, ie slightly lower than average. Therefore the overall indicator of observance developed from these respondents' answers appears to tally with respondents' self-reported understanding of bidah.

Know bidah term?	No	Yes	Net
Average religiosity score	8.3	10.5	10.3

Please see Appendix figure 7.6.1 for the correlation test results.

Religiosity scores derived from observance measures volunteered do appear to correlate with the preferences among respondents for a literal reading of revelation, a result statistically significant at 95% confidence. The correlation test results are provided in Appendix figure 7.6.2. Those with a strong preference for a literal reading of revelation have a higher-than-average religiosity score (12.2).

Literal reading preferable	Strongly disagree	Slightly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly agree	Strongly agree
Average religiosity score	9.5	9.7	10.6	9.6	12.2

Preference for a literal reading might appear logical when considering those Muslims with higher religiosity score based on the measures used here to develop that score, such as more religious legal and domestic environments. However, this does correlation does not speak of causation.

These are the only significant results relating to religiosity scores through this measure as developed. It is possible that religiosity scores derived from a larger range of elements – ie considering a greater range of aspects of religious feeling and environment – would show greater correlations.

While these religiosity scores were generated for an overall perspective on observance, it is worth examining the results in terms of the individual measures as

well. Among the indicators of religiosity measured were: home life (H), legislation (L), practice (P) and additional observance of Islam (I). Some of the measures correlated with others – as might be expected given they interact with each other – but, as shown in Appendix figure 7.6.6, none of the overall measures showed statistically significant correlations with respondents' descriptions of radical ideologies.

Based on the answers given in this survey there is no apparent relationship between the derived religiosity score as measured by the indicators studied, and views on innovation in worship and bidah (noting the range of understanding about bidah); see Appendix 7.6.4. One possibility is that the survey questions have not sufficiently measured observance. However if the indicators have established a reasonable relativity between believers' engagement, the responses suggest that views on innovation in Islam may form independently of observance and engagement in the faith. Further study of this topic might investigate the sources of the knowledge behind such views and address the apparent lack of relationship to overall observance. The potential exists to educate Muslims at every level of practical experience on religious innovation in Islam.

I will now explore the survey's second aim, to understand whether participants see radical ideologies as innovation or as bidah.

RADICAL IDEOLOGIES

The average religiosity score of respondents seeing radical ideologies as innovation in worship was 10.0, ie very close to the average religiosity score of all respondents (10.3). So arguably this is not a view held by those lacking an understanding of Islam or equally by those possessing greater knowledge.

No statistically significant correlation was found between the descriptions selected for radical ideologies and either home life or legislation; see Appendix 7.6.6. These results are therefore relevant only to this cohort of respondents and not the general population.

Those who practised at least five times a day (35 respondents) differed widely in their view of radicalism:

5.5 A Those who practice five times a day: radical ideologies best described as



Thus the frequency of practice alone cannot be said to offer any clear indicator as to perception of radical ideologies as innovation.

Attitudes to interpretation or literalism were compared to a range of views on the level of innovation of radicalism. Those who agreed, either slightly or strongly, that revelation could be interpreted (a total of 53 respondents) had a range of views on radicalism as innovation or bidah, seeing it variously as some other form of innovation (26%), as prohibited bidah (22%) or as not innovation (22%).

Those who agreed, either slightly or strongly, that a literal reading was preferable (a total of 22 respondents) were more likely to feel that radical ideologies were either prohibited bidah (36%) or not innovation (27%). No-one who agreed that a literal reading was preferable felt that radical ideologies were best described as innovation in worship. Although this group most often chose the best description of radical ideologies as being prohibited bidah, it is clear that a substantial proportion felt such ideas were not innovation:

5.5 B Those who feel a literal reading is preferable: radical ideologies best



Are any of these indications statistically significant? The scoring tables and correlation tests can be seen in Appendix 7.6.7. The only statistically significant relationship found, at a confidence level of 95%, is a weak and negative one between a preference for interpretation and the descriptions given to radical ideologies as being forms of innovation. As causation is not established, there is more than one possible explanation: (1) those agreeing that revelation may be interpreted might be less likely to see such ideologies as innovation in worship; or (2) Muslims who see radical ideologies as innovation in worship or prohibited bidah are less likely to agree that revelation can be interpreted. The correlation here is interesting although not very strong.

It is noted that all those who felt that radical ideologies were permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs (four respondents) had an average religiosity score of 13.3. The small size of the group may account for this result but it is interesting nonetheless that a few of those respondents with a high religiosity score, and therefore more than average religious engagement, answered in this way. Of all respondents, 26 of the 79 had a higher-than-average religiosity score (ie 12 or over), and this cohort of four is therefore not representative. Nonetheless, this does suggest that views of radical ideologies are very varied and cannot easily be ascribed to the level of one's religious understanding or practice. This is a similar result to that found for views on religious

innovation and bidah, and might confirm that the components measured for religiosity were insufficient descriptors, or that observance and engagement are independent of opinion on this topic.

5.6 Discussions

The third aim of the survey was to draw out views on the key concepts in Islamic radical narratives discussed earlier.

Of the 79 respondents completing the survey, 21 indicated an interest in further discussion. These individuals were all contacted by email within 24 hours of their taking the survey. Of these 21 contacts, three email exchanges resulted.

Two respondents highlighted varying use of the Quran and ahadith. One of these respondents saw a lack of balance in their usage. The other emphasised personal judgement.

Interview respondent 2

"I live in Egypt and can tell you without a doubt that scholars and TV channels about Islam quote hadith much more than the Qur'an. Many people are realising that much damage has been done to Islam by the [use of] hadith. … The Qur'an itself warns against following any other hadith than the Qur'an. … Today a lot of Muslims are now opening their eyes against hadith, against Salafism and how it causes radicalism. … This is because Wahhabism is literal interpretation and extreme use of hadith."

This respondent recommended further investigation of Qur'an-only sources. The increasing use of the ahadith and emphasis on the Sunnah as obligatory is described by Hassan Hassan as one of the characteristics of the sectarian nature of the IS group.[403] Tawfik Hamid notes that jihadists justify their violence by citing examples of such conduct by Muhammad found largely in ahadith and later writings.[404] An emphasis on

[403] Hassan, *The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context*, p11

[404] Hamid, *Inside Jihad – How Radical Islam Works, Why it Should Terrify Us, How to Defeat It*, p42

Sunnah also serves to divide Sunni from Shi'a, who have their own collections – and there are also differences between Shi'a traditions as to gauging authenticity. Raising the importance of the ahadith and Sunnah over recognition that the Qur'an is the only solely-revealed and common link potentially divides Islam further.

Interview respondent 3

"Radical ideologies or whatever people may try to do as an innovation in practice or how to worship of anything that has to do with basic rules in our religion will not affect it [Islam]. Allah said in the Holy Qur'an … He Himself can protect it [Islam] from any harm whether it's people forgetting the signs or even others trying to change or falsify its signs. … Our Prophet told us to follow the teaching in our Qur'an and his Sunnah (Hadith). They complete each other the Sunnah is merely the things that are preferable but not things you MUST do like there is something good and [an]other better, and also Sunnah explains matter of Qur'an. Also there are some 'Hadith' that God spoke in them Himself to our Prophet not only our Prophet's words and actions. So they complete each other." … "The main rule is to use your brain and think about it. Sira also means or Prophet's life so I think it's equal to Sunnah."

In contrast to the previous participant, this respondent advocates the Basic Code of Qur'an and ahadith. There is a shared perspective across these different opinions: the personal judgement required by Muslims today in assessing the sources. This may help explain the proportion of survey respondents who felt that 'any Muslim' has the authority to interpret the sources: this may reflect an increasing need to assess the variety of information disseminated.

The use of ahadith was also noted by the other interview respondent:

Interview respondent 1

"Since [radical recruiters] consider the Ummah now lives in the era of second jahiliyah and oppression, they invoke many references from hadith like 'Migration will not end until repentance ends, and repentance will not end until the sun rises in the west', and from Qur'an such as Ayah 97 of Surat Al Nisaa' to support the hijrah to jihad without permission."

The context of this contribution aimed at Islamists' support for the evolution in meaning of the concept of hijrah, but it concurrently demonstrates the use of ahadith. The use of ahadith in deriving the Sunnah took place in the tradition perhaps at the expense of the deduction of laws directly from the Qur'an. Notwithstanding the investigations of authenticity of the ahadith, the laws of Islam developed along a formulation that was 'anecdotal' rather than solely logical. This accords Muhammad and the Companions their status as exemplars of observance, even though Muhammad had said he was not an expert in worldly affairs.

The emphasis on use of ahadith and their relation to the Qur'an are interesting as they relate to two key areas of the survey's results: the sizeable minority who feel any Muslim has authority to interpret the texts, and preference for a literal reading among those who more frequently practice Islam.

The first interview respondent also commented on two of the other concepts under study.

Interview respondent 1

Takfir: "[Radicals] highlight every aspect in the society that contradicts Shariah and direct orders from Allah," … "They have to condemn the society as a jahili society or kufr society to justify jihad."

Use of any means: "Those means would be subjected to something called 'Ta'seel Shar'y' which means finding a precedent in the form of an action done by the Prophet or one of the rightful Caliphs or one of the Companions 'Sahabah', or an action done by any Muslims and the Prophet, Caliphs, Sahabah didn't condemn his action or even instead praised it. Or if this action is already supported by a fatwa or a hadith or the Qur'an. They would go to great lengths to eliminate any suspicions of committing a bidah."

The comment about suspicions of bidah is very interesting, as the lack of consensus around bidah surely serves the purposes of radical actors. The use of precedent also implies a flexible attitude to the sources on the part of extremists. As noted

previously, more fundamentalist Muslims might prefer a selective use of the sources – and potentially the criteria for selection of a part of the texts might include its potential to serve as a precedent. In making such a selection, a sense of regressive innovation is demonstrated.

The relative number of occurrences of different words across the email exchanges can be represented visually, demonstrating the pre-eminence interviewees gave the Qur'an and ahadith – with the term hadith being used more often than the terms Sunnah, Islam or Allah:



5.7 Conclusions on the survey's key findings

Andrews, Nonnecke & Preece note that, for various reasons including access and internet literacy, 'online populations are not generalizable to offline populations'.[405] The following thoughts, based on an online audience recruited largely through one platform, are not necessarily representative of all Muslims.

Some interesting outcomes that were not statistically significant might bear repeating here before progressing to the results that were statistically significant. A quarter of the Muslims responding to the survey apparently see radical ideologies as an existing or integral part of Islam. A similar proportion disagree that innovation in worship is

[405] Andrews, Nonnecke & Preece, 'Electronic Survey Methodology: A Case Study in Reaching Hard-to-Involve Internet Users' pp189

forbidden. Around one-fifth of the survey participants feel that any Muslim has the authority to interpret the main sources of Islam. However, those respondents with a greater observance of Islam preferred a more literal interpretation. These two latter views are possibly assisted by an emphasis on ahadith rather than on the Qur'an.

Twenty people said that radical ideologies were prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs. Of the 79 respondents, only 10% characterised radical ideologies as innovation in worship. The religiosity scores of these respondents ranged from 4 to 17, and seven of the eight respondents giving this answer strongly agreed that innovation in worship was forbidden. Nine of the twenty people indicating that radical ideologies were prohibited bidah also said that bidah was innovation in worship, and eight of the twenty said that bidah was bad or forbidden innovation. Yet none of them chose to describe radical ideologies as innovation in worship.

One possible explanation for this is that I failed to define my phrase 'radical Islamic ideologies' within the question, and it is possible therefore that the question became circular: the phrase implies the ideologies meant are indeed inherently derived from Islam. In any repetition of the exercise, the question should be re-worded or include examples or the names of groups by which to illustrate more clearly what is meant.

There may also be a reluctance to describe radicals as innovating in worship. If this is felt to be forbidden in Islam, such a description might be felt as rendering those Muslims outside the faith. Muslims may be unwilling to effectively render a judgement equivalent to takfir. Equally, and given their medieval roots, such ideologies may now be understood as an intrinsic part of the tradition: not 'new' or particularly innovative. Those characterising radical ideologies as not innovation (15 respondents) or as 'none of the above' (10 respondents) constitute nearly a third of all respondents. This suggests a sizeable proportion may see radical ideologies as an existing or integral part of Islam: neither innovation nor any form of bidah. This represents a possible key finding: while a majority see radical ideologies as innovation, there is a sizeable minority view that radical ideologies are not innovation – and therefore are an integral part of Islam. And one of the few correlations found was the relationship between the

preference for revelation to be interpreted and the description of radical ideologies as not being innovation. These points might be explained by a tolerance for new ideas seen as contiguous to classical belief. It is also likely that the individuals making such interpretations are unqualified to judge the level of innovation they have created; they may promote their readings as entirely integral. We have also seen that preference for literal reading of revelation is associated with greater religiosity, and is potentially linked to viewing radical ideas as innovations.

Greater religious engagement is linked with an awareness of bidah, although there is a lack of consensus or understanding about the concept of bidah. Seven of the 79 respondents, nearly 10%, strongly agreed that innovation in worship is forbidden. However 23 respondents (29%), nearly a third, disagreed either strongly or slightly that innovation in worship is forbidden. The religiosity scores of these respondents ranged from 3 to 14.

5.7 A Disagreeing that innovation in worship is forbidden: radical ideologies best described as



The apparent acceptance of the idea of innovation in worship may therefore be a factor in the acceptance and enablement of radical ideologies.

Before I draw together conclusions, I will note the main achievements of the survey.

The survey aimed to assess whether religiosity might be associated with views on innovation in religion and bidah – it does not appear to be, at least among this online constituency. I also wished to learn from the survey whether radical ideologies are considered by Muslims to be innovation or bidah, and the majority, 66% of respondents, described radical approaches as some form of those. It is noted though that 34% of the online survey participants feel radicalism is not new. The key point drawn from the further conversations, that understanding how the sources of Islam are used, is vital in comprehending growing fundamentalism.

Nearly a third of respondents disagreed that innovation in worship was forbidden. This suggests potentially a sizeable proportion of Muslims may not be on their guard for changes to the way they worship. There is also a lack of agreement as to the meaning of bidah. So it would be easy to denigrate new advances as being inappropriate or conversely as being necessary – without an understanding of permissibility, it would be difficult for a layperson to judge. Both the above points have the potential to greatly mislead Muslims who lack a firm grounding in the tradition or who are without access to appropriate guidance.

Radical ideologies were not seen as innovative by nearly a third of all respondents. Although this is a possible artefact resulting from a circular question, this finding does echo the mapping reproduced below, where academic writers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, characterised radical ideologies as not innovative, regressively innovative, and in one case potentially progressively innovative:

Copy of 2.5 K Mapping comparison: radical theme and types of innovation



This similarity across both lived experience and academic analysis lends weight to the range of innovation styles that appear to exist within radical Islam. It suggests that elements of radical ideologies are inherent in the traditions. The diversity of approach in description and perception of such ideologies is apparent.

The interview responses identifying the possible over-use of ahadith, offer a potential base for counter-arguments to be developed: a return to the Qur'an as the foremost authority in Islam. I will explore this and the above points in my conclusions.

It is fitting that this study's investigations have included a review of the literature and of the development of such ideologies across history, and has ended with the views of Muslims around the world contributed via social media and technology. Islam will always be alive to technological developments, even as these might lead to different ways of practising.

6 Conclusions

We should not be shy to invalidate militant and opportunistic approaches that distort the intentions of any religious tradition for worldly or political goals. Islamic extremism is not the only response possible to the challenges that face Islam, and in fact may provoke reactionary Islamophobia and a self-perpetuating cycle. In concluding this study, I will revise the key points arising from the literature and survey responses within suggestions for counter-balancing radicalism. These recommendations were among the objectives of the study and I include them here among my conclusions to show clearly their source in the matters discussed. Firstly, I will recap the key concepts investigated in chapter 4.

Why do radical ideologies survive? Changes to the meaning and context of the texts, and a lack of understanding of bidah appear to be key areas. In my review of radical ideologies, I proposed that modern changes to the concept of hijrah, the use of takfir, and the use of any means are potentially haram bidah: forbidden changes to social matters. To legitimise fighting jihad, radical groups have two options: either war must be properly authorised, or if violent actions stop short of war, tradition prohibits the ends justifying the means. Encouraging young people to join extremist groups to fight 'jihad' contravenes traditional boundaries of permission. Violence undertaken for sectarian reasons negates the Shahadah, and raising jihad to be a Pillar for Sunnis is an innovation in worship. Altering traditional understandings of obligation, and the use of takfir, are potentially innovations in religious matters. Changes in obligation reframe one's relationship with God, and the intention of worship. Determining the belief of individual Muslims is a judgement only possible by God; pronouncing takfir disavows another's Shahadah and is a self-appointment to divine authority.

I have explored the change of meaning introduced by a selective approach: innovations resulting from such reduced knowledge base may be regressive in nature. For literalism to succeed in conveying the spirit of a tradition, it must therefore be a literalism of the whole, and not of merely a part. The survey showed that those respondents who practice of Islam was more extensive preferred greater literalism,

and the majority of those who preferred literalism indicated radical ideologies to be prohibited bidah. Tolerance of a selectivity of sources would potentially be less likely among those with broad engagement across Islam.

6.1 The priority and entirety of the Qur'an

The survey responses suggested a weak negative correlation between descriptions of radical ideologies as innovation or prohibited bidah and preference for interpretation of revelation. Greater literalism, utilising texts in their entirety rather than selectively, would seem to negate some acceptance of extremist ideas. This is counter-intuitive to a degree given the emphasis on narration for more conservative groups, but those who prefer greater flexibility in understanding what God requires of them may be less likely to feel inhibition about 'bending the rules' or making extensive interpretations. The Qur'an itself asks Muslims to use their reason. But not all those who follow more greatly interpretative versions, such as liberal or mystic perspectives, become jihadis or aspire to violence. This may be the aspect in which regressive innovation is important – the selectivity and paucity of sources perhaps lies at the heart of extremism, putting it at odds with traditional views.

Interviewees highlighted the importance of the Qur'an, and the trend for using ahadith to legitimise interpretations and avoid charges of bidah. Islam has a number of authoritative sources of information but they are not equal.

John Voll suggested promotion of a solely-revealed 'normative Islam'. Reducing the association with historical militancy would be more in keeping with modern geopolitics. However, as the focus of both the Qur'an and Sunnah tend toward individual conduct, the textual bases for civic affairs may be weaker. In addition, erasing historical context from revelation may open up the texts for even more reductive and extreme interpretations. 'Abduh and Qutb are among those ideologues who favoured the Qur'an's pre-eminence over other sources, and Qutb used de-contextualised ayahs liberally in his work.

'Normative Islam' has also been described as that outlined by the Sunnah.[406] The promotion of the Sunnah as revelation in its own right is worth exploring. It is regarded as revealed through the example of Muhammad, following God's instructions for Muslims to obey him. This premise is also given weight as the Sunnah contribute to the fiqh al ibadah laws surrounding worship; the Sunnah are also used to abrogate the Qur'an. Survey participants reported an increasing use of ahadith within broadcast media. This appears to be provoking growth of the Qur'an-only movement, which advocates the Qur'an as the sole religious authority for Islam. Some groups of these groups make use of the tafsir commentaries, and some groups use selected reliable ahadith; there are differences among groups as to adherence to Shariah law and deference to imams.

Critics of the Qur'an-only approach associate it with historic Mutazilite source-reduction and elevation of reason, and cite the Qur'an's lack prescriptiveness about how the practices it asks for should be carried out. Among the disapproving voices is Dr Jonathan Brown, apparently featured in a YouTube clip talking about his recent book entitled *Misquoting Muhammad*. In the clip, he describes Qur'an-only approaches as selective, inconsistent and potentially leading to a dishonest relationship with God.[407] His description might apply equally well to extremist ideologies. Indeed, in his book *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World*, Dr Brown uses the word radical to describe Qur'an-only ideas and associates them with Orientalist thinking, humanism and Westernism, perhaps attempting to make Qur'an-only attitudes appear inauthentic.[408] Both his books subtly discredit the Qur'an-only movement, noting its fleeting existence in the Arab world; he acknowledges its Indian eighteenth-century stronghold and its slight acceptance in the

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[406] Jamaal al-Din Zarabozo, 'God's Preservation of the Sunnah (Part 1 of 7): The Companions' Understanding of their heavy responsibility', *The Religion of Islam*, published 25 June 2007, modified 16 October 2011 http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/582/viewall/god-s-preservation-of-sunnah/ Accessed 12 February 2017

[407] Yahya Snow, *Hamza Yusuf and Jonathan Brown Expose Quran-Only Movement*, published 24 April 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIFJl5KtVqQ Accessed 11 February 2017

[408] Brown, *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World*, p244

parts of contemporary Turkish culture that are more secularised.[409] This appears to be at odds with the numerous resources for it online, and with this study's interview responses implying its renewal as reaction to the over-emphasis of ahadith. Across both his descriptions, Brown describes the tenuousness of developing practice from the Qur'an alone and their scholars' apparent hypocrisy in deriving Qur'anic meaning by use of language found in the ahadith.

Qur'an-only attitudes have a part to play in re-examining the encultured practice of Islam, just as radical ideologies might inspire reconsideration of the spirit and intention of Islam.

Like tafsir, the ahadith and Sunnah offer examples of early Islam. But just like the translations of the Qur'an, they are subject to time. Prioritising the practice of the first Muslims over revelation potentially freezes human development, which cannot have been God's intention. Likewise, it makes little sense that the Sunnah are used to abrogate the Qur'an; this invokes a level of infallibility not just in the person of Muhammad, but of all the early Muslims, which enables their experiments in living out submission to be held as more valid than both accumulated historical experience and God's direct message. Muhammad's perfection is realised in his admission of fallibility in social affairs.

It is possible for the ahadith to be sound, reflecting the historical accuracy of the chain of their transmission, without holding the Sunnah so derived to be infallible. The Sunnah are a guide to conduct. They may include parts of revelation, or explain revelation, but cannot all be regarded as having the same status as revelation. The basis for the validity of the Sunnah is often given as the Qur'an's instruction for believers to obey Muhammad (such as ayah 4:59) and heed his explanations of the divine will (such as 16:44). But these ayahs respectively also instruct the hearers to obey God and those in authority as well as Muhammad, and to meditate or reflect on

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[409] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, pp244-245, p203

Muhammad's explanations. Notwithstanding that the human recorders of the ahadith had a vested interest in ensuring their work was self-authorising, the Qur'an permits reflection and the use of reason (21:10).

This study has focused on innovations, and it is likely that many Muslims will feel a decrease in the authority of ahadith and Sunnah to be an innovation, or as resulting in innovations in religious matters. This is understandable: the Qur'an tells Muslims to pray and mentions two prayers, but it is the Sunnah that outline the accepted form of this worship for each tradition, such as the number, timing and direction of prayer. This is true for all the Pillars of practice: while their roots are in the revelation, the form for each tradition or school of law is based on the Sunnah. The need for and types of ibadah are set by God, and the Sunnah provide examples of the forms religious matters might take. While they cannot determine religious matters, ahadith are a useful guide in helping describe the permissibility of bidah in social matters through levels of nas. Ahadith are an authentic part of Islam, but this does not mean these human-derived and time-bound models of living should be accepted uncritically.

Are Qur'an-only groups innovating in religious matters? Not while they meet obligations to God to carry out worship. If laws surrounding worship for a tradition or a school depend on a Sunnah that prescribes the forms, then disregarding that Sunnah to the extent that change in practice is created is innovation in worship for that tradition or school. Some Qur'an-only groups accept some ahadith, probably for this very reason. There are a number of traditions and schools of Islam: they all follow the revealed Qur'an and interpret the forms of their submission in different ways. The Qur'an-only movement, in rejecting all the schools of law, might be considered a future sect in its own right, and thus able to determine its forms of worship.

Imams and community leaders have much to offer in terms of developing and delivering Qur'anic education, engaging disillusioned members within their local communities, and contributing to regional and national consensus. This may in turn

endorse the countries in which these efforts take place as *Dar al-Amn* (world of safety), expressing more clearly a tolerance and the freedom to practice Islam.[410]

This leads to **my first potential counter-approach to radical arguments: encouraging emphasis of the Qur'anic revelations as a whole, and establishing the clear status of the Qur'an above the ahadith and Sunnah**. The Sunnah have a clear role to play in explaining God's word – both through the language and culture of the time but also to access the meaning and intention of revelation. Denying their existence appears reductive in a way analogous to radical preferment of some parts of the traditions – but holding the Sunnah to be above revelation surely denies God's sovereignty.

Such suggestions have been described as 'attacks' on the Sunnah.[411] And the preservation of form does have a part to play in the cohesiveness of Islam. But rigid and inflexible conservation of form may come at the cost of meaning and the spirit and intention of Islam. This is indeed an aspect of radical Islam: changes to meaning and extensions of classical concepts in pursuit of worldly ends.

Given the temporal basis of the Qur'an, its interpretations and abrogations are similarly worth exploring for authenticity and appropriateness. It is possible to agree with Ibn Hanbal that revelation is uncreated, in the sense of its meaning and intention. But it is inescapable that His message as written down and re-ordered by humans reflects the circumstances of each time of its recording, translation or interpretation, as we have seen in the recent versions that refer to the expansion of the universe. It is still to be completely understood. To separate out the message from its history completely denies the gains of consensus and learned experience. And to write off the ahadith as a corpus denies the experience and contribution of Muhammad as the first hearer and reciter. The formulation of a normative Islam must include appreciation of the commentaries and consensus derived to date, and a re-orientation with the context of God's revelations, asbāb al-nuzūl. The meaning of the message is understood by comparing it to the time and place in which it was recorded, and the

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[410] Abbas, *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics – The British experience*, p35
[411] S M Yusuf, 'The Sunnah: Its Place In Islam', *Islamic Studies* vol 1, no 4 (1962), p46

failure to readjust our interpretations accordingly surely denies the eternal nature of the revelation. Such reconsideration based on historical circumstance and evolutions of understanding are another aspect apparently derided by Jonathan Brown.[412] However Tariq Ramadan's point, that radicals fail to differentiate between the immutable and the adaptable, surely also applies to uncritical acceptance of ahadith and Sunnah.

The Qur'an succeeded the Christian and Jewish texts, and in a sense itself set a precedent for 'abrogation' by reclaiming God's message to humanity and refining it to the situation and time of The Messenger. The Qur'an as recorded apparently allows for its own abrogation (2:106), although this idea is contested as resulting from an overly self-referential reading of the word ayah [which may also mean miracle].[413] Irrespective of the source of or validation for the process of abrogation, it is scholars who decide the prioritisation, and indeed whether the Sunnah may even abrogate the Qur'an.

Re-examination of interpretation and the suitability of these abrogations might serve to increase the relevancy of the revelations. Many abrogations, such as the use of the Verse of the Sword to replace more tolerant and forbearing ayahs, appear to reflect the history of the later Muslim period, but not the time of the earlier revelations and not of today's international diplomacy and diasporas. **Therefore my second suggestion is a reconsideration of the abrogations of the eternal message, with a recognition that history infuses every aspect of our understanding of revelation.**

6.2 Assessments of in-novo

Benoit Godin has shown the changes in fortune of the term 'innovation' through history, and its meaning in early Christianity as *in-novo*, a return to the pure soul. This

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[412] Brown, *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*, pp202-203

[413] A Muhammad, 'The Lie of Quranic Abrogation', http://www.quran-islam.org/main_topics/quran/false_accusations/abrogation_claims_(P1216).html Accessed 05 February 2017

return to purity might be considered analogous to a renewed perfection of submission. Godin traces the term's journey from its positive origins to medieval negative meanings: innovation was condemned by the young Protestant Church, which sought to prevent both changes to worship and disrupting opinions in matters of religion. The concept of innovation has since re-gained a positive connotation in social matters in many areas of the world, particularly with regard to technology and economic growth.[414] Godin describes this as a linguistic movement in the term's meaning.[415] His description has resonance with the discussion in previous chapters of the linguistic meaning of the term bidah, and so I would suggest that the concept of bidah may continue to evolve in a way similar to the change in fortune of the term innovation. The treatment of innovation by Christianity as described by Godin seems somewhat lacking in nuance when compared to the levels of permissibility in new social developments allowed for in Islam, even with the prohibition of innovation in worship. This suggests that Islam already has a greater sense of the ethics that lie behind such developments – not all innovations may be worthy, but all deserve evaluation.

Evolutions in religion such as reformation or revival, which might include changed interpretations and selectivity, may offer solutions to new circumstances. To be legitimate and in the spirit of the faith, the goal of these interpretations must be *in-novo*, to perfect the purity of practice and intention. This assessment forms the basis of my **third counterpoint to radical ideas: questioning the extent of in-novo within changed or new interpretations.** Just as this study has reviewed a few concepts important to radical ideologies for innovations in worship or in social affairs, the idea of in-novo offers a similar benchmark. If changes or ideas benefit mostly worldly or human goals they may be open to questions of legitimacy, however old those ideas are, or however venerated their deviser. Judging these ideas by the scope of their Quranic sourcing, and qualifying the intention through a sense of in-novo, may offer one way for laypeople to assess different interpretations. The idea of repurification as

[414] Benoit Godin, 'Innovation: From the Forbidden to a Cliché' in *Journal of Business Anthropology* vol 4 no 2 (Fall 2015), p221
[415] Godin, 'Innovation: From the Forbidden to a Cliché', p220

in-novo would also appear to be in keeping with attitudes derived from prioritising the revealed Qur'an over the later human-derived ahadith.

The previous Christian usage of in-novo should not detract from its purpose and application to Islam – it is authentically of God's successive messages to humanity. By applying the assessment of in-novo to the use of the changed concept of hijrah, it becomes clear that the new reading is in conflict with perfect submission, Muhammad's injunction, and conforming to the wishes of one's parents.

6.3 Discussion and study of bidah

The typology mapping showed that radical ideologies are described as non-traditional, and as either progressively innovative, regressively innovative owing to the constricted resources used, or as not innovative at all. Radicalism's description in the academic typologies is mirrored by the results of the survey, where some respondents saw these ideologies as not being innovation, but a clear majority saw radicalism as described by either innovation or bidah. However, there was also an apparent lack of consensus regarding bidah.

Wahhabism's emphasis on the avoidance of bidah may be part of the reason for the word's recognition, but the term's usage, and definitions online, are confusing and inconsistent. This forms the basis of **my fourth counter-weight to radical ideas**: **discussion and study of bidah** seems vital academically and within local communities. Bidah is potentially a key fulcrum. If the concept of bidah was more widely understood, radical ideologies might have less leverage.

In the light of ever-changing circumstances and cultures, the concept of bidah actually enables social innovations to be recognised and considered for their appropriateness, and I would argue that the levels of permissibility offer an immediate guide for everyone if used as a qualifying adjective when discussing bidah. In this study, I have offered a potential definition for haram bidah. As social affairs now vary widely across the world, it follows that classifications of the permissibility of bidah may vary in time,

according to region, or perhaps by school of law. If an Imam is not native to the culture of his wider community, consideration might be given to conference and consultation among both Muslims and non-Muslims. If radicalism develops in response to perceived moral decay, a greater understanding of cultural influences on all sides may be of benefit and serve additionally as islah or dawah.

However, outreach also requires prior education: selective interpretations made by laypeople may be dangerous. This is potentially another key to the survival of extremist ideologies: because 'precedents' are found for legitimising actions that would otherwise not be condoned. The majority of survey respondents favoured interpretation of revelation. Greater interpretation gives a wider scope in which to find permissibility. This may explain the weak correlation seen among survey respondents between preference for interpretation and descriptions of radical ideologies as not innovation – where interpretation is preferred, acceptance of different ideas is greater.

We have seen that views on innovation in Islam may form independently of observance and engagement in the faith. One quarter of the survey respondents disagreed to some extent that innovation in worship is forbidden, and this apparent acceptance of innovation in worship might help perpetuate radical ideologies. In further study, it would be interesting to understand the basis of this acceptance, and compare it to changes in belief. In spite of the Pillars' enumeration in the Qur'an, the concepts of takfir, obligation and jihad have been written about in such a way as to try to effect changes in religious matters: negating the Shahadah, allowing jihad for sectarian ends, adding to the Pillars of Sunni practice and altering the nature of obligation shaping our relationship with God. If radical ideologies depend on these innovations, then they are surely invalid.

The presumption of unqualified laypeople to offer religious pronouncements depends on modern senses of identity and individualism, and on modern technology to disseminate those opinions. Studies of bidah might be complemented by discussions of obligation, authority and permissibility.

6.4 Online dissemination

The survey – while arguably an insignificant sample of a particular constituency – suggested a possible minority view that radical ideologies are neither new nor described by newness. This view implies these participants see at least the components of radicalism as integral to Islam, a faith that in its early decades often grew through military conquest, and later became the indigenous means of responding to unjust rulers and social change. While online responses are not necessarily translatable to offline believers, the use of digital technologies to disseminate radical ideas means that this platform and its users are worth considering in their own right. The internet's connectivity cross-pollinates and disseminates ideas in a way that has never before been possible, and it offers a platform to the oppressed and marginalised. Social forces may transplant these ideas to offline communities. Counterbalances must also be present in these ways, seeking the same audiences while also strengthening moderate and modern views. Inventiveness in promoting Islam cannot be left to extremists. Miller cites the need to proactively support traditionality.[416] This forms **a fifth proposition: a specifically online programme of Qur'anic education, bidah studies, discussions of obligation, authority and permissibility, and guidance on finding in-novo in new interpretations**. Sunni leadership in this would have enormous value. Promoting Qur'an-centric interpretations online that emphasise the relevance and beauty of the entire text may be a striking contrast to the reductive and violent versions of extremist groups.

6.5 Old roots, new contexts

My overall aim was to determine whether some of the key ideas of radicalism are innovation in religious matters, or changes in social matters that oppose the spirit and intention of Islam. The roots of radicalism are centuries old. But I have shown how Islamic extremist groups effectively deny God's revelation by prioritising the parts of the texts advocating violence, and by employing selected ahadith in support of their worldly aims. While the potential for militancy or extremism (in any religion) is not

[416] Miller, 'Competitive Strategies of Religious Organisations', p442

new, the changes radical scholars are infusing into Islam's key concepts to provide a validating context for their actions and ideas are new, and I have shown how some of these might be analogous to prohibited bidah in social affairs or to innovation in worship. These deliberately-altered concepts will survive or expire depending on their usefulness to extremists and the acquiescence of the majority. The longevity of these ideologies within Islam rests with the ummah.

7 Appendices

7.1 Appendix A: Classifications included in compilation and mapping of typologies

Source	Nationality	Background
As'ad AbuKhalil, 'The incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of the 20th century' in *Middle East Journal* vol 48, no 4 (1994), pp677-694	Lebanese-American (born in Lebanon)	Professor at California State University
Jasser Auda, 'Classification of Islamic Trends', http://www.onislam.net/english/reading-islam/research-studies/islamic-thought/416368.html Accessed 30 Sept 2014		Associate Professor, Qatar Foundation
R Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995, 2nd edn)	Armenian-American (born in Syria)	Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California
Guilain Denoeux, 'The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam', in *Middle East Policy* vol 9, no 2 (2002), pp56-81	French	Professor of Governmen t, Colby College
Michael O Emerson and David Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism' in *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol 32 (2006), pp127-144	MOE: American? DH: American?	MOE: Professor at Rice University DH: academic at University of Notre Dame
Yahya Fozi, 'Typologies of Contemporary Islamic Movements' in *The Third International Conference in International Studies* (2010), Kuala Lumpur College of Law Government and International Studies Universiti Utara Malaysia, pp1-11	Malaysian?	Universiti Utara Malaysia?
Thomas Hegghammer, 'Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Theology and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism', in Roel Meijer (ed) *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp244-266	Norwegian	Director of Terrorism Research, Norwegian Defence Research Establishme

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Sherman A Jackson, 'Liberal/Progressive, Modern and Modernised Islam', in Mehran Kamrava (ed). *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2011)	American (Muslim)	Professor of Religion, American Studies & Ethnicity, University of Southern California
Angel M Rabasa, Cheryl Bernard, Peter Chalk, C Christine Fair, Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser, David Thaler, *The Muslim World after 9/11* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2004)	Various – assume majority American	RAND Corporation
Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)	Swiss (born Egypt)	Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies, Oxford University
Abdullah Saeed, 'Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification' in *Muslim World* vol 97 no 3 (2007), pp395-404	Maldivian	Professor of Arab & Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne
Raja M Ali Saleem, 'Identifying Islamist Parties Using Gunther and Diamond's Typology' in SAGE Open 2014 4 (July-September 2014), pp1–8 http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/4/3/2158244014544288 Accessed 30 Sept 2014	Pakistani?	PhD candidate, George Mason University
Itzchak Weismann, 'Modernity from Within: Islamic Fundamentalism and Sufism' in *Der Islam Bd*, vol 86, S (2011), pp142-170	Israeli?	Professor in Department of Middle Eastern History, University of Haifa
Simon A Wood, 'Rethinking Fundamentalism: Ruhollad Khomeini, Mawlana Mawdudi, and the Fundamentalist Model' in *Journal of Religion and Comparative Theology* vol 11, no 2 (2011), pp171-198	American?	Professor in Department of Religion, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

7.2 Appendix B: Questions in the online survey

Your environment and observance
Please think about the laws or regulations of the country you live in, which may be different from the way you live your life or the standards and customs expected at home.
Which of the following is the best description of the laws governing the population in the country you live in? • Mostly secular • Mostly religious • A combination of secular and religious
Please think about the way you live your life; your personal life and beliefs
Does your home life reflect habits, customs and occasions that are best described as ... • Almost or completely secular • Secular, with some religious festivals and observances • Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends • Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes • Almost or completely religious
About you … Please think about your own practice and lifestyle
How often do you practice Islam? For example through prayer, charitable activities, fasting at Ramadan • Less than once a year • At least yearly • At least weekly • At least daily • At least five times a day
Please indicate if you ... • Have memorised the entire Qur'an • Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca • Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity • Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods • None of these

Innovation
Islam has been able to adapt to changes in time, location and circumstance.
Revelation is an eternal message that can be interpreted for any situation • Strongly disagree • Slightly disagree • Neither agree nor disagree

- Slightly agree
- Strongly agree

A literal reading of received revelation is preferable

- Strongly disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Slightly agree
- Strongly agree

Who has the authority to make interpretations of the texts (Qur'an and ahadith) and use analogy? [select all that apply]

- Imams
- Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications
- Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise
- Those who have memorised the Qur'an
- Any Muslim
- Other
- If you selected Other, please specify:

Please think about the religious matters and worship - 'the Pillars' - derived from revelation and the Hadith of Gabriel, according to your tradition.
For example, for Sunnis these are the prayer, *salah*; giving alms, *zakah*; bearing witness, *shahada*; pilgrimage, *hajj*; and fasting during Ramadan, *sawm*

Innovation in worship is forbidden in Islam

- Strongly disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Slightly agree
- Strongly agree

Bidah

Bidah is something that is new or novel.
Have you seen or heard the term bidah before?

- Yes
- No

If you have seen or heard this term before, please select the answer that most closely fits your understanding. Bidah is … [select one]

- Bad or forbidden innovation
- Good or beneficial innovation
- Innovation in social / worldly affairs
- Innovation in worship or religious matters
- Any kind of innovation
- None of the above

- Other
  If you selected Other, please specify:

Bidah can be divided into five categories that follow the permissibility of all actions, *nas*.
Do you recognise any of these as possible categories or characterisations of bidah? [select all that apply]

- Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community
- Mandub, recommended
- Mubah, permitted
- Makruh, discouraged
- Haram, prohibited
- None of the above
- Other
  If you selected Other, please specify:

Do you think radical Islamic ideologies can best be described as [select one]

- Innovation in worship
- Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
- Permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs
- Some other form of innovation in Islam
- Not innovation
- None of the above

7.3 Appendix C: Promotion of the survey on Facebook

The advert was a 'call to action', which when clicked on by a viewer, took them directly to the survey site.

Placement and audience

The initial placement of the advert, which was most cost-effective, was the mobile feed – this resulted in a great number of likes and positive feedback to the advert, but little participation in the survey. While the format of the survey was designed to display equally well on mobiles as on desktop pcs, it is possible either that it was too long for casual interest, or that the requirement to read participant information proved to be a barrier, or that these likes were given by members under 18 unable to take part. As a result I changed the advert's placement to the next most cost-effective option: Facebook members accessing the site at desktop pcs, and the advert was sited in the right-hand column. A few days later I changed the advert's placement to the desktop news feed (more centrally sited on the screen), and while more expensive, this produced a greater number of completions of the survey by people viewing the advert. I retained this option for the remainder of the survey's duration.

I included within the target audience only those Facebook members who had indicated knowledge of English language.

Terms used in targeting of the advert

The terms used for targeting the advert promoting the survey link used possible interests in Facebook members' profiles. These included:

- Allah
- Dawah
- Fard
- Fiqh
- Hadith, hadith studies
- Hajj
- Haram
- Hijra (Islam)
- Imam
- Islam, Islamism
- Makkah, Mecca
- Medina
- Mosque
- Muhammad, Prophet Muhammad
- Prophets and messengers in Islam
- Quran
- Ramadan
- Salah
- Sharia
- Shia

- Sunnah
- Ulama
- Ummah
- Zakah

I also included three broader terms / topics directly relevant to the survey and study listed as member interests on Facebook:

- Religion
- Innovation
- Obligation

7.4 Appendix D1: Responses to the survey – innovation and bidah questions

Unique Response Number	Rel score	Revelation can be interpreted	Literal reading preferable	Authority to interpret	Innovation in worship forbidden	Know bidah term	Bidah as innovation	Bidah characterisation	Radical ideologies best described
181206-181199-13652591	3	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree	Some sort of Public Institution like Court of Law	Strongly disagree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	None of the above	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-12899230	4	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly disagree	Anyone. Religion should be interpreted by everyone and anyone, as the majority of religious people are close minded, I would prefer that anyone could perform an analogy.	Strongly agree	No	None of the above	None of the above	Innovation in worship
181206-181199-13555494	4	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim, Other: even non-Muslims		Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13527687	5	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-13167409	6	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mubah, permitted; Haram, prohibited	
181206-181199-13056717	6	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly disagree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam

181206-181199-13473990	6	Strongly disagree	Slightly agree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise, Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13143636	6	Strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Any Muslim, Other: Anyone	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Not innovation
181206-181199-13206772	7	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Other: Any one can interpret the texts in their own way in a personal capacity, but to publish an authoritative interpretation on an individual needs to be a scholar with appropriate qualifications or background in studies of the texts, as is the case in all academia	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	None of the above
181206-181199-13627700	7	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Other: Imam of the time has the authority but f someone has studied Islam vastly (not the clerics and imams of mosqies) can interpret for themselves.	Strongly disagree	No			Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs

181206-181199-12806541	7	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Imams	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13820568	7	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly disagree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Haram, prohibited	Innovation in worship
181206-181199-13252773	7	Strongly agree	Slightly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly disagree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-12424102	8	Neither agree nor disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	None of the above
181206-181199-13692171	8	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Slightly disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Makruh, discouraged	None of the above
181206-181199-13077894	8	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Slightly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-12811971	8	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-12774496	8	Slightly disagree	Slightly disagree	Any Muslim	Slightly agree	No	None of the above	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community	None of the above
181206-181199-13119301	8	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Any Muslim, Other: Historians, Theologians, Philosophers	Slightly disagree	No	Bad or forbidden innovation	None of the above	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs

181206-181199-13371441	8	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Not innovation
181206-181199-13329163	8	Strongly agree	Slightly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13741881	8	Strongly disagree	Slightly agree	Imams	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13169379	8	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly disagree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13821363	9	Slightly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise, Those who have memorised the Qur'an	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged	Innovation in worship
181206-181199-12745090	9	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	No	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-13178491	9	Strongly agree	Slightly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Slightly disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13560623	9	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs

181206-181199-13392635	9	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams	Strongly disagree	No			
181206-181199-13625153	10	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly disagree	No		Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-12808411	10	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13687271	10	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Other: People with both Religious and worldly knowledge.	Strongly disagree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-12845742	10	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-12948588	10	Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Neither agree nor disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Not innovation
181206-181199-13696540	10	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Not innovation
181206-181199-13063315	10	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Mubah, permitted	None of the above
181206-181199-13440500	11	Neither agree nor disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters		Innovation in worship

181206-181199-13827411	11	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly agree	Any Muslim	Neither agree nor disagree	No			
181206-181199-13088881	11	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly agree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise	Slightly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-12703293	11	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Neither agree nor disagree	Yes	Innovation in social / worldly affairs		
181206-181199-13249843	11	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Other: Imam Ash-Shatibi refuted the concept that Bidah can be split into 5 and it is erroneous because it is impossible for a bidah for example to be Fard or Mandub because for something to be Fard or Mandub then this requires a proof, which in turn does not make it a Bidah!	Innovation in worship
181206-181199-13416263	11	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13701053	11	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	None of the above	None of the above
181206-181199-13730253	11	Slightly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise, Any Muslim	Slightly disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs

181206-181199-13183503	11	Slightly disagree	Slightly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Haram, prohibited	Innovation in worship
181206-181199-12807803	11	Strongly agree	Slightly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	None of the above	None of the above
181206-181199-13824822	11	Strongly agree	Slightly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13631430	11	Strongly agree	Slightly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	
181206-181199-12739364	11	Strongly agree	Slightly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly disagree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Other: I didn't really understand the question and didn't want to ruin the results :)	None of the above
181206-181199-12850317	11	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-12766888	11	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	None of the above	Permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13087945	11	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mandub, recommended; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Not innovation
181206-181199-12931582	11	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise,	Slightly disagree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged	Some other form of innovation in Islam

				Any Muslim					
181206-181199-13486990	11	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise, Any Muslim, Other: Any human can make if he studies it throughly	Slightly agree	Yes	Other: Adding anything to religious practice by own self	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	None of the above
181206-181199-12772456	12	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly agree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Slightly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-12808323	12	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13306109	12	Slightly agree	Slightly agree	Any Muslim	Neither agree nor disagree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Mandub, recommended; Makruh, discouraged	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13137072	12	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly disagree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mandub, recommended	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-12402385	12	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-12289126	12	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Imams	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Haram, prohibited	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs

181206-181199-13587930	12	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Imams	Strongly disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mubah, permitted	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13236432	12	Strongly agree	Strongly agree		Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters		Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13096363	12	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Mandub, recommended; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13601704	13	Slightly agree	Slightly agree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13022519	13	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Not innovation
181206-181199-13027517	13	Slightly agree	Strongly agree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	None of the above
181206-181199-13542285	13	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation		Innovation in worship
181206-181199-13380419	13	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Slightly disagree	Yes	None of the above	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-13424392	13	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	Mubah, permitted,Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam

181206-181199-13212050	13	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise	Strongly disagree	Yes	Innovation in social / worldly affairs	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-12808475	13	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Imams	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Not innovation
181206-181199-12670230	13	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise		Yes	Bad or forbidden innovation	None of the above	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-12780256	13	Strongly disagree		Other: Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications of Islam	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-12737752	14	Slightly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-12811850	14	Slightly agree	Strongly disagree	Any Muslim	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged	Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13247411	14	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly disagree	Yes	Good or beneficial innovation	Fard kifaya, obligatory on the community; Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged	Permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs

181206-181199-13820883	14	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Innovation in worship
181206-181199-13367506	15	Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Neither agree nor disagree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	Mandub, recommended; Mubah, permitted; Makruh, discouraged; Haram, prohibited	Permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs
181206-181199-13741970	16	Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Imams, Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications, Clerics and scholars with any level of expertise	Strongly agree	Yes	Innovation in worship or religious matters	None of the above	Some other form of innovation in Islam
181206-181199-13330418	17	Strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Clerics and scholars with appropriate qualifications	Strongly agree	Yes	Any kind of innovation	Haram, prohibited	Not innovation

7.5 Appendix D2: Responses to the survey – calculation of religiosity score

Unique Response Number	Legislation	L Score	Home life	H Score	How often practice	P Score	Indicate if you have	I Score	Religiosity score
181206-181199-13652591	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely secular	1	Less than once a year	0	None of these	0	3
181206-181199-12899230	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely secular	1	Less than once a year	0	None of these	0	4
181206-181199-13555494	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	Less than once a year	0	None of these	0	4
181206-181199-13527687	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	Less than once a year	0	None of these	0	5
181206-181199-13167409	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely secular	1	Less than once a year	0	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca	2	6
181206-181199-13056717	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least yearly	2	None of these	0	6
181206-181199-13473990	Mostly religious	3	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	Less than once a year	0	None of these	0	6
181206-181199-13143636	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	Less than once a year	0	None of these	0	6

181206-181199-13206772	Mostly religious	3	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least weekly	2	None of these	0	7
181206-181199-13627700	Mostly religious	3	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least weekly	2	None of these	0	7
181206-181199-12806541	Mostly religious	3	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least weekly	2	None of these	0	7
181206-181199-13820568	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Almost or completely secular	1	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	7
181206-181199-13252773	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least weekly	2	None of these	0	7
181206-181199-12424102	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	8
181206-181199-13692171	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least weekly	2	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca	2	8
181206-181199-13077894	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least weekly	2	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	8

181206-181199-12811971	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	Less than once a year	0	Have memorised the entire Qur'an; Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	3	8
181206-181199-12774496	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least daily	3	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	8
181206-181199-13119301	Mostly religious	3	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least daily	3	None of these	0	8
181206-181199-13371441	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least yearly	2	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	3	8
181206-181199-13329163	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least daily	3	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	8
181206-181199-13741881	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	8
181206-181199-13169379	Mostly religious	3	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least daily	3	None of these	0	8

181206-181199-13821363	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	9
181206-181199-12745090	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3			9
181206-181199-13178491	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least daily	3	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	9
181206-181199-13560623	Mostly religious	3	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	9
181206-181199-13392635	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least yearly	2	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	9
181206-181199-13625153	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least yearly	2	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	10
181206-181199-12808411	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least yearly	2	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity;	2	10

							Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods		
181206-181199-13687271	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	10
181206-181199-12845742	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least weekly	2	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	10
181206-181199-12948588	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	10
181206-181199-13696540	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	None of these	0	10
181206-181199-13063315	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	10
181206-181199-13440500	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	None of these	0	11
181206-181199-13827411	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	None of these	0	11
181206-181199-13088881	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or	4	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a	2	11

			attitudes				Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods		
181206-181199-12703293	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	11
181206-181199-13249843	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	11
181206-181199-13416263	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	None of these	0	11
181206-181199-13701053	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	11
181206-181199-13730253	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	11

181206-181199-13183503	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	11
181206-181199-12807803	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	11
181206-181199-13824822	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	11
181206-181199-13631430	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular with some religious festivals and observances	2	At least five times a day	4	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	3	11
181206-181199-12739364	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial	2	11

							products or halal food and goods		
181206-181199-12850317	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	11
181206-181199-12766888	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	None of these	0	11
181206-181199-13087945	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	11
181206-181199-12931582	Mostly religious	3	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	11
181206-181199-13486990	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	11
181206-181199-12772456	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or	4	At least daily	3	Have memorised the entire Qur'an; Only ever	3	12

			attitudes				use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods		
181206-181199-12808323	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	12
181206-181199-13306109	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least daily	3	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	12
181206-181199-13137072	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca	2	12
181206-181199-12402385	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca	2	12
181206-181199-12289126	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or	2	12

							halal food and goods		
181206-181199-13587930	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	12
181206-181199-13236432	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4			12
181206-181199-13096363	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity;Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	12
181206-181199-13601704	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least weekly	2	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca;Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity;Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	4	13
181206-181199-13022519	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever	2	13

							use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods		
181206-181199-13027517	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca,Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	3	13
181206-181199-13542285	Mostly religious	3	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	13
181206-181199-13380419	A combination of secular and religious	2	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least five times a day	4	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca; Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	4	13
181206-181199-13424392	A combination of secular and religious	2	Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	4	At least daily	3	Have memorised the entire Qur'an; Have volunteered at a mosque, or	4	13

							for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods		
181206-181199-13212050	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	1	13
181206-181199-12808475	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	13
181206-181199-12670230	Mostly religious	3	Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	3	At least five times a day	4	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca; Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity	3	13
181206-181199-12780256	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	1	13
181206-181199-12737752	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	14

181206-181199-12811850	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	2	14
181206-181199-13247411	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have memorised the entire Qur'an,Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	3	14
181206-181199-13820883	Mostly secular (non-religious)	1	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca; Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	4	14
181206-181199-13367506	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have memorised the entire Qur'an; Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant	4	15

							financial products or halal food and goods		
181206-181199-13741970	Mostly religious	3	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca; Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	4	16
181206-181199-13330418	A combination of secular and religious	2	Almost or completely religious	5	At least five times a day	4	Have memorised the entire Qur'an; Have made hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca; Have volunteered at a mosque, or for a Muslim charity; Only ever use Sharia-compliant financial products or halal food and goods	6	17

7.6 Appendix E: Survey trends and associations – correlation tests

The aims of the survey included assessing whether religiosity is associated with views on innovation in religion and bidah. To this end, I have used tests to determine correlations and their strength, and looked briefly at regression analysis to determine whether the variables might be used in predicting outcomes. The tests were conducted in Excel, SPSS and Datacracker.

Only two variables showed any kind of relationship with the religiosity score as developed: awareness of the term bidah, and a preference for a literal reading of revelation.

7.6.1 Correlation tests on religiosity score and respondents recognising the term bidah

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Religiosity score	79	3	17	10.25	2.803
Know bid'ah term	79	1	2	1.90	.304
Valid N (listwise)	79				

The tests for correlation show there is a weak positive linear relationship [judged to be weak as the calculated value of correlation is less than 0.3]

	Religiosity score	*Know bid'ah term*
Religiosity score	1	
Know bid'ah term	0.241400506	1

Correlations

		Religiosity score	Know bid'ah term
Religiosity score	Pearson Correlation	1	.241*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.032
	N	79	79
Know bid'ah term	Pearson Correlation	.241*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.032	
	N	79	79

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Scores		Religiosity	Description
Religiosity	Pearson Correlation	1	.241*
	Sig (2-tailed)		.032
	N	79	79
Know bidah term	Pearson Correlation	.241*	1
	Sig (2-tailed)	.032	
	N	79	79

* = correlation significant at 95% confidence

Therefore the likelihood is that recognition of the term bidah and the religiosity score both increase together, but the linear relationship between them is not strong.

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.241400506
R Square	0.058274204
Adjusted R Square	0.046043999
Standard Error	2.737944792
Observations	79

ANOVA

	df	*SS*	*MS*	*F*	*Significance F*
Regression	1	35.718399	35.718399	4.76477734	0.032095379
Residual	77	577.2183099	7.496341686		
Total	78	612.9367089			

	Coefficients	*Standard Error*	*t Stat*	*P-value*	*Lower 95%*	*Upper 95%*	*Lower 95.0%*	*Upper 95.0%*
Intercept	6.021126761	1.963097838	3.067155719	0.002981467	2.112099563	9.930153959	2.112099563	9.930153959
Know bidah term	2.228873239	1.021090098	2.182836993	0.032095379	0.195623094	4.262123385	0.195623094	4.262123385

The adjusted R square value is at a low level, indicating that only 4% of the variation can be accounted for by the variable studied. This shows the data do not closely fit the regression line, and we might infer that this regression is potentially invalid: religiosity score and recognition of the term bidah cannot be used to predict each other. However, the p-value shows there is a statistically significant chance of the association between the data being true. This significant but low-level relationship implies that while religiosity score and bidah are probably associated, the strength of their

relationship is probably not an important one – there may be other factors that are more important in determining why respondents recognise the term bidah.

7.6.2 Correlation tests on religiosity score and preference for literal readings of revelation

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Religiosity score	79	3	17	10.25	2.803
Lit score	79	0	5	2.54	1.517
Valid N (listwise)	79				

	Religiosity score	*Lit score*
Religiosity score	1	
Literal reading preferable score	0.277632576	1

Correlations

		Religiosity score	Lit score
Religiosity score	Pearson Correlation	1	.278*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.013
	N	79	79
Lit score	Pearson Correlation	.278*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.013	
	N	79	79

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Scores		Religiosity	Description
Religiosity	Pearson Correlation	1	.278*
	Sig (2-tailed)		.013
	N	79	79
Literal interpretation preferred	Pearson Correlation	.278*	1
	Sig (2-tailed)	.013	
	N	79	79

* = correlation significant at 95% confidence

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.277632576
R Square	0.077079847
Adjusted R Square	0.065093871
Standard Error	2.710469459
Observations	79

ANOVA

	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	47.24506804	47.24506804	6.430836124	0.01324072
Residual	77	565.6916408	7.346644686		
Total	78	612.9367089			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	8.948195658	0.598167691	14.95934299	1.72515E-24	7.757091614	10.1392997	7.757091614	10.1392997
Literal reading preferable	0.512898224	0.202254165	2.535909329	0.01324072	0.110158729	0.915637719	0.110158729	0.915637719

Again the adjusted R square value is low, indicating that the variables studied accounts for a low amount of the variation seen. Other factors may be more important in contributing to the relative strengths of the relationship between religiosity score and whether a literal reading is preferable. The relationship is still statistically significant, inferring a good likelihood of the relationship being true, even if neither religiosity score nor preference for a literal reading are the most important factors in understanding the association.

7.6.3 Scoring table and correlation test on religiosity score and whether innovation in worship is forbidden

One of the survey's aims is to see whether there is an association between religiosity and perceptions of religious innovation and bidah:

Innovation in worship is forbidden: answer	Description score	Number of answers
Strongly agree	5	44
Slightly agree	4	5
Neither agree nor disagree	3	5
Slightly disagree	2	6
Strongly disagree	1	17
[answer blank]	0	2
Mean	4.23	Total (N): 79
Standard deviation	6.049	

Here the standard deviation is greater than the mean, reflecting a wide dispersion of values away from the average. Relating that to the data for this answer: the scores I assigned to each option were assigned to be in keeping with the scoring used for these

answers in other questions. However the scores closest to the mean derived from this arbitrary scoring were the options chosen least often by respondents: the number of respondents picking the statement that I have assigned a value of 5 and the number of respondents picking the statement for which I assigned a value of 1 far outweigh the number of respondents picking the statements to which I assigned values that are closest to the mean. The arbitrary nature of the scoring is the reason for this large standard deviation, and may therefore also account for the lack of any correlation.

Correlations

		Religiosity score	InnWorship score
Religiosity score	Pearson Correlation	1	.093
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.417
	N	79	79
InnWorship score	Pearson Correlation	.093	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.417	
	N	79	79

Scores		Religiosity	Description
Religiosity	Pearson Correlation	1	.093
	Sig (2-tailed)		.417
	N	79	79
Description	Pearson Correlation	.093	1
	Sig (2-tailed)	.417	
	N	79	79

There was no significant correlation.

7.6.4 Scoring table and correlation test on religiosity score and characterisation of bidah

Bidah as innovation: answer	Bidah is score	Number of answers
Good or beneficial innovation	7	1
Bad or forbidden innovation	6	20
Innovation in social / worldly affairs	5	2
Innovation in worship or religious matters	4	36
Any kind of innovation	3	12
None of the above	2	3
Other	1	1
[answer blank]	0	4
Mean	4.11	Total (N): 79
Standard deviation	1.55	

Here the responses – unique and not shared by any other question – were each assigned a numerical scale that attributed a value close to the mean for the most popular answer.

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Religiosity score	79	3	17	10.25	2.803
Bidah is	79	.0	7.0	4.101	1.5492
Valid N (listwise)	79				

Correlations

		Religiosity score	Bidah is
Religiosity score	Pearson Correlation	1	.041
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.718
	N	79	79
Bidah is	Pearson Correlation	.041	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.718	
	N	79	79

There is no significant correlation.

Scores		Religiosity	Description
Religiosity	Pearson Correlation	1	.041
	Sig (2-tailed)		.718
	N	79	79
Bidah as innovation	Pearson Correlation	.041	1
	Sig (2-tailed)	.718	
	N	79	79

There is no significant correlation.

7.6.5 Scoring table and correlation test for religiosity score and descriptions given to radical ideologies

One of the aims of this survey is to gauge whether religiosity is associated with views on innovation in religion and bidah – and therefore on how radical ideologies are seen.

Answer option	Description score	Number of answers
Innovation in worship	6	8
Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs	5	20
Permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs	4	4
Some other form of innovation in Islam	3	17
Not innovation	2	15
None of the above	1	10
[answer blank]	0	5
Mean	3.25	Total (N): 79
Standard deviation	1.797	

Scores		Religiosity	Description
Religiosity	Pearson Correlation	1	.044
	Sig (2-tailed)		.698
	N	79	79
Description	Pearson Correlation	.044	1
	Sig (2-tailed)	.698	
	N	79	79

There was no significant correlation.

7.6.6 Correlation tests on home life, legislation, practice and additional observances with descriptions given to radical ideologies

As the calculated religiosity score shows no strong correlations with descriptions characterising radical ideologies, I also tested the individual components of religiosity score, to see whether any of these by themselves has an association with the descriptions chosen for radical ideologies.

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
L Score	79	1	3	2.22	.654
H Score	79	1	5	3.57	1.195
P Score	79	0	4	2.97	1.240
I Score	77	0	6	1.53	1.283
Religiosity score	79	3	17	10.25	2.803
InnWorship score	79	0	55	4.23	6.049
Valid N (listwise)	77				

Correlations

		L Score	H Score	P Score	I Score	Religiosity score	Described score
L Score	Pearson Correlation	1	-.077	-.136	-.118	.082	.132
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.501	.234	.308	.473	.245
	N	79	79	79	77	79	79
H Score	Pearson Correlation	-.077	1	.538**	.305**	.772**	-.002
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.501		.000	.007	.000	.989
	N	79	79	79	77	79	79
P Score	Pearson Correlation	-.136	.538**	1	.308**	.773**	.083
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.234	.000		.006	.000	.466
	N	79	79	79	77	79	79
I Score	Pearson Correlation	-.118	.305**	.308**	1	.692**	-.063
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.308	.007	.006		.000	.587
	N	77	77	77	77	77	77
Religiosity score	Pearson Correlation	.082	.772**	.773**	.692**	1	.044
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.473	.000	.000	.000		.698
	N	79	79	79	77	79	79
Described score	Pearson Correlation	.132	-.002	.083	-.063	.044	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.245	.989	.466	.587	.698	
	N	79	79	79	77	79	79

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Scores		Home life	Legislation	Practice	Additional	Description
Home life	Pearson Correlation	1	-.077	.538**	.305**	-.002
	Sig (2-tailed)		.501	.000	.007	.989
	N	79	79	79	77	79
Legislation	Pearson Correlation	-.077	1	-.136	-.118	.132
	Sig (2-tailed)	.501		.234	.308	.245
	N	79	79	79	77	79
Practice	Pearson Correlation	.538**	-.136	1	.308**	.083
	Sig (2-tailed)	.000	.234		.006	.466
	N	79	79	79	77	79
Additional	Pearson Correlation	.305**	-.118	.308**	1	-.063
	Sig (2-tailed)	.007	.308	.006		.587
	N	79	79	79	77	79
Description	Pearson Correlation	-.002	.132	.083	-.063	1
	Sig (2-tailed)	.989	.245	.466	.587	
	N	79	79	79	77	79

** = correlation significant at 99% confidence

There is no correlation between the component parts used to calculate religiosity and the descriptions chosen to characterise radical ideologies. A statistically significant relationship is seen between scores for practice and home life, indicating that a moderately positive relationship exists between the scores assigned to reported practice and the respondents' home environment. This is sensible as much religious practice will take place in the home or be influenced by it. Likewise, a weaker but still positive statistically significant relationship is seen between practice and additional observance, and this is logical: those who practice to a greater extent might be more likely to undertake additional observance or devotion, or vice-versa. However it is interesting that this positive relationship is relatively weak.

7.6.7 Scoring table for feelings about interpretation, literalism and practice and correlation tests with descriptions given to radical ideologies

Revelation can be interpreted: answer option	Interpretation score	Number of answers
Strongly agree	5	35
Slightly agree	4	18
Neither agree nor disagree	3	9
Slightly disagree	2	9
Strongly disagree	1	8
[answer blank]	0	0
Mean	3.80	Total (N): 79
Standard deviation	1.381	

Literal reading preferable: answer option	Literalism score	Number of answers
Strongly agree	5	14
Slightly agree	4	8
Neither agree nor disagree	3	14
Slightly disagree	2	15
Strongly disagree	1	27
[answer blank]	0	1
Mean	2.54	Total (N): 79
Standard deviation	1.517	

How often practice: answer option	Practice score	Number of answers
At least five times a day	5	35
At least daily	4	23
At least weekly	3	8
At least yearly	2	5
Less than once a year	1	8
[answer blank]	0	0
Mean	3.91	Total (N): 79
Standard deviation	1.313	

Radical ideologies are best described: answer	Description score	Number of answers
Innovation in worship	6	8
Prohibited bidah or innovation in social affairs	5	20
Permitted bidah or innovation in social affairs	4	4
Some other form of innovation in Islam	3	17
Not innovation	2	15
None of the above	1	10
[answer blank]	0	5
Mean	3.228	Total (N): 79
Standard deviation	1.797	

Scores		Interpretation	Literalism	Practice	Description
Interpretation	Pearson Correlation	1	.047	.160	-.250*
	Sig (2-tailed)		.680	.160	.026
	N	79	79	79	79
Literalism	Pearson Correlation	.047	1	.160	.010
	Sig (2-tailed)	.680		.160	.928
	N	79	79	79	79
Practice	Pearson Correlation	.160	.160	1	.096
	Sig (2-tailed)	.160	.160		.402
	N	79	79	79	
Description	Pearson Correlation	-.250*	.010	.096	1
	Sig (2-tailed)	.026	.928	.402	
	N	79	79	79	79

* = correlation significant at 95% confidence

Here a statistically significant relationship is seen between the descriptions chosen for radical ideologies and agreement with whether revelation can be interpreted. The relationship is weak, and negatively associated, ie it is probable that people who see radical ideologies as innovation in worship or prohibited bidah are likely to disagree that revelation can be interpreted.

It is worth noting that there appears to be no significant correlation between interpretation and literalism. A correlation might be expected, as the level of

interpretation should fall as the level of literalism rises, and vice-versa. This lack may indicate a deficiency in the contributing measurements or in their scoring.

Column %	Innovation in worship	None of the above	Not innovation	Permitted bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Prohibited bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Some other form of innovation in Islam	NET
Neither agree nor disagree	25%	20%	7%	0%	5%	6%	9%
Slightly agree	13%	30%	20%	0%	25%	29%	23%
Slightly disagree	38% ▲	10%	0%	0%	25% ▲	0%	12%
Strongly agree	13%	40%	60%	75%	35%	53%	45%
Strongly disagree	13%	0%	13%	25%	10%	12%	11%
NET	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Revelation can be interpreted by Radical ideologies best described
sample size = 74; total sample size = 79; 5 missing; 95% confidence level

This Datacracker table shows how 25% of respondents who see radical ideologies as prohibited bidah slightly disagree that revelation can be interpreted, and 38% of the respondents who see radical ideologies as innovation in worship slightly disagree that revelation can be interpreted. There is a statistically significant correlation between the reverse relationship too:

Column %	Innovation in worship	None of the above	Not innovation	Permitted bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Prohibited bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Some other form of innovation in Islam	NET
Neither agree nor disagree	50% ▲	10%	27%	0%	5%	24%	19%
Slightly agree	0%	0%	7%	0%	20%	12%	10%
Slightly disagree	13%	50% ▲	20%	0%	10%	18%	19%
Strongly agree	0%	10%	33%	67% ▲	20%	12%	19%
Strongly disagree	38%	30%	13%	33%	45%	35%	33%
NET	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Literal reading preferable by Radical ideologies best described
sample size = 73; total sample size = 79; 6 missing; 95% confidence level

67% of respondents who see radical ideologies as permitted bidah strongly agree that a literal reading of revelation is preferable. This cohort of respondents who see radical ideologies as permitted bidah also shared other choices and lifestyle factors; they are more likely to have a religious home life and to practice five times a day (and, consequently, had a higher religiosity score). However the size of this cohort, at four respondents, while demonstrating statistically significant relationships within the study, is insufficient to form definite conclusions.

Column %	Innovation in worship	None of the above	Not innovation	Permitted bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Prohibited bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Some other form of innovation in Islam	NET
Almost or completely religious	25%	10%	20%	100% ▲	15%	29%	24%
Almost or completely secular	25% ▲	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	4%
Mostly religious, with some secular activities or attitudes	38%	30%	33%	0%	45%	35%	35%
Secular professionally or outside the home, more religious at home or among friends	0%	40%	40% ▲	0%	10%	12%	19%
Secular with some religious festivals and observances	13%	20%	7%	0%	30%	18%	18%
NET	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Home life by Radical ideologies best described
sample size = 74; total sample size = 79; 5 missing; 95% confidence level

Column %	Innovation in worship	None of the above	Not innovation	Permitted bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Prohibited bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Some other form of innovation in Islam	NET
At least daily	13%	50%	20%	0%	35%	41%	31%
At least five times a day	75%	30%	40%	100% ▲	35%	35%	43%
At least weekly	0%	20%	13%	0%	15%	6%	11%
At least yearly	0%	0%	7%	0%	5%	12%	5%
Less than once a year	13%	0%	20%	0%	10%	6%	9%
NET	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

How often practice by Radical ideologies best described
sample size = 74; total sample size = 79; 5 missing; 95% confidence level

Average	Innovation in worship	None of the above	Not innovation	Permitted bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Prohibited bid'ah or innovation in social affairs	Some other form of innovation in Islam	NET
Religiosity score	10.0	9.8	9.9	13.3 ▲	10.0	10.8	10.3

Religiosity score by Radical ideologies best described
sample size = 74; total sample size = 79; 5 missing; 95% confidence level

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